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Since the first iteration of prostitution legislation in 1759, the language and discourses 
used to refer to ‘prostitution’ has undergone many changes. The constitutional challenge 
of Bedford v. Canada (2010 ONSC 4264) resulted in legislative amendments of 
prostitution laws (Bill C-36). Bill C-36, implemented in 2014, resulted in several 
significant changes, including the eradication of the word ‘prostitution’ from the Criminal 
Code, and the criminalization of buying, but not selling, sexual services. Given Bill C-36, 
this research inquires: How has prostitution discourse changed in Canadian common law 
from 2010 to 2018? A discourse analysis of 58 court decisions compared the language 
used before and after 2014; this revealed courts’ frameworks for understanding sex work 
have not changed significantly despite the Bedford ruling, since exploitation remains the 
major discursive underpinning.  The theoretical framework integrates anti-carceral 
feminist theory and governmentality, to render visible the marginalization, discrimination 
and stigmatization of the paternalistic punitive system on sex workers.  
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On January 22, 2020 Marylène Levesque, a 22-year-old woman working as a sex 
worker, was found dead in a hotel room in Quebec City (Bramham, 2020). The person 
who killed her was Eustachio Gallese, who was previously “convicted in 2006 of killing 
Chantale Deschenes with a hammer and knife” (Hayes, 2020, para. 2). Gallese was on 
day parole when he murdered Marylène Levesque (Bramham, 2020; Hayes, 2020). Prior 
to his day parole, Gallese was in a halfway house where his parole officers allowed him 
to have his sexual needs met (Steuter-Martin & Pindera, 2020). On the day of his parole 
hearing, Canada’s parole board expressed their concerns regarding the parole officers “ 
risk management strategy” (Steuter-Martin & Pindera, 2020, para.7). Canada’s parole 
board also stated that “Gallese wasn’t deemed ready to have relationships with a woman” 
(Bramham, 2020, para. 2). This is concerning because if Gallese was not deemed fit to 
have relationships with women, how come he was allowed “to meet with women to fulfill 
his ‘sexual needs’”? (Hayes, 2020, para.1).  
Male sexual desire appears to be a right that cannot be denied, even if it 
compromises the safety of women. On the day of the parole hearing, Gallese’s parole 
officers proposed a correctional plan that “included allowing him to solicit women for 
sexual purposes” (Harris, 2020, para. 9). Jennifer Oades, a parole board member, claimed 
that the correctional plan was “categorically rejected’ (Harris, 2020, para. 10); yet, 
Gallese was categorized as “low to moderate” likelihood to reoffend (Steuter-Martin & 
Pindera, 2020, para.7). Even though Canada’s parole board did express concern regarding 
Gallese soliciting sexual services (Harris, 2020; Steuter-Martin & Pindera, 2020), day 
parole was granted to Gallese. This suggests that there is a perceptional difference 
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between women who engage in sex work, and those who do not. The implied inequality 
entails that the bodies of sex workers are worth less than women who do not engage in 
sex work. Sex workers are seen as subhuman or disposable individuals (Craig, 2014). 
Therefore, the language used in the parole hearing was important since it implicitly 
defined female sexuality according to its function to male sexuality and the role of sex 
workers in society. Beyond sexuality, the language in the parole hearing, especially from 
the parole officers tacitly exposes negative perception of female sex workers, the sex 
industry, and of sex work itself.  
Language is also referred to as discourse. Discourse encompasses language in use 
(Schiffrin, 2003). Thus, prostitution discourse encompasses the use of language in the 
criminal justice system. Thus, the setting where language is used as well as the 
environment and producers of language should be considered. Rules surrounding 
prostitution are established in the legislative and executive branches, which are then 
implemented and discussed in the judiciary branch. Therefore, the presence of 
prostitution discourse in law is not uncommon. Law establishes inappropriate and 
appropriate behaviour, while not recognizing the influence of “subjective areas like moral 
evaluations, or political bias” in its discerning process (Smart, 2002, p. 22). Prostitution 
discourses used in law further shape and perpetuate ideas surrounding sex work; thus, 
discourse has unacknowledged complex functions.  
Discourse is susceptible to change, which is similar to social conventions. Social 
conventions change over time (Marmor, 2009). Therefore, they require a relevant 
population to sustain the existence of a specific convention (Marmor, 2009). This entails 
that a group of people or part of the population sustain the social convention, as long as 
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the uninscribed rules are practiced by the stated group. Certain conventions either 
disappear or have ‘amendments’ made to their rules throughout time, according to the use 
of individuals (Marmor, 2009). Similarly, discourse is subjected to social influence 
throughout time (Foucault, 1978a). Words used with a specific discourse shape and 
change language. Analogously to social conventions, discourse changes as long as the 
population changes the words and meanings used for a specific discourse.  
 Considering that prostitution has been around for a long time, time subjects the 
topic to change (Backhouse, 1985). Law establishes the regulations of prostitution; thus, 
the language and context of prostitution legislation are relevant to the study of 
prostitution discourse (Smart, 2002). Legislation is continuously amended; Canadian 
prostitution legislation changed in 2014, after a long-lasting constitutional challenge that 
started in 2010. The major changes included the implementation of a legal model that 
criminalized the buyer of sexual services, while not criminalizing the seller. Considering 
this change of legislation, this research asked: How has prostitution discourse changed in 
Canadian common law? This research considers how Canadian government engages with 
prostitution discourse, from legislation that change throughout time, to the rulings of 
judges and justices in Canadian courts. The array of prostitution discourses shapes the 
interpretation of prostitution.  
Comparing Canadian judicial decisions before and after the legislative change in 
2014, this research seeks to explore which words and language were and are used to refer 
to prostitution and the context they were and are used in. Analysis of discourses on 
prostitution prior and after the legislative change of 2014 identifies words and phrases 
and their meaning used in prostitution discourse in common law. The study explores if 
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the implementation of statutes reinforce or hinder negative language towards prostitution. 
Using discourse that addresses negative interpretations of prostitution shows a lack of 
tolerance and understanding of a matter that involves individuals who consensually 
participate in such activities. Furthermore, addressing sex work and sex workers in a 
negative manner leads to marginalization, victimization and discrimination, which 
promotes a detriment to their general well-being (Benoit, Jansson, Smith, & Flagg, 2017; 
Benoit, McCarthy, & Jansson, 2015; Benoit, Ouellet, & Jansson, 2016.). The dismissal of 
sex workers voices in the new laws is presented in literature as problematic to the extent 
that this absence affects their agency in matters that involve them (Abel, 2014; Anderson, 
2002; Benoit et al., 2017; Benoit et al., 2015; Benoit et al., 2016; Campbell, 2015; Craig, 
2011; Kantola & Squires, 2004; Krüsi et al., 2014; Miller & Schwartz, 1995; Law, 2015). 
Considering Smart’s (2002) ideas on the separation of law from social order, the 
broader question this research seeks to address is whether discourse has a transferable 
power that permeates to settings beyond common law. The study seeks to identify 
discourses surrounding sex work and discourses that contribute to the construction and 
practice of prostitution in common law. As a by-product of such identification the study 
aims to analyze the treatment of sex workers in the criminal justice system. The study 
provides a contemporary insight on tentative legislation reform. Last but not least the 
study seeks to give agency to the voices sex workers who were dismissed during previous 
legal reform. 
A Note on Terminology  
Throughout the study the terms prostitution/prostitute and sex work/sex worker 
are used interchangeably. The terms sex work and sex worker are umbrella terms that 
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encompass different types of jobs within the sex industry. Nonetheless, in this study, the 
terms sex worker and sex work represent the consensual transaction of sexual services for 
monetary compensation, where both parties are present physically. The use of the terms 
prostitution and prostitute in this research is due to the presence of the terms in the 
caselaw to be analyzed. The terms prostitution and prostitute are used in the current study 
interchangeably with sex work and sex worker. 
Canadian legislation in the 1700s and partially in the1800s referred to sex workers 
as vagrants, and terminology that indicated they were ‘undesirable’ individuals. In 
legislation the term vagrants changed to prestation/prostitute during the 1800s, and this 
terminology was present in statutes until 2014 (Protection of Communities and 
Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25). The term prostitute has been stigmatized since the 
late 1700s, due to the perception that women who engaged in such activities were not 
pure (Backhouse, 1985; Hallgrímsdóttir, Phillips, Benoit, & Walby, 2008; Weisberg & 
Steinberg, 1996). The stigmatization is also promoted by ideas that depict prostitution as 
inherently violent and as an oppressive tool towards women (Weisberg & Steinberg, 
1996). In addition, the moralization of prostitution contributes to stigmatization and 
discrimination since the act of prostitution is culturally perceived as an undignified act 
(Law, 2015; Shaver, 1994).  
The terms sex work and sex worker humanize and legitimize jobs of the sex 
industry. In the 1970s there was an increase of the usage of these terms, which 
legitimized the transaction of sexual services for monetary compensation (Nussbaum, 
1998). Legitimizing sex work entails accepting sex work as viable employment. To better 
understand this concept, Nussbaum (1998) explains how different types of jobs demand 
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the use of different body parts. In this sense, the body of the sex worker is the tool of 
work (Nussbaum, 1998). Therefore, sex workers use parts of their bodies to perform their 
job tasks (sexual services) (Nussbaum, 1998). In other words, sex work should be 
addressed and treated as any type of employment. Furthermore, the use of the term sex 
work steps away from the view of prostitution as inherently oppressive and advocates for 
voluntary involvement in the sex industry. There are accounts of sex workers who 
voluntarily exchanged sexual services for money since the Victorian era (Walkowitz, 
1982). Shaver (2005, 1994) advocates for the term sex work and has demonstrated the 
possibility and the methodology to carry out research that overcomes and challenges 
unethical and exploitative studies. Shaver’s (1994) work offers insights into the reason 
why sex work has not been properly examined, which entails overt and covert 
moralization to regulate prostitution throughout time. Given the approach of pro-
prostitution scholarship, sex work and sex worker are used when speaking about pro-
prostitution scholarship. Nevertheless, there are instances when the terms prostitution and 
prostitute are used when speaking about scholarships that are not pro-prostitution or 
because the scholarship itself uses the stated terms. When analyzing the caselaw, the 
terms prostitution and prostitute are used. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter One is the introduction of this study, which touches on the treatment of 
sex workers as not equal to their women counterparts in Canada. The Chapter introduces 
discourse and its characteristic to change over time. The Chapter provides the research 
question, its relevancy and a note on the terminology that is used throughout the study. 
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 In Chapter Two, I start by providing scholarship that examines prostitution 
discourse within legal documents. I follow by highlighting major changes in Canadian 
prostitution legislation, to provide the legislature’s context for prostitution discourse. In 
the literature review, I explore a range of feminist theories to show the diversity of 
existing prostitution discourses, which incorporate perspectives on consent and 
exploitation in relation to sex work. I finish the chapter by exploring the range of 
available legal models to further uncover language that frame prostitution discourse as 
well as the impact of each on sex workers.  
In Chapter Three, I discuss my theoretical approach. The epistemological 
assumptions that guide my research consist of Foucauldian derived concepts such as 
governmentality and anti-carceral feminism. I discuss sexuality in relation to power and 
discourse, and the control of sexuality through discourse. I also discuss the concept of 
governmentality, governance feminism, carceral feminism, concluding on the 
appropriateness of anti-carceral feminism as the main overarching theoretical framework.  
In Chapter Four, I discuss the methodological approach of my study. I explain 
that the data, which are court decisions, are subjected to a discourse analysis. The 
methodological approach consists of a combination of Fairclough’s (2013) three stage 
model, Wood and Kroger’s (2000) advice on conducting a discourse analysis and the use 
of Foucault’s (1972,1978a) ideas on discourse formation and the power of words. I also 
include the steps taken for the data collection, data analysis, refinement of data to be 
included in the data analysis, and data organization. 
In Chapter Five, I discuss the socio-political context within which the changes in 
legislation (Bill C-36) occurred in 2014. I explore issues surrounding sex work that led 
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up to the Canada v Bedford (2010 ONSC 4264) application and the demands of the 
Bedford decision applicants. I provide historical background for the three provisions that 
were challenged by the Bedford applicants. I include a brief exposition of discourses 
found in the Bedford decision. I outline the outcomes of implementing Bill C-36 and the 
issues sex workers faced after the stated implementation.  
In Chapter Six, I discuss the first part of the findings and analysis. I divided the 
findings and analysis into two chapters, discursive constructions and discursive practices. 
In Chapter Six I address the discursive constructions I found in the caselaw. Discursive 
constructions refer to the abstract, conceptual and ideological boundaries, and 
underpinnings of language I found in the court decisions. The chapter is divided into 
three major sets of findings: the definition of prostitution, moralization of prostitution and 
the conflation of sex trafficking with sex work.  
In Chapter Seven, I discuss the second part of the findings and analysis. The 
discursive practices found in the court decisions comprise Chapter Seven. Discursive 
practices denote the material reality within which stakeholders of the sex industry and the 
sex industry are spoken in. The chapter is divided into two major findings which are: sex 
worker protection strategies and judicial approaches to the sex trafficking model. I focus 
on the range of sex trafficking within different discursive practices in the judiciary as 
well as the legislative branch.  
In Chapter Eight, I discuss major findings and their theoretical implications. I use 
governmentality concepts as well as anti-carceral feminism to explain the paternalistic 
and negative effect of the punitive system on sex workers. I include a discussion about 
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positive discourses found in the caselaw as well as limitations and contribution to the 
scholarship. I conclude with a short reflection of the study.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter has five main aims. First, I aim to provide scholarship that uses 
different elements from the legislative branch to study prostitution discourse and the 
relevance of common law in sex work discourse. Second, I am to provide a brief history 
of the changes in Canadian prostitution legislation. This locates sex work in a legislative 
historical context. Third, I am to explore various discourses that frame prostitution, which 
uncovers common discourses associated with sex work. Fourth, I am to identify different 
feminist theories of sexuality and their range of reasons for the commodification of 
sexual services. Fifth, I am to introduce legal models for approaching sex work used in 
the legislature and courts.  
Prostitution Discourse in the Criminal Justice System 
 Academic literature uses a variety of legal documents to study prostitution 
discourse, as well as, study prostitution discourse to improve legal approaches to sex 
work. For example, Law (2015) uses Foucauldian archeology to uncover discourses that 
affect the regulation of erotic dancers. Law’s (2015) study explores the moralization of 
stripping discourse, which affected regulative practices from a liberal feminist 
perspective. This study revealed the difficulty to identify erotic dancing as a legitimate 
form of employment (Law, 2015). Other studies have analyzed legislative Bills through 
discourse analysis (Niemi, 2010). Niemi’s (2010) study uncovers discourse in legal 
reform to explore the use of commercial discourse in Norway and Sweden (Niemi, 2010). 
Niemi (2010) found that commercial language has become normalized through everyday 
speech, which also implies voluntary participation in the sex industry, thus, absence of 
oppression against workers. 
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Scholars have explored dominant discourses prior to legislation formation through 
the use of discourse analysis (Kantola & Squires, 2004). Kantola and Squires (2004) 
expose the shortcomings of the legislative branch when creating laws that instead of 
decriminalizing prostitution, aim to eradicate the visibility of street prostitution (Kantola 
& Squires, 2004). Other studies focus on important dualities sex workers are subjected to, 
such as risk and risky, when understanding the concept of community safety (Wright, 
Heynen, & Van der Meulen 2015). In Wright and colleagues’ (2015) study ambiguity in 
Canadian legislation led the community to construct normative derived responses to sex 
work, which in turn produced unsafe and insecure conditions for sex workers to live and 
work in (Wright et al., 2015).  
Clearly, the presence of prostitution discourse in the criminal justice system has 
been previously studied (Kantola & Squire, 2004; Niemi, 2010; Wright et al, 2015). The 
change in Canadian sex work law in 2014 with Bill C-36 has been studied in terms of the 
cause and outcome (Lawrence, 2015) and public perception of probable law reform 
(Lowman & Louie, 2012). Creating literature that explores prostitution discourse changes 
in common law in Canada, given the change in law in 2014 and 2019, would complement 
current scholarship. Prior to studying the presence of prostitution discourse in courts, it is 
necessary to consider the discursive models surrounding prostitution in Canadian 
statutory and common law. Courtrooms provide a setting through which an array of sex 
industry stakeholders passes. Furthermore, comprehending the construction and the 
change in prostitution discourse helps frame the social lens through which Canadian 
common law approaches cases involving prostitution.  
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History of Canadian Prostitution Legislation 
Early Canadian prostitution law targeted street prostitution to improve the 
aesthetic of the streets. Consequently, in the 1700s, prostitution legislation focused on 
keeping public places free of streetwalkers (Hallgrímsdóttir et al., 2008). Prostitutes were 
considered vagrants, that is, undesirable individuals. In 1864, the United Kingdom passed 
The Contagious Disease Act which was also enacted in Canada (Backhouse, 1985). The 
act was an attempt at decreasing venereal diseases in soldiers, who allegedly were the 
individuals purchasing sexual services (Backhouse, 1985). The act was amended in 1866 
to regulate prostitution, which led to regulation of bawdy houses by obliging sex workers 
to invasive venereal disease checks (Backhouse, 1985). As a result of the Contagious 
Disease Act, unmarried women were harassed and stigmatized (Backhouse, 1985). In 
1885, The Criminal Law Amendment Act or An Act To Make Further Provision For The 
Protection Of Women And Girls, The Suppression Of Brothels, And Other Purposes 
abolished the regulation of prostitution, but criminalized procuring women for the 
purpose of prostitution. All the acts mentioned were enacted in the United Kingdom, but 
they were also implemented in Canada. 
In the 19th century there was dominant notion regarding sex work. Street workers 
were thought to have deviant sexual behaviour, thus, deviant sexuality (O’Connell, 
1988). Towards the end of the Victorian era in 1892 the laws surrounding prostitution 
were consolidated into the first Canadian Criminal Code (Backhouse, 1985). The 
consolidation integrated provisions that criminalized keeping a bawdy house for the 
purposes of prostitution and being a prostitute, which was defined as s. 175(1)(c) a person 
who engages in prostitution as a person who wanders outside their home and does not 
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give a satisfactory account of herself, this provision was also considered as “vag c” 
(Criminal Code, 1892).  
Throughout the 20th century prostitution statutes underwent various amendments. 
In the early 1900s the procuring provision was amended to include procuring female 
immigrants or foreigners, as well as, the criminalization of males living with prostitutes. 
Living with a prostitute was criminalized under the provision s. 212(1)(j) living on the 
avails of prostitution (Criminal Code, 1892). Further amendments denoted that homes 
could have been deemed as bawdy houses and women who habitually used their property 
to carry out such acts could be convicted for the offence s. 210 keeping a bawdy house. 
In 1947, knowingly transporting women to a bawdy house became illegal (Backhouse, 
1985). In 1972, s. 175(1)(c) was repealed and replaced by s. 195(1) every person who 
solicits any person in a public place for the purpose of prostitution is guilty of an offence 
punishable on summary conviction. In 1983 there was an amendment made to the 
definition of prostitution s. 197(1) which clarified that males could engage in prostitution 
as well as females (O’Connell, 1988). In 1985, the provision s. 195(1) was repealed and it 
was rewritten to s. 213 it is an offence to communicate in a public place for the purposes 
of prostitution in Bill C-49 (O’Connell, 1988).  
In 1990, the Standing Committee on Justice reported that s. 213 did not decrease 
the visibility of street sex workers because they were displaced to other locations 
(Protection of Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25, section 1.3.2). In 
1992, The Federal Provincial Territorial Working Group on Prostitution recommended 
that the government review their social programs to ensure the needs of sex workers were 
met (Protection of Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25, section 1.3.3). 
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In 2006, the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws reported the negative effects of 
criminalization for sex workers (Protection of Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 
2014, c. 25, section 1.3.4). All of these committees, working groups and subcommittees 
were not able to provide a law reform but expressed the concern for the safety and lack of 
services provided to sex workers. The problem of criminalizing prostitution is that it 
exacerbates the dangers sex workers face. The pro-prostitution literature reflects the latter 
idea, this is also echoed in Canadian common law, which will be addressed in Chapter V.  
Overall, Canadian prostitution legislation has changed over time. The 
amendments made in 2014, which will be discussed in depth in Chapter V, and the report 
of the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws target sex workers as individuals who are 
oppressed and coerced. Referring to sex workers as inherently oppressed individuals is 
not representative of all the individuals involved in the sex industry (Bedford v. Canada, 
2010 ONSC 4264). As seen above, exploitation discourse is a dominant language in 
prostitution discourse but there are other discourses that shape it.  
Sex Work Discourses 
 Sex work legislation contributes to sex work discourse, this includes sex work 
discourse used in the criminal justice system and sex work discourse used by the general 
population. Therefore, policy makers through legislation contribute to the construction 
and practice of sex work discourse. Sex work discourse, whether constructed or practiced 
in government carries underlying ideas and perceptions about sex work. Kantola and 
Squires (2004) emphasized the importance of sex work discourse when legislative reform 
occurs, since such discourse permeates to the general public. Literature addresses 
different existent discourses surrounding sex work. 
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There are several discourses that frame discussions of sex work, which ultimately 
shape and shift legislative and regulatory frameworks. These include: moral order or 
morality, public nuisance, victim or threat to the community and sex trafficking. 
Moral Order or Morality. 
Morality or moral order are the most significant discourses that frame discussions 
and thoughts about sex work. This is in part due to the view that laws as codes of 
morality. Therefore, when legislation addresses sex work it entails moral rules imposed 
on the general population (Bruckert & Dufresne, 2002; Kantola & Squires, 2004; Law, 
2015). The previous idea frames sex work as an activity in which the moral values of the 
person who engages in sex work are questionable. Criminalization of sex work attributes 
a negative connotation to the engagement in the sex industry (Bruckert & Dufresne, 
2002; Kantola & Squires, 2004; Law, 2015). For example, Law (2015) argues that in the 
late 1990s the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) expressed how touching between an 
erotic dancer and the client/patron was an indecent act that lacked dignity. Describing sex 
work as an ‘indecent’ act as well as an act that ‘lacked dignity’ are manners of moralizing 
sex work discourse. Furthermore, the criminalization of sex work also contributes to the 
perception of sex work as deviant.  
Engaging in sex work is rendered deviant, likely to the result of its 
criminalization. Laws serve not only to deem what is moral and immoral, but exist to 
shape appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. Behaviours that are inappropriate are 
deemed illegal. In the earlier example of the exotic dancer, the SCC commented that the 
dancer, due to her engagement in erotic dancing, was predisposed to act in an anti-social 
manner (Law, 2015). Morality discourse represents the association of sex work with an 
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abnormal activity. Furthermore, there are moral debates in the sex industry that uncover a 
classification system of the sex industry.  
Morality discourse affects even stakeholders involved in the sex industry. For 
instance, dancers that provide lap dances are deemed “dirty girls”, while dancers that do 
not provide lap dancers are referred to as “good girls” (Law, 2015, p. 36). Furthermore, 
some dancers do not conduct lap dances because they equate the activity to prostitution 
(Law, 2015). The perception of lap dancers as ‘dirty’ echoes the indecency of 
prostitution; furthermore, it also conveys the inadequacy of sexuality outside of the home 
sphere (Foucault, 1978a). Physical contact for the exchange of money is seen as a 
morally wrong, deviant and undesirable act (Law, 2015).  
On the other hand, morality discourse establishes acceptable women's sexuality 
and purity. In the 19th century multiple sexual encounters were equated to impurity; 
therefore, women prostitutes were seen as impure individuals with a lesser value 
(Backhouse, 1985; Hallgrímsdóttir et al., 2008). A woman’s virtuousness was her 
virginity, therefore engaging in premarital sexual activity was morally wrong. Even 
though this was a belief from the 19th century, it has been perpetuated throughout the 
years as one of the reasons sex work is an unacceptable behaviour. Another contributor to 
the morality discourse is religion (Kantola & Squires, 2004). The concept of female 
purity is echoed in religious discourse, more specifically in Judeo-Christian beliefs, 
where women must go into marriage ‘pure’ (Brundage, 2009). Such purity is attained by 
remaining celibate prior to marriage. This contribution to the morality discourse 
perpetuates the idea that sex should only be kept within marriage, therefore engaging in 
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sex work goes against social convention. Consequently, sex work has been stigmatized, 
since it is viewed as morally wrong and inappropriate. 
Public Nuisance. 
Similar to morality discourse, discourse associating sex work with a public 
nuisance is a dominant discourse in literature. Common nuisance is defined as “an 
unlawful act or fails to discharge a legal duty and thereby endangers the lives, safety, 
health property or comfort of the public” (Criminal Code, 1985, section 180(2)(a)). 
Nuisance can also be defined as “an unlawful act or fails to discharge a legal duty and 
thereby obstructs the public in the exercise or enjoyment of any right that is common to 
all the subjects of Her Majesty in Canada” (Criminal Code, 1985, section 180(2)(b)). The 
perception of sex work as a public nuisance derived from the wish to free public places 
from street workers (Backhouse, 1985; O’Connell, 1988). The public nuisance discourse 
has been shaped by discourses used by prime minister candidates, parliamentary debates, 
and overall prostitution discourses in the criminal justice system. Discourses used by the 
three arms of government that shape public nuisance include the good and respectable 
citizen versus the others, unscrupulous sellers and buyers and overall the everlasting 
debate of public order versus private freedom (Outshoorn, 2004).  
 In 1985, the Fraser Committee released a report that could combat the public 
nuisance of prostitution (Outshoorn, 2004). The changes proposed included removing 
prostitution provisions that criminalized organized prostitution activities (Outshoorn, 
2004). The removal of such provision from the Criminal Code would promote public 
order by providing more private freedom. On the other hand, shortly after the report was 
released, the Conservative government released Bill C-49, which included stricter rules 
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surrounding public communication for the purpose of prostitution (Outshoorn, 2004). 
Clearly, the desire of the government to keep public order was greater than to provide 
private freedom.  
The stricter rules on communication for the purpose of prostitution were 
implemented because sex work was perceived as a public nuisance. Brock (as cited in 
Outshoorn, 2004) reported that associations, police officers and mayors stated that street 
prostitution brought a “decline in property values, an increase in traffic problems, 
harassment of residents and harm to ‘legitimate’ businesses in the area” (p. 86). 
Prostitution was perceived as a disruption of a well-balanced society. Moreover, as seen 
in the quote above, prostitution was not perceived as a viable job, since it was compared 
to legitimate businesses. The public nuisance discourse obstructs prostitution from being 
perceived as an industry, while constructing the values of a good citizen.  
Outshoorn (2004) argues that parliamentary debates also promoted discourses that 
othered prostitutes and other sex industry stakeholders. For example, there was a negative 
effect of street prostitution on “respectable and law-abiding citizens” (Outshoorn, 2004, 
p. 70). The construction of citizens that do not engage in prostitution as respectable and 
law abiding, establishes the deviance of sex industry stakeholders. Furthermore, the 
heavy use of morality to validate the criminalization of prostitution allows for the use of 
language such as ‘unscrupulous’ to refer to pimps or sex workers (Outshoorn, 2004).  
The moralization of sex wok shapes prostitution as an unacceptable activity, 
which entails that any visibility of prostitution in public spaces is a representation of 
unacceptable behaviour (Law, 2015). As mentioned earlier, sex work as a public nuisance 
derives from the perception that sex work is not a job, which hinders sex work from 
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obtaining a labour discourse (Law, 2015). Sexuality is implicit in sex work discourse. 
Street prostitution as a public nuisance is a way to say that sex is not to be showcased in 
the streets, and should not be used for financial gains. In the United Kingdom, one of the 
most dominant discourses around the early 2000s was public nuisance discourse, due to 
public discontent with the visibility of curb-crawling (Kantola & Squires, 2004). Later 
on, the Parliament received pressure on behalf of the public to decrease or abolish curb-
crawling (Kantola & Squires, 2004).  
Framing sex work as a public nuisance has a negative impact on sex workers. 
When the target of legislation is to abolish or decrease the visibility of sex work in the 
public eye, it pushes sex workers to perform their jobs to remote areas where they are 
more vulnerable to violence and assault (Anderson, 2002; Campbell, 2015; Craig, 2011; 
Krüsi et al., 2014; Miller & Schwartz, 1995). Sex work discourse as a public nuisance 
creates discrimination against sex workers by stigmatizing sex work (Kantola & Squires, 
2004; O’Connell Davidson, 2014). Consequently, morality is deeply ingrained in notions 
of prostitution as a public nuisance, which perpetuates the stigmatization and 
discrimination of sex workers.  
Victim or Threat to the Community. 
A duality found in literature is the perception of the sex worker as either an 
innocent victim or a threat to the community. This debate derives from different 
perspectives on the role of consent when engaging in prostitution. The use of the victim 
discourse is based on the belief that no one willingly would engage in such practices. 
Therefore, sex workers must be coerced and oppressed into the sex industry (Niemi, 
20 
 
2010). In this sense, the sex worker is viewed as an individual who is ‘at risk’, a 
vulnerable victim of sexual exploitation (Farley, 2003, 2004, 2005; Poulin, 2003).  
On the other hand, the idea that a sex worker is a threat to the community implies 
the sex worker is not a victim. As mentioned earlier, framing sex work as public nuisance 
implies that the sex worker is a threat to the community given the discussion of morality. 
This perspective recognizes the autonomy of the sex worker because it is established that 
the person voluntarily engaged in prostitution. Yet, the sex worker is engaging in an 
activity that is culturally regarded as lacking morals (Outshoorn, 2004). The sex worker 
is othered since their actions are seen as deviant and do not comply with normative 
structures (Outshoorn, 2004; Bruckert & Hannem, 2013; Wright et al., 2015). For 
example, in Ontario the early 2000s was a time when strip clubs were perceived as 
harmful to neighborhoods and their residents (Law, 2015). Law (2015) reports that lap 
dancing debuted in the 1990s which “introduced touching between dancers and patrons, 
provoking heated debates among industry stakeholders and communities across Ontario” 
(p. 32). Consequently, bylaws were created to prohibit dancer- patron touching, restrict 
owner’s ability to be licensed and restrict the number of strip-clubs (Law, 2015). In the 
early 2000s, community groups associated strip clubs with sex trafficking and a decrease 
in property values, therefore an increase in crime in the area (Law, 2015). Sex workers as 
a threat to the community creates resistance and perpetuates otherness.  
The resistance of community groups to sex work isolates sex workers by 
excluding them and not integrating them (Wright et al., 2015). Socially out-casting and 
resisting to integrate sex workers to the community creates inequality (Campbell, 2015) 
and perpetuates discourses of ‘good’ and ‘respectable’ citizens. The discrimination made 
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by differentiating respectable citizens from ‘others’ stigmatizes sex workers (Campbell, 
2015). Moreover, the desire to ‘clean’ communal areas of prostitution (Kantola & 
Squires, 2004), further perpetuates the notion of sex workers as inferior citizens. 
Consequently, deeming their sexual behaviour as different from social convention 
established since the 1800s. Marques (2010) reports that prostitutes have been perceived 
as “the epitome of the incorrigible woman and sexual villain” (p. 323). The illustration of 
the sex worker as threat to community or a risky individual also leads to responsibilizing 
them for many social ills.  
Community safety is a topic addressed in literature as an urgent request imposed 
by the general population on legislators (Backhouse, 1985; Kantola & Squires, 2004; 
Law, 2015). The use of the language community safety in conjunction to prostitution 
incorrectly depicts sex work as an inherently dangerous act. Wright et al (2015) comment 
that Bill C-36 made it seem that community safety only exists in the absence of sex work, 
without any other contributor to danger of the community. Consequently, the language of 
the sex worker as a threat to society holds responsible the sex worker for their own safety 
and the safety of the community, unlike the language of innocent victim (Kantola & 
Squires, 2004).  
Sex Trafficking. 
The term ‘traffic’ predated the use of the term ‘sex trafficking’. In the 1900s, the 
term traffic was used to “refer to movement of persons for immoral purposes, e g, 
prostitution” (Howard & Lalani as cited in George, Vindhya, & Ray, 2010, p.65). 
Pearson (as cited in George et al., 2010) reports that in the 1970s trafficking became 
more encompassing of other types of exploitation. Trafficking refers to the exploitation 
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of human labor, as much as it can refer to the exploitation of sex (Barnhart, 2009), yet in 
the public minds, trafficking is always imagined as related to solely sex. The definition of 
sex trafficking must differ from labor trafficking. 
Sex trafficking is defined as egregious actions towards a person, constituting of 
nonconsensual sex and a violation of rights (Barnhart, 2009; Shelley, 2003). Exploitation 
and harm are defining features of this type of trafficking, but not exclusive to it 
(Zimmerman, Hossain, & Watts, 2011). Weitzer (2005a) defines sex trafficking as the 
use of “force, fraud or deception to procure, transport, habours and sell persons, within 
and between nations for purposes of prostitution” (p.4). Zimmerman et al. (2011) reports 
that individuals who undergo sex trafficking are likely to experience physical violence, 
sexual abuse, threats, and reproductive health risks. Therefore, the language used in 
literature is ‘traffickers’ and ‘victims’. Barnhart (2009) compares the different strains 
victims undergo when experiencing diverse types of trafficking. 
Barhart (2009) states that victims of sex trafficking are believed to undergo a 
greater strain than victims of other types of trafficking. This is due to the violation of “a 
woman’s bodily integrity” (Barhart, 2009, p.92). However, Barhart (2009) reports that 
victims of other types of trafficking have similar psychological trauma to victims to sex 
trafficking. Barnhart (2009) explains this finding by stating that both types of victim lose 
the ability to dictate over their own bodies. Regardless, sex trafficking is considered 
“more morally repugnant” than other types of trafficking (Branhart, 2009). Branhart 
(2009) justifies this by reasoning that the activities related to the commercialization of 
sexual services are illegal, thus, already considered deviant. Branhart (2009) introduces 
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the conflation of sex work to sex trafficking due to stereotypical victimization of women 
and moralization of womens’ sexuality.  
Sex work is continuously conflated with sex trafficking. This is in part due to the 
moralization of commercialized sex. Therefore, the idea of sex work or sex trafficking is 
automatically perceived as equally immoral. The most common reason why sex work is 
conflated to sex trafficking is due to generalizations regarding sex work and sex workers’ 
conditions. Weitzer (2005a) critiques feminist scholars Andrea Dworkin, Catherine 
MacKinnon and Kathleen Barry for creating feminist theories that are extremist, 
absolutist and doctrinaire for the conflations of the terms. As I explore in the next section, 
these scholars take a radical feminist approach to prostitution. Weitzer (2005a) 
emphasizes that these scholars perpetuated narratives that stigmatizes sex work. Weitzer 
(2005a) reveals that the United States’ State Department in 2004 in alliance with feminist 
organizations with radical beliefs created websites that treated sex work like sex 
trafficking, an issue to be solved. Therefore, part of the conflation of the terms is due to 
opposite ideologies that are anti-prostitution and pro-prostitution. 
Scholars explore the major differences between anti-prostitution frameworks and 
pro-prostitution frameworks (Barnhart, 2009; George et al.,2010; Weitzer, 2005a). Pro-
prostitution approaches usually view sex work as work, sex workers as workers, and sex 
work as a voluntary activity (Barnhart, 2009; George et al., 2010; Weitzer, 2005a). 
Above all, pro-sex work approaches believe that in engaging in the sex industry as part of 
the sex workers’ agency, thus it can be empowering for some (Barnhart, 2009; George et 
al., 2010). On the other hand, anti-prostitution approaches believe the sex industry, thus 
sex work and sex trafficking are inherently exploitative (Barnhart, 2009; George et al., 
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2010; Weitzer, 2005a). Anti-prostitution approaches believe the commodification of 
sexual services is a form of violence against women, thus, women’s oppression 
(Barnhart, 2009; George et al., 2010; Weitzer, 2005a).  
The main issue surrounding the continued conflation of sex work with sex 
trafficking is the erroneous generalization made about women sex workers. While sex 
trafficking exists, there are also women who voluntarily participate in the sex industry 
(Barnhart, 2009; George et al., 2010). Complying with the victim discourse denies the 
agency and empowerment of engaging in the sex industry (George et al., 2010). The 
common ground established between the two is that “vulnerabilities and violations of 
rights characterize the conditions in which women work selling sex” (George et al., 2010, 
p.67). 
Feminist Theories 
Similar to existing discourses that frame sex work, there exist diverse feminist 
theories to explain and understand sex work, or prostitution. Through the use of 
discourse, feminist theories provide reasons individuals engage in sex work, explain 
relations between stakeholders of the sex industry, and establish the relationship between 
sex workers and society. A central debate in feminist literature is whether the engagement 
in the sex industry is voluntary or forceful. This division creates many feminist stances 
which span between, pro-prostitution and anti-prostitution (Durham, 2015), and each 
with diverse perceptions on sex work, thus diverse legal approaches (Weisberg & 




In the book Female Sexual Slavery, Barry (1984) proposes that male sexual 
expectation reduce women to their sexual utility; which leads to sexual violence. This 
dominant dynamic of males over women is reinforced through the existence of 
prostitution (Barry, 1984). Prostitution as female sexual slavery is the main tenet of 
radical feminism (Barry, 1984;1996). Echoing Barry’s (1996, 1984) work, Mackinnon 
(1993) states that prostitution is “the denial of women's humanity” (p.13). Mackinnon 
(1993) establishes that the humanity of women is denied in both social and legal spheres; 
the social sphere normalizes the subjectification of women bodies to “cruel and brutal 
treatment” (p.13). On the other hand, the legal sphere allows such mistreatment to be 
perpetuated by criminalizing women and allowing male customers to have no legal 
repercussions (Mackinnon, 1993). Clearly, the commodification of sexual services is 
problematic to radical feminists.  
Radical feminist theory frames prostitution as oppressive and coercive (Weisberg 
& Steinberg, 1996). Prostitution is seen as sexual abuse and overall violent, especially 
towards women, where the perpetrators are men (Barry, 1996,1984; Mackinnon, 1993; 
Monto, 2004; Niemi, 2010; Sullivan, 2007). Such literature heavily uses the term victim 
to refer to sex workers, since they are seen as victims of rape (Barry, 1996,1984; 
Mackinnon, 1993). Protection discourse is a common theme when this framework is used 
in legislation formation (Niemi, 2010). This literature does not use the language ‘sex 
work’ and ‘sex worker’, since this commercial language neutralizes concepts likes 
trafficking, which radical feminists believe is the underlying reality for all sex workers 




Radical feminists believe prostitution should be eradicated due to its inherent 
oppressive nature (Dempsey, 2010; Gerassi, 2015). Prostitution can be abolished through 
the criminalization of purchasing sexual services, since it is believed that the male client 
or customer takes advantage of women (Gerassi, 2015; Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). 
Such an approach sees prostitution as degrading and equal to sex trafficking due to its 
apparent violent and oppressive nature (Barry, 1996, 1984; Gerassi, 2015; Niemi, 2010; 
Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). Furthermore, radical feminists uncover the neglect of 
women experiences (Mackinnon, 1993) and the notion that “all heterosexual sex [is] 
coercive” (Kotiswaran, 2018, p. 86).  
Socialist Feminism.  
Socialist feminists believe that women are oppressed through social and 
psychological means (Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). Pateman (1999) clarifies that women 
have control over their bodies through the creation of sexual contracts, therefore, they are 
able to choose to engage in prostitution. Yet, for socialist feminists, prostitution is 
problematized since capitalism enables the demand for sexual services (Wedum, 2014). 
Prostitution is problematic because the commodification of sexual services is an 
unacceptable act, and because the demand for such services is imposed by men (Pateman, 
1999; Wedum, 2014). Even though women have the ability to decide to participate in 
prostitution, the exchange of sexual services for money is deemed a degradable career 
path (Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996).  
Pateman (1999) blames male citizens of the capitalist society and poses the 
question “why men demand that women's bodies are sold as commodities in the capitalist 
market?” (p. 56). Pateman’s (1999) question leads to the answer of “prostitution is part of 
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the exercise of the law of male sex right, one of the ways in which men are ensured 
access to women's bodies” (p. 56). Socialist feminists are preoccupied with the right of 
men to access women bodies; The latter idea entails greater social and psychological 
issues and ideologies of males inherent of the male-female relationship dynamic. 
Socialist feminism frames prostitution as the outcome of gender inequality.  
Gender inequality is enhanced when women form part of the capitalist society. 
The professional opportunities available for men are not consistent with the opportunities 
women have (Wedum, 2014). As a result, socialist feminist literature refers to female 
prostitutes as ‘victims of the system’ (Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). Socialist feminists 
believe in social reform as part of solving the ‘prostitution issue’ (Wedum, 2014; 
Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). The eradication of the capitalist economic system and a 
social reform will restructure society to financially benefit women (Wedum, 2014; 
Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). Furthermore, prostitution should be criminalized (Wedum, 
2014; Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). 
Marxist Feminism. 
Marxist feminism centers the oppression of women through class distinctions, 
corruption of wage labour, and capitalism (Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). Engels (1972) 
establishes that men search for the control of women’s labour and sexual faculties. In the 
late 1900s, women’s labour as well as their sexual faculties were exploited through 
capitalism and the institutionalization of the nuclear family (Engels, 1972). Thus, the 
power of men over such institutions delineates their control over women’s bodies 
(Engels, 1972). Therefore, Marxist feminism refers to the existence of prostitution as the 
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oppression of women through the economic dependence on men (Gerassi, 2015; 
Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). 
Engels (1972) uncovers discourses of female sexual morality, virginity, and 
sexual purity as the discursive practices that led women into submissive roles within the 
marriage sphere. Therefore, for women to engage in prostitution is to disrupt their 
femininity, which is partly shaped by their untouched sexuality (Gerassi, 2015). This 
theory proposes that the capitalist system oppresses women, which facilitates the control 
of female sexuality and sexual energy by men (Gerassi, 2015). Men profit off women by 
controlling their work (Gerassi, 2015). Prostitution is perceived as an activity that 
degrades women’s dignities (Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). Patriarchal control of private 
property also contributes to the oppression of women into prostitution (Engels, 1972). 
Due to the male control of private property, this limits women’s access to finances, 
making them dependent on their male counterparts.  
The literature uses discourse such as ‘victim of the economic system’ to refer to 
sex workers (Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). The economic system as the oppressor 
implies that there is no voluntary engagement in the sex industry. Abolishing the 
oppressive capitalist system is the best approach to solve the ‘prostitution issue’, since its 
removal guarantees the eradication of the demand for prostitution (Weisberg & Steinberg, 
1996). Similar to radical and socialist feminism, Marxist feminism seeks to end 
prostitution altogether, since it is viewed as a coercive activity. 
Existentialist Feminism. 
Existentialist feminists uncover the inherent inequality of social freedoms for 
women (Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). The inequality is unveiled through the 
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normalization of women as the second or other gender (De Beauvoir, 2012). In The 
Second Sex, De Beauvoir (2012) explains that (a) women are defined in relation to men 
and (b) due to women reproductive faculties, men have gradually been able to dominate 
women throughout time. De Beauvoir (2012) clarifies that “it is not women’s inferiority 
that has determined their historical insignificance: it is their historical insignificance that 
has doomed them to inferiority” (p.184). Yet, the historical insignificance does not inhibit 
women’s freedom. De Beauvoir (2012) contributes to the difference between sex, 
biologically constructed, and gender, which is socially constructed. 
De Beauvoir (2012) demonstrates that effect of the social sphere, which is not to 
be confused with determinism. Existentialist feminism recognizes the ability of women to 
engage in activities of their choice, in other words, the existence of their freedom (De 
Beauvoir, 2012). For example, in terms of prostitution, existentialist feminists accept 
voluntary engagement of sex workers into the sex industry (Weisberg & Steinberg, 
1996). Prostitution can positively affect women by empowering them (Weisberg & 
Steinberg, 1996). De Beauvoir (2012) describes prostitutes in terms of sexual services 
contracts.  
 Unlike the previous feminist theories, women were not coerced nor oppressed 
into prostitution. De Beauvoir (2012) argues married women and prostitutes share in 
common that both are bound to contracts where their sexuality is exchanged. The key 
difference is the duration of the contract, and the number of clients, while married women 
have one male client, sex workers have multiple male clients (De Beauvoir, 2012). The 
contract for the married women consists of conjugal duties, while the prostitute fulfills 
masculine desire (De Beauvoir, 2012). The married woman is “oppressed” (p. 681), yet, 
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she is “respected as a human person” (p. 681), while the prostitute “does not have the 
rights of a person” (p. 681). The social sphere affects the formation, thus perception of 
women, and in the case of this study, the prostitute.  
Even though the sex worker is not oppressed nor coerced into prostitution, 
existentialist feminism is aware of the inequality between males and females (Weisberg 
& Steinberg, 1996). Prostitutes are viewed as liberated women (De Beauvoir, 2012). This 
framework views the female prostitute as an entrepreneur, an individual who is able to 
financially support themselves, and support decriminalization of sex work (Weisberg & 
Steinberg, 1996).  
Post-structuralist Feminism. 
Post-structuralist feminists focus on the meaning of experiences grounded in 
discourse (Gavey, 1989). Discourse plays a great role in all concepts (Gavey, 1989). 
Post-structural feminists uncover the “binary gender system” from which society is 
discursively constructed upon (Butler, 1986, p. 47). Butler (1986) explores the “norms of 
differentiation” to establish from birth the gender category the individual goes into. This 
establishes that existentialist feminism is aware of the inequality between males and 
females (Butler, 1986). Yet, such inequality does not restrict women from engaging in 
sex work. 
Butler (1986) studies how gender norms impose limitations on women. Gender 
norms are oppressive, yet, Butler (1986) explains that gender norms “persist only to the 
extent that human beings take them up and give them life again and again” (p. 41). 
Freedom for Butler (1986) is applicable to all women experiences. Therefore, women are 
not coerced into prostitution; it is a career the individual can engage in (Butler, 1986). 
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Post-structuralism feminists, like most post-feminists challenge normative systems 
(Fullagar & Pavlidis, 2018). Post-structuralists accept sex work as a form of labour, 
through which individuals sustain themselves financially (Fullagar & Pavlidis, 2018). 
Furthermore, since sex work is a type of labour, it should not be abolished (Weisberg & 
Steinberg, 1996).  
Postmodern Feminism. 
Postmodern feminists uncover the gender inequalities perpetuated by the 
patriarchal norms on which society is built (Fraser, 2017). Postmodernists recognize that 
the experience of women differs from the experience of their counterparts (Sands & 
Nuccio, 1992). Therefore, the source of oppression then becomes the inability to identify 
patriarchal norms imposed on women (Fraser, 2017).  
Postmodern feminists use the language of ‘prostitution’ as well as ‘sex work’ 
(Scoular, 2004). This feminist approach establishes that sex work is a voluntary activity. 
Postmodernists “consider prostitution as neither a subversive sexual practice nor an 
inherently oppressive one” (Scoular, 2004, p. 348). Postmodernists uncover and 
challenge the dichotomies in sex work discourse, which are the perception of sex work as 
either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, or the perception of the sex worker as “whore and madonna” 
(Scoular, 2004, p. 348). Yet, postmodernists recognize the structural barriers sex workers 
encounter when performing their sexual transactions without coercive or oppressive 
discourses (Scoular, 2004). Therefore, postmodernists feminists advocate for the 




Similar to the post-structuralists, postmodernists and existentialists, liberal 
feminists expose the gender inequality of amongst the sexes in the social and legal 
spheres (Marilley, 1996; Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). Therefore, liberal feminists seek 
gender equality and equal rights for women (Marilley, 1996; Weisberg & Steinberg, 
1996). Men have greater control over the legal and economic system, which leads to the 
inequality women experience (Marilley, 1996). 
Liberal feminist literature uses ‘sex work’ discourse, which derives from the 
belief that sex work is a type of employment (Nussbaum, 1998; Weisberg & Steinberg, 
1996). Nussbaum (1998) reinforces that in sex work the body is used as a tool to carry 
out work tasks. Consequently, sex work engagement is voluntary, and the sex worker is 
an entrepreneur who seeks financial stability through one of many other options 
(Nussbaum, 1998; Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996; Wedum, 2014). Literature on liberal 
feminism addresses consent as a key player for the absence of oppression, coercion and 
exploitation (Sullivan, 2007). Sex work, like any other job, has difficulties the workers in 
terms of performance need to overcome (Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). 
Liberal feminists encounter legislative barriers, as I will show in Chapter V, to 
have their work recognized as legitimate. Legal reform should consider the voices of sex 
workers, to cater to their employment needs and physical safety (Campbell, 2015; 
Durham, 2015; Kantola & Squires, 2004; Sampson, 2014; Sullivan, 2007; Wedum, 
2014). Sex work is a civil right; therefore, the decriminalization of prostitution is 
essential to the equality of the sexes (Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996).  
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Conditional Liberal Feminism. 
Similar to liberal feminists, conditional liberal feminists consider sex work as 
viable employment that can financially sustain women (Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996). 
The main difference between liberal feminism and conditional feminism are sources of 
oppression. Conditional liberal feminists make an emphasis on educating women of the 
realities of the sex industry (Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996; Wedum, 2014). Conditional 
liberalists recognize the “negative forces at work that result in many women being 
prostitutes against their will, such as human trafficking and crippling poverty” (Wedum, 
2014, p. 25). Therefore, an informed woman may not engage in prostitution. Another key 
difference between liberalists and conditional liberalists is the approach to sex work in 
the criminal justice system.  
In the legal sphere, conditional liberalists believe sex work qualifies to be 
decriminalized. Additionally, sex work should be legalized, which entails taxation and 
regulation of sex work (Wedum, 2014). Wedum (2014) emphasizes that regulation is a 
system of control, which establishes an “accepted form of prostitution without any 
concern for what is best for her as an individual worker” (p. 24). Conditional liberalists 
believe prostitution should not be eradicated; however, it should not be encouraged 
(Weisberg & Steinberg, 1996).  
The different feminist approaches to sex work uncover diverse discourses that 
shape prostitution. Prominent discourses such as gender inequality, types of oppression, 
and entrepreneurship reflect the permanence of specific discourses that have shaped 
prostitution over time. The next section will explore diverse legal models of sex work, 
which will reiterate themes related to decriminalization 
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Legal Models of Sex Work 
Prohibitionist.  
This legal model frames prostitution similarly to radical feminists. The 
prohibitionist approach derives from the belief that prostitution is degrading and 
inhuman, thus the engagement in it disrupts the morality of the individual (Anderson, 
2002; MacKinnon, 1993). Prostitution is perceived as a public nuisance, especially for 
middle class citizens (Anderson, 2002). This legal model consists of criminalizing both 
sellers and buyers of sexual services, making this transaction illegal (Anderson, 2002). A 
country that has taken a prohibitionist approach is the United States of America (USA). 
The implementation of the prohibitionist model in USA, except for the state of 
Nevada, has led to sex workers’ safety issues (Anderson, 2002; Mathieu, 2004). Prostitutes 
are not able to receive protection against clients who become abusive or violent (Anderson, 
2002). The prohibitionist legal approach forces sex workers to work in areas where they 
become vulnerable to violence and assault (Anderson, 2002; Miller & Schwartz, 1995). 
The criminalization of prostitution does not benefit sex workers who willingly part take in 
the sex industry. 
Abolitionist. 
This legal approach “prefers to see commercial sex as a private affair” (Mathieu, 
2004, p.154). The approach allegedly focuses on the sex worker, who voluntarily engages 
in prostitution, or due to financial need (Mathieu, 2004). While prostitution is legal, 
soliciting, third party involvement, and organized activities are illegal (Jakobsson & 
Kotsadam, 2013; Mathieu, 2004); this entails the act of pimping, managing and attending 
brothels (Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2013; Mathieu, 2004). Similar to conditional 
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liberalism, the government does not encourage participation in prostitution, and uses 
legislation to prevent third party involvement in the sex industry (Mathieu, 2004).  
 Abolitionist legal approaches view sex work as a morally wrong activity, which 
endangers family life. Therefore, the prostitute is perceived as “socially maladjusted” 
(Mathieu, 2004, p. 154). Social workers and policing are strategies used to rehabilitate 
prostitutes into ‘normal’ life and target undesirable morally wrong activities (Mathieu, 
2004). On the other hand, feminist abolitionists argue that women are oppressed through 
patriarchal and structural inequality to participate in sex work (Dempsey, 2010).  
Neo-abolitionist. 
Deriving from the abolitionist approach, neo-abolitionist legal model criminalizes 
the purchase of sexual services (Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2013). The neo-abolitionist 
approach focuses on the prostitute as a victim of sex trafficking; unlike its predecessor, 
this approach assumes that the prostitute does not engage in the sex industry voluntarily 
(Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2013). Since the prostitute is coerced, the aim of the legal 
approach is to eradicate the demand of sexual services (Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2011; 
Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2013). The approach is also called the Nordic model, given its 
implementation in Sweden, Norway and Iceland (Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2011; 
Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2013).  
Skilbrei and Holmström (2011) challenged the international concept of a Nordic 
regime as an approach to prostitution legislation reform. Sweden implemented the neo-
abolitionist approach to change prostitution demands, change perceptions of gender and 
sexuality (Skilbrei & Holmström, 2011). On the other hand, other countries have debates 
surrounding the prostitution market, class inequality and globalization (Skilbrei & 
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Holmström, 2011). Skilbrei and Holmström (2011) uncover that the focus on the sex 
workers as a continuous target group for social harm reduction perpetuates the discourse 
of sellers as nonconsenting participants in the sex industry (Skilbrei & Holmström, 2011). 
Prostitution and the sex industry are equated to sex trafficking due to their apparent 
violent and oppressive nature (Gerassi, 2015; Niemi, 2010). 
Neo-abolitionist approaches to sex work legislation, reduces prostitution to sex 
trafficking (Vanwesenbeeck, 2017). Similarly to prohibitionist, the approach increases 
over policing, and pushes sex workers to remote locations making them prone to violence 
and abuse (Campbell, 2015; Craig, 2011; Krüsi et al., 2014; Vanwesenbeeck, 2017; Ward 
& Wylie, 2017).  
Legalization.  
In the 19th century, prostitution was a “health hazard, where women were seen as 
sources of contamination” (Outshoorn, 2004, p. 7). In an attempt to control the 
propagation of STDs amongst male soldiers, prostitution became regulated and contained 
to specific locations and houses (Outshoorn, 2004). Legalization, as mentioned in 
conditional liberalist feminism, entails the regulation of prostitution through registration 
of brothels, requiring licenses to practice sex work, taxation and medical testing of 
prostitutes (Outshoorn, 2004; Wedum, 2014). This legal approach involves the control of 
prostitution through the government (Outshoorn, 2004; Wedum, 2014).  
The legal model of legalization or regulation of prostitution derives from a pro-
prostitution framework. As clarified earlier in this chapter, there are many types of 
feminisms that embrace pro-prostitution ideology. This entails using sex work discourse, 
instead of prostitution discourse. This preference establishes that sex workers should be 
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referred to as workers, employees or entrepreneurs (Nussbaum, 1998; Outshoorn, 2004; 
Wedum, 2014). The work sex workers perform should be regulated through legislations 
and acts that protect workers’ safety (Outshoorn, 2004).  
Decriminalization.  
This legal approach consists on decriminalizing all prostitution legislation that 
prevents individuals to engage in sex work (Kuo, 2005; Wedum, 2014). This entails all 
prostitution-related activities, from the advertisement of sexual services, purchasing 
sexual services, selling sexual services, involvement of third parties or organized 
activities (Gerassi, 2015). The approach at times is confused with the neo-abolitionist 
legal approach, which partially decriminalizes the selling of sexual services (Gerassi, 
2015). Yet, the goal of the two diverse legal approaches differ.  
Neo-abolitionist legislation aims to decrease the demand of sex work by 
criminalizing the client (Skilbrei & Holmström, 2011). The seller of the sexual services is 
viewed as a victim of exploitation (Skilbrei & Holmström, 2011). On the other hand, 
proponents of the decriminalization approach emphasize that the involvement of the 
punitive system in the regulation or criminalization of sex work, negatively affects sex 
workers (Kuo, 2005; Taylor, 2018a). Therefore, decriminalization establishes that 
regulation of the government nor criminal sanctions should form part of sex work (Kuo, 
2005). “Decriminalization combined with appropriate social services” needed by sex 
workers ensure their safety, and the safety of the communities (Kuo, 2005, p.135). 
Decriminalization steps away from the stigmatization perpetuated by legal and illegal 
discourses and towards nonpunitive systems (Kuo, 2005). After the decriminalization of 
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sex work legislation in New Zealand, there was an improvement in sex workers’ safety 
and their human rights (Abel, 2014).  
Canadian Legal Approach to Prostitution Legislation  
Until 2014, Canada had a quasi- criminalized legal approach to prostitution 
(Lowman, 2000). Chu and Glass (2013) establish that even though the exchange of 
sexual services for money was not illegal “virtually every activity required to do this 
work” was (p. 102). Under the leadership of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, after 
November 6 of 2014, Canada implemented the neo-abolitionist approach to prostitution 
legislation. The Conservative party led by Harper claimed that general public opinion on 
prostitution was prohibitionist (Lowman & Louie, 2012). This claim was debunked when 
seven national public opinion polls revealed that a small majority of Canadian citizens 
believed the decriminalization of prostitution was the most beneficial legal model 
(Lowman & Louie, 2012). The events that led up to the implementation of the neo-
abolitionist legal model will be discussed in Chapter V.  
Conclusion 
This chapter provided different discourses that frame prostitution, as well as a 
brief historical background on Canadian legislation. The chapter served to show the 
different ideologies that construct diverse prostitution frameworks, which serve as a 
practical tool when uncovering discourses present in common law. In addition, the 
chapter explored the various manners in which prostitution discourse and different 
branches of the government intersect. Scholar literature uses different elements from 
governmental branches to study prostitution discourse, which establishes the pertinency 
of the aim to study the changes of prostitution discourse in common law. The next 
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chapter will address the theory used in the current study. The theory comprises 
Foucauldian principles of governmentality and anti-carceral feminism.   
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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter describes the Foucauldian, anti-carceral feminist framework that 
grounds my research project. I begin by uncovering the regulation of sex discourse 
through institutions of power. I introduce governmentality to explain the power dynamic 
between the state and the population. Given that women are often the envisioned gender 
of importance in discussions of sex work, I explore governmentality while considering 
feminist theories, this includes exploring feminist theories that derive from 
governmentality. Feminist governance is introduced to fill gaps related to gender due to 
Foucault’s inattention to the female experience. I explore heteropatriarchal discourses 
within carceral feminist theory, which are damaging to sex workers as well as other sex 
industry stakeholders. I conclude by proposing anti-carceral feminism as the central 
theoretical framework to analyze prostitution discourse changes in Canadian common 
law. 
The Regulation of Sex Discourse 
Foucault (1978a) sought to discover “the way in which sex is ‘put into discourse’” 
(p. 11) by implementing a genealogical analysis. This analysis revealed the complexity of 
discourse, thus, sex discourse. Foucault (1978b) uncovered that sex discourse 
encompasses suppressed language, language used, and social conventions attached to sex. 
Moreover, the genealogical analysis explained in detail the transformative power of 
discourse.  
Foucault’s (1978b) analysis revealed “the regime of power-knowledge-pleasure 
that sustains the discourse on human sexuality” (p. 11).  This regime was able to exist due 
to the confinement of sex discourse to institutions such as the church and the state. For 
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example, in the middle ages to the 17th century people explained in detail their sexual 
desires and pleasures while in confessionals. The enunciation of sex and sexuality 
language within the confessionals was due to the perception of such language as 
illegitimate and sinful. Towards the end of the 18th century the state, through civil law, 
defined standards of appropriate and inappropriate sexuality. The church and the state can 
establish norms surrounding sex discourse, which leads to the normalization of norms 
imposed by stated institutions surrounding sex discourse (Foucault, 1978c). Therefore, 
institutions such as the government regulate sex discourse as a mechanism of power. 
Foucault (1978a,1978b, 1978c) establishes that institutions through their power can 
regulate sex discourse, which ultimately regulates sex. 
 The regulation of sex and sex discourse is a form of control over individuals, thus 
control over the population. The regulation of sex discourse is a “technique of power” 
(Foucault, 1978a, p. 25), meaning that the state uses sex discourse to control the 
population. This process of control is a third party induced subjectification (Foucault, 
1982). The individual also becomes a subject of their own consciousness and self-
knowledge (Foucault, 1982). In this sense, the individual subjectifies himself or herself 
by self- regulating sex discourse through their consciousness and knowledge about sex 
(Foucault, 1982). Subjectification of the population and self-subjectification of the 
individual are processes where sex discourses are imposed or internalized to the point 
that they become normalized. The subjectification of the individual and the population 
allows them to become governable. The action of governing the population is called 




Governmentality encompasses government procedures that subjectify populations 
(Lemke, 2019). Therefore, governmentality explains the power relation between the 
government and the population, which is considered the macro level; and the “control of 
the body”, which is the micro level (Macleod & Durrheim, 2002, p.49). In other words, 
governmentality refers to the governmental management of the population, and the self-
management of individuals (McKee, 2009). Governmentality is the art of governing and 
an analysis that addresses the conduct of conduct (Bevir, 2018; Foucault, 1982; Glenn, 
2019; Gordon, 1991; Halley, Kotiswaran, Rebouché, & Shamir, 2018; Lemke, 2001; 
Mckee, 2009; Moonesirust & Brown, 2019; Rose et al., 2006; Springer, 2012).  
Similar to discourse, governmentality is an active practice, which is present in 
multiple spheres by actively engaging the subject (Gordon, 1991; Lemke, 2001; McKee, 
2009). The government is able to govern the individual in diverse spheres. This entails 
that the conduct of individuals is governed by: themselves, other subjects (the rest of the 
population), social organizations besides the state, and other inherently social spheres 
(Bevir, 2018; Glenn, 2019; Larner, 2000; McKee, 2009). The regulation of sex discourse 
across diverse spheres demonstrates the governability of individuals through discourse. 
 Individuals become governable through relations of power they cannot control. 
For example, the regulation of sex and sex discourse was done through the censorship of 
pleasure. This new norm of confining and experiencing sexuality without pleasure 
conditioned the individual (Foucault, 1978a). The practice of sex inhibition and its 
banishment allowed the disciplining of sex to spread amongst the population (Foucault, 
1978b). Even though canonical law already moralized sex and sex discourse, the 
moralization was exacerbated when sex work was criminalized. This introduced 
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discourses of criminality and deviance to a topic that was already taboo. The 
criminalization of sex work governs bodies by restricting the context in which sexual 
activity takes place; the commodification of sexual services, even if defined by Canadian 
law as partially legal, is linked to an illicit activity. Even though governmentality is 
dynamic, and explains the control of the state over the human body, the concept does not 
account for the existence of sex work and the female subject. 
Foucault (1978a, 1978b,1978c) investigates sex and sexuality discourse but he 
does not address the commodification of sexuality. He does not rationalize the existence 
of sex work, or the experience of the prostitute. Foucault (1978b) addresses the function 
of brothels from the perspective of the consumer of sexual services, to rid themselves of 
their sexual desires and level off their sexuality. The experience of the prostitute under 
the Victorian regime is not discussed, and the commodification of sexual services is not 
addressed as an event in the genealogy of sexuality. In particular, the discussion of civil 
law and sex discourse should include sex work and the effect the mechanisms of power 
had on the discursive practices of sex work and repressed the sex worker. Furthermore, 
Foucault (1978a, 1978b, 1978c) often uses masculine pronouns when exemplifying the 
Victorian citizen. This is problematic, since he does not account for the manner in which 
governance differentially affects the female body.  
Foucault does not explore the “implications of his work in gendered terms” 
(Macleod & Durrheim, 2002, p. 42). His “gender blindness” limits the analysis of the 
experience of the female subject (Macleod & Durrheim, 2002, p. 42); yet, feminist 
theorists use the Foucauldian analysis of power to explain the engendered and 
intersectional within which the female subject experiences power relations (Allen, 2005; 
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Bartky, 2015). Bartky (2015) explains that disciplinary power renders the female body 
more compliant than the male body. The female subject is continuously disciplined 
through power relations, that leads it to engage in self-surveillance as a form of 
obedience to the patriarchy (Bartky, 2015). Moreover, in the work of Shaver (1994) the 
topic of sex work is nuanced with morality and descriptors that affect the male and 
female subject differently. Clearly, governmentality is a resource for feminists to 
conceive concepts of domination, but a feminist theory is required to account for the 
female experience.  
Post-Governmentality Feminist Theories 
In this section I explore the concept of governance feminism and contradictions 
that render it an inadequate theoretical framework for the current study. Then, I critically 
explore carceral feminism. While carceral feminism echoes Foucauldian disciplining 
concepts, it reinforces the use of a damaging punitive system as the best approach to 
regulate prostitution. Furthermore, carceral feminist scholars agree on the criminalization 
of sex work, since from their perspective involvement in the sex industry is oppressive 
and coercive (Musto, 2019; Roy, 2018; Taylor, 2018b). I propose anti-carceral feminism 
as the main theoretical framework in conjunction with Foucaldian governmentality. Anti-
carceral feminism is a theory that explains the detriment of using the punitive system to 
target injustices.  
At the intersection of feminism and governmentality, governance feminism is 
conceptualized as “every form in which feminists and feminist ideas exert governing will 
within human affairs’” (Halley et al., 2018, p. ix). The conceptualization of governance 
feminism takes into consideration that the power of the government expands “beyond the 
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juridical into the discursive or governmental realm” (Kotiswaran, 2018, p. 77). 
Governance feminist scholars are aware of the benefits of participating and becoming 
part of institutions that govern populations (Halley et al., 2018). According to Halley 
(2018a), governance feminism is inclusive of an array of feminisms; this leads different 
types of feminists from state institutions to come together to advocate for the same cause. 
Governance feminists who are able to penetrate the legal setting are given 
opportunities to make a positive impact. They involve themselves in legislative processes 
such as policy making, and even become experts in courtrooms (Kotiswaran, 2018). 
Overall, governance feminists uncover their arduous involvement in state institutions to 
advocate for issues relevant to women and vulnerable populations. However, governance 
feminists face barriers while working with or participating in state institutions.  
 Feminists inside the state and even non-profit organizations that participate in the 
state face the preservationist power of patriarchy due to institutional inequality, which 
perpetuates structural disadvantage (Halley, 2018b). Furthermore, Halley (2018c) 
emphasizes that legislation from United States of America is based on radical feminist 
ideology. Therefore, when governance feminists abide by legislation, they accept and 
comply with radical or dominance feminist ideology. Governance feminism has a 
contradictory ideology regarding the experience of the female subject.  
Roy (2018) explains that feminist governance is contradictory “since the subject 
is supposed to act freely but is prevented so by external constraints” (p.299). This is due 
to “the punitive and paternalistic character of feminist governmentality” (Roy, 2018, 
p.299). Foucault (2012) explores the topic of prison as an outcome of a system of power 
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that punishes and disciplines its subjects. Constant surveillance from the disciplinary 
institution produces “docile bodies” (Foucault, 2012, p.138).  
The necessity for punitive responses to the ungovernable led to the development 
of a carceral system (Foucault, 2012). Therefore, incarceration is the solution to 
maintaining the subjectification of the population, and also, the self-subjectification of 
the individual (Foucault, 2012). Consequently, incarceration is a technique of power, 
implemented by the state (Roy, 2018). Carceral feminists believe incarceration is a proper 
disciplining tool, an appropriate punitive instrument (Roy, 2018). Carceral feminists 
engage in governance feminism since they advocate for the penal system.  
Bernstein (2007) coined the term carceral feminism. Carceral feminists address 
“feminism’s reliance on statist tools of policing, prosecution and incarceration as 
punishment and deterrence in order to protect women from (gender-based) violence and 
to further women’s human rights” (Roy, 2018, p.283). Carceral feminists propose 
“technologies of empowerment that are aimed at liberating women from violence, harm 
and deprivation are at once technologies of control, surveillance and disciplining” (Roy, 
2018, p.285). Carceral feminists addresses sex work by establishing legislation that 
criminalizes sexual acts (Musto, 2019; Roy, 2018; Taylor, 2018b). There are two main 
issues at the intersection of sex work and carceral feminism. First, the perception of sex 
work as unidimensional, thus labeling it as a coercive and oppressive practice. Second, 
the negative effect of implementing sex crime policies on sex workers.  
The perception of sex work as a solely coercive and oppressive activity leads to 
the immediate link of the term to sex trafficking. Sex trafficking is the sexual exploitation 
of a person against their will and to the benefit of others (George et al., 2010) This 
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negates the possibility of the practice of voluntary sex work, and consequently the 
conflation of conceptually different terms. Carceral feminism literature touches on sex 
work, addresses it as sex trafficking and treats sex crimes as criminalized acts due to their 
violent nature towards women (Engle, 2017; Kapur & Cossman, 2018; Roy, 2018; Ward 
& Wylie, 2017). Moreover, carceral feminists emphasizes practices that perpetuate sexual 
violence against women, and the carceral punishment of perpetrators of the stated 
violence (Bernstein, 2007; Engle, 2017; Kapur & Cossman, 2018; Roy, 2018; Ward & 
Wylie, 2017). Carceral feminists do not distinguish sex trafficking legislation from 
prostitution legislation; carceral feminists address both as sex or sexual crimes. Kapur 
and Cossman (2018) emphasize that studying sex crimes entails studying sexuality in the 
context of power, identity and practice. Kapur and Cossman (2018) recognize that the 
focus on sexuality “brings attention to the inappropriate and damaging ways in which 
consensual sexual conduct continues to be criminalized, and its oppressive impact on the 
lives of women and sexual minorities” (p. 270).  
The implementation of sexual crime legislation has negative effects on sex 
workers as well as for non-sex workers. For example, Taylor (2018a) addresses negative 
outcomes for sex workers: 
“carceral responses do not eradicate sex work but merely drive it indoors, thus 
facilitating the gentrification of urban neighborhoods that were once red-light 
districts. Sex workers who are targeted by punitive strategies are those who 
remain on the streets, who are the poorest, most vulnerable and usually racialized 
sex workers engaged in the most dangerous forms of survival sex work. Harassed 
by the police, these sex workers are more likely to get into cars or go into dark 
alleys with strangers to evade arrest, increasing their vulnerability to assault, 
unsafe sex, and murder” (p. 35). 
 
 In addition to the negative outcomes sex workers face, the carceral state does not 
“empower the women who are the primary objects of concern, but strengthen the state’s 
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regulatory apparatus and intensify the sexual surveillance of women’s lives’” (Roy, 2018, 
p.299). Sex work legislation becomes a regime that targets and manages the sexuality of 
women for the sake of “the security of the nation-state and stability of the market” 
(Kapur & Cossman, 2018, p. 287). Carceral feminists disregard women while attempting 
to implement a solution to an issue that concerns them, and also makes women more 
vulnerable to sexual violence (Michalsen & Williams, 2019; Musto, 2019; Whalley & 
Hackett, 2017).  
Carceral feminists perpetuate issues that affect women, individuals from the 
LGBTQIA community, and people of colour. Carceral feminists mobilize dominating 
discourses within feminisms, which preserves the white supremacist and 
heteropatriarchal ideologies of the state, and its penal system (Huxley, 2002; Taylor, 
2018a; Whalley & Hackett, 2017). Abstaining from criticizing carceral feminism, 
contributes compliance with these ideologies that impact minoritized populations 
(Whalley & Hackett, 2017). Carceral feminists rely on imprisonment to solve social 
feminist issues that require learning from advocates of the social movement at hand 
(Michalsen & Williams, 2019; Whalley & Hackett, 2017).  
Adopting an anti-carceral feminist approach to understand the nuances of sex 
work, specifically the changes of the prostitution discourse in common law, will allow for 
a multi-layered approach pertinent to the complex topic at hand. The anti-carceral 
feminist perspective is the main theoretical framework proposed for the current study, 
which will be explored in the next section. 
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Theorizing Shifts in Sex Work Discourse 
The study of evolving prostitution discourse in common law requires an approach 
that considers the social aspect of discourse. Kapur and Cossman (2018) emphasize that 
when matters in criminal law are discussed it is important to question “the extent to 
which engagements with criminal law in particular can bring about social change, even in 
light of a more nuanced understanding of discursive change” (p. 270). The power of 
discursive change of a governmental institution—in this case common law— needs to be 
considered. Anti-carceral feminists caution that legislation and ‘activities’ in the criminal 
justice system may divert the attention of subjects from the function of power “which is 
to constitute, discipline, and normalize us” (Taylor, 2018a, p. 35). An anti-carceral 
feminist approach inspects the impacts of legislation on a population. 
Anti-carceral feminism uncovers the structural injustices embedded within 
criminalization and incarceration (Carlton, 2018). Taylor (2018a) adopts an anti-carceral 
feminist perspective to understand the negative impact of controlling sex or sexual 
crimes: 
“prohibition may produce, perpetuate, or accelerate desires for what the law is 
prohibiting, especially in the case of sexual prohibitions. Law, on this view, far 
from writing normative scripts with which we then comply, contributes to the 
production of the kinds of deviance it intends to curtail” (p. 36).  
 
Anti-carceral feminist theory is a robust framework that facilitates the 
understanding of the complex negative effects sex work legislation has on sex workers 
(Carlton, 2018; Michalsen & Williams, 2019; Musto, 2019). Criminalization of sex work 
is intertwined with the intersectionality of gender, morality, sexual orientation, amongst 
others; the decriminalization, and thus the decarceration of sex work entails rising above 
structural inequality (Musto, 2019). Anti-carceral feminists reject “false binaries between 
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“good” victims and undeserving criminals” (Musto, 2019, p. 49); this entails that 
embracing anti-carceral feminism rejects narratives such as sex workers at risk (victim) 
and risky. The language of victims limit the comprehension of a heavily nuanced topic. 
The framework also recognizes the negative effect of law enforces on sex workers and 
other sex industry actors (Musto, 2019). 
According to anti-carceral feminists the carceral state is a paternalistic system that 
oppresses sex workers. The criminalization of sex work through neo-abolitionist and 
abolitionist legal models of prostitution victimize sex workers, which makes them further 
vulnerable to the carceral state (Musto, 2019). The stated legal approaches increase 
“policing, surveillance, and other forms of justice-involvement” in the sex work 
community (Musto, 2019, p. 47). The intersectional nature of the framework proposes a 
comprehensive theory to understand issues of the sex work community.  
 Taylor (2018b) implies that sex work requires more than politics of punishment 
to advocate for the safety of its workers. Therefore, anti-carceral feminists recognize the 
permeability of power within the penal state, and propose an intersectional approach of 
social, economic, and political settings to seek a solution to ‘solve’ injustices sex workers 
face (Taylor, 2018b). Consequently, an anti-carceral feminist approach to prostitution 
discourse proposes a comprehensive multidimensional understanding of sex work. It 
analyzes the genealogy of sexuality, and explores the permeability of sex moralization 
into legislation. The negative effects of neo-abolitionist legislation require a socio-
economic understanding of sex work. The expected outcome is to identify dominant 
discourses in common law as well as socially normalized discourses that portray sex 
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work as a “perverse sexuality”, and decriminalize sex work since legislation negatively 
affects sex workers (Taylor, 2018b, p.12).  
Conclusion 
Overall, the current chapter provided the theoretical framework of the study. The 
ability of anti-carceral feminists to grasp the complexity of the issues sex work and sex 
workers face renders it an appropriate and pertinent framework for the current study. 
Anti-carceral feminists attend to the inattentiveness of the carceral state to 
heteropatriarchal discourses embedded in law. The proposed framework also considers 
the negative effect of surveillance, policing and imprisonment of sex workers and 
potentially of other sex industry characters. Furthermore, it recognizes power within the 





 In this chapter I provide the methodology and research design of the current 
study. I describe discourse, discourse analysis, and the pertinence of its application to the 
current study. I briefly describe different scholars approaches to discourse analysis and 
the relevance of the macro level to the current study. I introduce the methodological 
approach as a combination of: Fairclough’s (2013) three stage model, Wood & Kroger’s 
(2000) advice on conducting a discourse analysis and the use of Foucault's (1972,1978b) 
ideas on discourse formation and the power of words to fully grasp the themes the 
discursive texts provide. Then I outline the steps I took for data collection, data analysis 
and data organization.  
Discourse and Discourse Analysis  
Schiffrin (2003) refers to discourse as the use of language or what lies beyond its 
textual format. Fairclough (1985) offers a more detailed definition of discourse by 
encompassing non-linguistic communication and instances that do not necessarily pertain 
to language, such as gestures, social practices, clothes and objects that the speakers may 
carry. Fairclough’s (1985) definition expands discourse outside textual references by 
embracing behavioral aspects of the speaker at the interpersonal and intrapersonal level. 
Other definitions of discourse involve the intrapersonal setting to define the term.  
Social and historical frameworks determine discourse. Foucault is recognized for 
his work on comprehending discourse within a social and historical framework to 
understand the power words carry (Kendall & Wickham, 1998; Waitt, 2010). Discourse 
on a specific topic is passed down through generations, enabling discourse to penetrate 
social and political settings and attributing a historical significance to each discourse 
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(Foucault, 1978b). Discourse is affected and thus shaped by current events at a specific 
historical time similar to an ever-changing organism (Foucault, 1978b). As such, contrary 
to lay perceptions, discourse is malleable and not static. 
 Discourse is a dynamic concept that is affected by many factors. Attempting to 
analyze such a dynamic concept requires the acknowledgement of social factors such as 
the setting, function, topic and participants (Kendall & Wickham, 1998). Discourse 
analysis derives from social theory and linguistic theory, which entails considering 
language —which is part of discourse— for the purpose of analysis (Kendall & Wickham, 
1998). Language is continuously depicted as a multifaceted concept; it invokes meaning, 
actions, attributions to speakers and receivers, thus the driving force of change in 
discourse (Wood & Kroger, 2000). Discourse analysis is an appropriate method to 
analyze the inherently social practice of discourse. 
Discourse analysis is a comprehensive tool used to analyze discourse. As an 
approach to qualitative methodology, discourse analysis is capable of uncovering the 
complexity of discourse and the various levels through which language can be 
comprehended. Discourse analysis questions the functionality and aim of words (Wood & 
Kroger, 2000). The use of discourse analysis provides multiple levels of interpretation, 
which demonstrate the ability of words to construct meaning beyond the social setting. 
The ability and permeability of words to be interpreted in diverse settings establishes the 
power of language (Foucault, 1978b). 
There exist different methodological approaches to discourse analysis; regardless, 
a three-step model that attends to discourse structure, its generation and consumption, and 
social practices appears to be situated in the literature as the most comprehensive 
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methodology —and most appropriate— given the objectives of this research (Wodak & 
Meyer, 2015). The next section will discuss the implementation of discourse analysis by 
delineating the similarities in models that also use three-steps. The next section will also 
discuss where the different models vary. The interconnectivity of the different levels 
within the models will be briefly explored as well as a common criticism of discourse 
analysis.  
Implementing Discourse Analysis  
The current section introduces two different three-stage models which have 
similarities and differences. The next section contrasts the two models, which emphasizes 
the reason to select of Fairclough’s (1985, 2013) model.  
Three-Step Models. 
  Different discourse analysis models are articulated via a series of methodological 
steps. Hodges, Kuper and Reeves’s (2008) model, as well as Fairclough’s (1985, 2013) 
approach to discourse analysis propose a three-step model. The first level consists of 
micro-analyzing the language or the description of the text (Fairclough, 2013; Hodges et 
al., 2008). Hodges et al. (2008) refer to the second level as empirical discourse analysis, 
while Fairclough (2013) introduces it as the production and the consumption of the text. 
The third step is macro-analysis of discourse or the effects of sociocultural occurrences 
on discourse (Fairclough, 2013; Hodges et al., 2008).  
The third step of the model by Hodges et al. (2008) is termed critical discourse 
analysis. It focuses on the construction of what individuals and institutions are able to 
think and say (Hodges et al., 2008). Fairclough’s (2013) third step includes the socio-
cultural setting. Fairclough’s (2013) model of discourse analysis addresses ideology and 
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power patterns; these are created at the third level and reflected on the other levels. In this 
scenario the model is a network where the levels of interpretation are constructed by texts 
that influence each other. The third step reflects the necessity to analyze discourse from a 
socio-cultural framework, which demonstrates parts of Foucault’s (1978b) ideas on 
discourse formation since the analysis of discourse should consider factors beyond the 
linguistic level. Fairclough's (2013) model fits appropriately with the goal of the study. 
 In the second level of Hodges et al. (2008) model, empirical discourse analysis 
focuses on the analysis of the conversation, more specifically the production of the text. 
In contrast, the second stage of Fairclough (1985, 2013) model is more rounded due to 
the analysis of both consumption and production of the text. Moreover, while Hodges and 
colleagues (2008) model seeks to uncover and critique structures of power, Fairclough’s 
(1985, 2013) model discovers not only power patterns but also ideologies. Furthermore, 
Fairclough’s (2013) analytic framework takes culture into consideration. The socio-
cultural framework is pertinent to the current study since changes in prostitution 
discourse are being studied within Canadian culture.  
The first step of the model should not be overlooked, since the three levels of the 
model construct each other. An understanding of the social event or language is needed to 
analyze and comprehend social practices (second step). The social event or texts are 
analyzed within a specific context, which is the social practice and the social structure 
(third step). To understand the context from which a social structure exists, one should 
examine the social events and practices that contribute to the social structure itself. In 
literature, the contribution of social events and practices to a social structure reflects the 
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manner in which language shapes social practice and vice versa (Fairclough, 2014; 
Foucault, 1972; Wood & Kroger, 2000). 
Criticism of Discourse Analysis. 
Discourse analysis has received criticism throughout its development, like any 
other method of data analysis. The most common criticism this method has received is 
the possibility of interjecting the interpretation of discourse with the voice of the analyst 
(Cameron, 2001). To counteract, qualitative researchers do not believe on an objective 
and unbiased analysis (Tufford & Newman, 2012). This is due to preconceptions the 
researcher has prior to carrying out their studies (Tufford & Newman, 2012). 
Consequently, “preconceptions influence how data are gathered, interpreted, and 
presented” (Tufford & Newman, 2012, p. 2). Bracketing is a technique that allows 
researchers’ become aware and establish their pre-conceptions prior to starting their 
research. Bracketing considers the subjectivity of researchers –recognizing absolute 
objectivity does not exist– and aids academics through heavy emotionally laden research 
(Tufford & Newman, 2012). 
Early literature underestimated the capability of discourse (Fairclough, 1989; 
Foucault, 1972). The aim of discourse analysis has been to raise awareness of the power 
of discourse by creating conscientiousness around language (Fairclough, 1989); 
awareness is created by questioning the intentionality and finality of certain words and 
phrases (Wood & Kroger, 2000).  
Application of Discourse Analysis to the Legal Setting 
Previous studies surrounding sex work have used discourse analysis to analyze 
their data. (Hewer, 2019; Jovanovski & Tyler, 2018; Strega et al., 2014). Scholars 
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emphasize the inherent nature of discourse as always constructed in reference to other 
discourses beyond the text (Hewer, 2019; Jovanovski & Tyler, 2018; Strega et al., 2014). 
Hewer (2019) as well as Strega et al. (2014) emphasize that discourse analysis is 
pertinent to analyze diverse texts because the aim of such analysis is to identify 
ideological language. Sex work discourse is partially filled of specific political and social 
ideology (Strega et al.,2014). Discourse analysis has proven to be a versatile method, 
since it has been used to analyze legal documents, newspaper articles and online reviews 
that discuss the topic of sex work (Hewer, 2019; Jovanovski & Tyler, 2018; Strega et al., 
2014). In Strega et al. (2014), Foucauldian principles were used in combination with 
discourse analysis to identify the construction of the sex worker’s subjectivities.  
Scholars have questioned the applicability of discourse analysis in law, due to 
potential differences between the legal field, and social science fields where discourse 
analysis is commonly used (Niemi-Kiesiläinen, Honkatukia, & Ruuskanen, 2007). There 
have been discussions about legal discourse as inherently social, which falls in line with 
Foucauldian principles (Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al., 2007). Academics have argued that law 
should be interpreted as a social phenomenon, therefore it requires to be interpreted from 
a sociological standpoint (Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al., 2007). For example, courts pass 
rulings on cases based on findings from studies that address specific issues that are 
targeted during sociological, criminological or psychological research (Niemi-Kiesiläinen 
et al., 2007). Due to the congruence between the field of sociology and law, the tool of 
discourse analysis can be implemented to analyze legal data. 
 The earlier sections have established that diverse factors that help shape 
discourse throughout time. Foucault (1978b) claims that the formation and prevalence of 
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discourse throughout history is constructed and shaped by factors such as current events, 
politics, legislation, common law, amongst others. This study explores the construction 
and potential changes of the prostitution discourse in Canadian common law from 
January 1st, 2010 to December 31st, 2018; Canadian prostitution discourse in common 
law is also affected by discourses within legislation, previous court decisions and 
discourses used in Bill C-36. 
The next section will provide the methodological approach and study design of 
this study, outlining the process of data collection, data organization and data analysis.  
Methodological Approach and Study Design  
This study uses Fairclough’s (2013) discourse analysis model as a guiding 
template and Foucault’s (1972, 1978b) principles of discourse formation. Fairclough’s 
discourse analytic model gives importance to the macro analytical stage, which is 
constituted by the social and cultural context (Fairclough, 2013; Wood & Kroger, 2000). 
The emphasis on the macro analytical stage supports the understanding of text in relation 
to social factors like power, which pertains to the current study (Wood & Kroger, 2000).  
Data Collection. 
The dataset comprised of court decisions, which were categorized into two 
groups: pre-Bill C-36 and post-Bill C-36. The pre-Bill C-36 dataset consisted of court 
decisions found from the time frame of January 1st, 2010 to November 5th, 2014; this 
specific time frame yields court decisions before the Bill C-36 was implemented. The 
post-Bill C-36 dataset consisted of court decisions found from the time frame November 
6th, 2014 to December 31st, 2018; the time frame yields court decisions that occurred after 
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the implementation of Bill C-36. The following steps were taken to identify and select the 
court decisions that were pertinent to this study: 
I.  I accessed the database Lexis Advance Quicklaw, selected court decisions 
and when prompted selected all Canadian court cases. 
II. The keywords used were: communicating, sexual services and prostitution. 
The keyword ‘communicating’ yielded casesin which the charges were 
communicating for the purpose of prostitution (s. 213). This was the most 
common sex work offence between 2009 and 2014 (Rotenberg, 2016)., 
therefore the inclusion of the term should yield court decisions where 
individuals were charged with s. 213. The keyword ‘sexual services’ was used 
since one of the changes made to the Criminal Code as a result of the Supreme 
Court decision Canada v Bedford was eliminating the word ‘prostitution’ 
from the legislation; therefore, there was a possibility that the post-Bill C-36 
court decisions did not use the language of prostitution but instead used the 
language of sexual services. Similar to the previous idea, the keyword 
‘prostitution’ was used since the word was used in pre-Bill C-36 legislation 
and was therefore present in the Criminal Code. The use of the three 
keywords in combination generated 563 court decisions.  
III.  Some of the 563 court decisions dated back to three to almost four decades 
ago. The dataset needed to represent discourses used at the moment the 
Bedford application was made to emphasize the language used at that specific 
moment in time. The Bedford application was done in 2010; therefore, 
including court decisions from the year 2010 provided prostitution discourses 
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before the change of prostitution law in 2014. The change of prostitution law 
was on November 6, 2014 through the implementation of Bill C-36. I created 
the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, which covered 4 years of court decisions prior to 
2014. Adding an ending period to attain data allowed me to examine 
discourses used in the specific time frame; ascribing December 31, 2018 as 
the ending period identified discourses used post-Bill C-36. Refining the data 
by setting the January 1, 2010 to December 31 of 2018 time-frame also 
provided an equal amount of time for the pre and post datasets. The addition 
of the January 1, 2010 to December 31 of 2018 time-frame led to 217 cases.  
IV. The study sought to understand the changes in prostitution discourse in the 
province of Ontario; therefore, the data was refined to identify the number of 
court decisions that pertained to the jurisdiction of Ontario. There were 118 
court decisions that pertained to the province of Ontario. 
V. The 118 court decisions had to undergo an examination to select relevant 
court decisions. The data prior to the inspection included cases in which the 
main charges were not prostitution related charges; therefore, the facts 
provided and analysis made by the judges did not involve the topic of sex 
work and issues surrounding the topic. For example, in Sukhu v. Ramautar 
([2018] O.J. No. 4641) which was part of the 118 court decisions, the main 
charge was defamation of character; the presiding judge used the phrase 
sexual services but did not analyze the topic of sex work. Consequently, the 
court decision was removed from the dataset.  
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VI.  I inspected the 118 court decisions, which entailed reading the summary of 
the court decision and identifying the charges. For the court decision to be part 
of the dataset, the main charges needed to be prostitution related. This entailed 
charges such as keeping or being found in a common bawdy house (s. 210), 
living on the avails of prostitution (s. 212(1)(j)), procuring (s. 286.3), 
communicating in public for purposes of prostitution (s. 213 (1)(c) or (s. 
213.1(1)) and purchasing sexual services (s. 286.1), advertising (s. 286.4), 
receiving financial or material benefit (s. 286.2). The charges that were 
discussed in the court decisions had to be prostitution related. If there were 
charges that did not pertained to prostitution, the judge needed to discuss the 
topic of prostitution in the analysis of the court decision. For example, in R. v. 
Lucas-Johnson ([2018] O.J. No. 3685) there were non-prostitution charges 
such as forcible confinement (s. 279(2)) and concealing identity document 
from another person under 18 (s. 279.03(2)); yet the case included a procuring 
offense (s. 286.3(1)). If the charges did not include a prostitution related 
offence, the court decision was removed from the dataset. In court decisions 
where human trafficking charges were discussed, the cases were included 
since the judges usually stated that the person was being charged with human 
trafficking and “other related offences in respect of his/her relationship with” 
(R. v. Crosdale, [2018] O.J. No. 6028). The related offenses referred to the 
procuring offense (s. 286.3) or the commodification of sexual services offense 
(s. 286.2). After this inspection, there were 28 cases that were removed from 
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the dataset since the none of the charges were prostitution related offenses; the 
removal led to 90 court decisions to remain in the dataset. 
VII. The initial thorough reading of the 90 court decisions uncovered different 
types of documents in the dataset. The dataset included judgements, appeals, 
applications, motions and sentencing documents. Judgements provided facts 
and an analysis of the issues. Appeals included a summary of the original 
judgement, additional information and an analysis of the new issues brought 
forward. Applications included short documents that intended to include new 
evidence, cross examinations, preliminary hearings, amongst others. 
Sentencing documents provided the original facts and analysis and the judge’s 
rationale for the sentencing. The next section will include reasons to either 
include or exclude specific documents in the dataset and also unique court 
decisions that were included or excluded given their special circumstances.  
Justification for Case Selection Unique Cases 
Applications for evidence and cross examinations were removed from the dataset 
due to the lack of substantial information. Applications for evidence and cross 
examinations do not discuss the matter of sex work. They discuss the reason why specific 
evidence should be allowed in the courtroom or relevancy of cross-examining an 
individual. To illustrate, R. v. McPherson ([2011] O.J. No. 6549) was an application by 
the crown for admissibility of relevant evidence, not a court decision where the topic of 
sex work was discussed. Thus, the document was removed from the dataset. However, 




Preliminary hearings were included in the dataset. The only preliminary hearing 
in the dataset R. v. Alexander ([2016] O.J. No. 7163) was kept in the dataset since the 
charges of sex work and trafficking were discussed and analyzed. 
Sentencing documents were included in the dataset when the original judgement 
was not present; sentencing documents include a summary of the original judgement, 
therefore, having the original judgement and the sentencing document would create data 
duplication. For instance, the sentencing document R. v. Robitaille ([2017] O.J. No. 5954) 
was included in the dataset since the original judgement was not present. At times, the 
judge’s rationale for sentencing implicitly uncovered their beliefs of sex work practice, 
for example in R. v. Gray-Lewis ([2018] O.J. No. 4304) paragraph 59, the judge refers to 
the pimp’s behaviour as ‘morally repugnant’.  
Appeals were also included in the dataset. Appeals were included because they 
discuss the original judgement and give an insight into how a case can be reconsidered in 
common law. 
Unique Court Decisions. 
 This section will discuss the court decisions that had unique scenarios regarding 
charges and defendants and the reason these court decisions were either removed or kept 
in the dataset.   
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset there were two cases involving the same defendant. 
The cases R. v. Salmon ([2014] O.J. No. 4887) and R. v. Salmon ([2014] O.J. No. 1461) 
discuss two different times at which the same person is being accused of different 
offences. Both court decisions were included in the dataset since the complainant was 
different and the charges for each court decision were different.  
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In the post-Bill C-36 dataset there were two cases that referred to the same 
charges. The cases R. v. Alexis-McLymont ([2018] O.J. No. 983) and R. v. Alexis-
McLymont ([2018] O.J. No. 1053) were both included because they discuss the same 
offenders and offenses in the dataset due to dates and circumstances. They were judged 
on different occasions since one of the offenders was in custody for a longer time and 
was not able to assist the court date. The sentencing of Jaiden Alexis-McLymont and 
Dylan Hird occurred under R. v. Alexis-McLymont ([2018] O.J. No. 983) and the 
sentencing of Anthony Elgin occurred in R. v. Alexis-McLymont ([2018] O.J. No. 1053). 
Both court decisions had the same background information, therefore to prevent 
duplication of data, the background information was coded under R. v. Alexis-McLymont, 
([2018] O.J. No. 983).  
The cases R. v. Finestone ([2017] O.J. No. 677) and R. v. Robitaille ([2017] O.J. 
No. 5954) dealt with the same complainant. Mr. Finestone had slightly different charges 
from Ms. Robitaille, pertaining to the same underage sex worker. Both court decisions 
were included in the dataset. In both documents, the facts of the offense, victim impacts 
and additional impacts were the same. To prevent duplication, the information under 
stated categories were coded once under R. v. Robitaille ([2017] O.J. No. 5954). 
Court decisions that challenged the constitutionality of sex work provisions and 
human trafficking provisions were included in the dataset. Such court decisions discuss 
and debate on topics relevant to uncover prostitution discourse in common law. For 
example, in R. v. Boodhoo ([2018] O.J. No. 6413) the constitutionality of s. 286.2(2), s. 
286.3(2) and s. 286.4 was challenged. The application was dismissed. In R. v. Ghotra 
([2016] O.J. No. 957) the provisions s. 172.1(3) and s. 172.1(4) were challenged since 
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they violated sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter; this application was also dismissed. The 
court decision R. v. D'Souza ([2016] O.J. No. 4992) was included even though the 
provisions challenged addressed human trafficking due to the manner in which sex work 
was brought in the document.  
After the inclusion and exclusion of the stated court decisions a total of 58 court 
decisions were used for data collection. The pre-Bill C-36 dataset constituted of 13 court 
decisions and the post-Bill C-36 dataset constituted of 45 court decisions (see Appendix 
A). The dataset included court decisions which involved minors. In the pre-Bill C-36 
dataset seven cases involved minors and 27 cases in the post-Bill C-36 dataset involved 
minors (see Appendix B). In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset all the sex workers were female 
and only in one court decision the sex worker was charged. In two instances the client 
was charged. In the post-Bill C-36 dataset all the sex workers were female and in five 
cases sex workers were charged; in 35 cases the individual charged was a pimp and on 
seven occasions the client was charged.  
Data Analysis 
 The guiding template for data analysis was comprised of: (a) Fairclough’s (2013) 
three dimensional interpretation model, which allowed for a thorough interpretation of 
prostitution discourse at multiple levels, from the textual analysis of the data (micro 
level), to the societal occurrences affecting the data (macro level); (b) Wood and 
Kroger’s (2000) general advice on conducting discourse analysis, (c) and Foucault's 
(1972, 1978b) principles on discourse formation which contributed to the understanding 
of the formation of the prostitution discourse in common law. Foucault’s (1972, 1978b) 
contributions allowed for the understanding of the social and temporal context within 
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which prostitution discourse was constructed, as well as guidance for grouping discursive 
texts.  
The first step in data analysis was to read over the court decisions several times to 
get a sense of what the data itself provided without imposing themes on the existing data. 
This abides by Wood and Kroger’s (2000) assertion that: “The spirit of discourse-analytic 
research is inductive; that is, it involves moving from the concrete to the abstract, from 
the particular to the general” (p. 2). Based on Wood and Kroger’s (2000) advice, 
attention was paid to the language used in the data, and the reaction of the researcher 
while being wary of attributing a negative meaning to specific discourses hastily. Upon 
completing the first step, the themes of sex worker as a victim and prostitution as violent 
emanated from the data, which were similar discourses to the ones discussed in the 
literature (Bruckert & Hannem, 2013; Craig, 2011; Shaver, 2005; Skilbrei & Holmström, 
2011). 
The second step was familiarizing oneself with the data. Becoming familiar with 
the data allowed to identify different actors in common law setting. The characters 
identified were: the judge, the sex worker, the pimp, the client, the crown and law 
enforcement. Re-reading the data helped identify major topics that were mentioned when 
the specific character was addressed. For example, when mentioning the person who 
performed sexual acts information also presented was the age of the person, consensual 
practice, use of protection, thoughts about the practice and the relationship with the pimp 
or client. Recognizing the different information that was provided about each character 
was key to the next step of the analysis; as the analytical process “requires the 
identification and interpretation of patterns in discourse, that is, of systematic variability 
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or similarity in content and structure” (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 5). Therefore, 
familiarization with the data aids in the identification of patterns for each actor. 
The third step consisted of reading each court decision as well as identifying 
discursive texts and classifying them by the character (sex worker, judge, pimp, client, 
the crown); there were additional categories formed for discursive texts that referred to 
language, transactions, in court and policy. The categories will be further refined with the 
help of Fairclough’s (2013) model.  
The fourth step consisted of applying the first stage of Fairclough’s (2013) model 
to the discursive texts. The micro-analysis of the data analyzed the choice of vocabulary, 
grammar used and textual structure of the discursive texts. The linguistic analysis helped 
create subcategories like terminology, definitions under the language category.  
The fifth step was to subject the discursive texts to the second stage of 
Fairclough’s (2013) model. The meso-analysis of the discursive texts constituted of 
examining the relationship between the production of the text and the consumption of the 
text. This stage took a look at the text as a discursive practice (Fairclough, 2013). The 
stage of analysis required an identification and comprehension of the relationship 
between the texts, discourse and common law setting. The stage led to the creation of 
categories for each character, for example the relationship with pimp, and most categories 
under judge and language.  
The sixth step consisted of examining the discursive texts using the third stage of 
Fairclough’s (2013) model. The macro-analysis of the discursive texts entailed 
comprehending the effects of sociocultural occurrences on discourse. The stage subjected 
the discursive texts to an analysis that uncovered the social purpose of their production 
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and consumption (Fairclough, 2013). The stage allowed to further refine categories by 
identifying themes that needed to be understood from a social and historical framework. 
For example, the language category had a subcategory named interchangeability which 
refers to the conflation of sex work with sex trafficking.  
   The seventh step involved considering Foucault’s (1972, 1978b) work and its 
applicability to the current study. Foucault’s (1972, 1978b) principles of discourse 
formation, knowledge generation, and the power of discourse were used to comprehend 
the convoluted historical change of prostitution discourse in Canadian common law. 
Similar to the macro stage in the three-dimensional model, the use of idea formation from 
Foucault (1978b) allowed to comprehend diverse prostitution discourses from the 
discursive texts that existed due to the social and temporal circumstances of the data. 
Taking into consideration Foucault’s (1978b) work allowed an examination of the 
discursive texts in the context of the history of sex work legislation in Canada up to the 
year of 2018. Adopting Foucault’s (1972, 1978b) framework provided an identification 
of the associations and contributions to prostitution discourse made by the literature 
surrounding prostitution in Canada, the Bedford decision and Bill C-36.  
The eighth step was to compare both pre-Bill C-36 dataset and post-Bill C-36 
dataset for similarities or differences in themes.  
Data Organization. 
Both pre-Bill C-36 and post-Bill C-36 dataset had their own Excel document. 
Discursive texts found in each dataset were respectively entered in the appropriate 
dataset. In every Excel document there were columns for major themes: sex worker, 
client, pimp, judge, transaction, attorney or crown, language, references to Bedford and in 
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court. The columns were further subdivided into codes according to the discursive texts 
found in the data. See Appendix C for a breakdown of the codes and their meanings.  
Conclusion 
This chapter attended to the methodological considerations as well as the specific 
methods used to analyze the change in prostitution discourse between 2010 and 2018 in 
common law. The court decisions were subjugated to discourse analysis through the 
implementation of Fairclough’s (2013) three-dimensional interpretation model, Wood 
and Kroger’s (2000) general advice on conducting discourse analysis and Foucault's 
(1972, 1978b) ideas on discourse formation and the power of words aided in 
comprehending changes in prostitution discourse in common law. Discourse analysis is a 
pertinent and appropriate method to analyze court decisions due to its implementation on 
previous studies that used legal documents and other texts that discussed sex work 
(Hewer, 2019; Strega et al., 2014). The following chapter will introduce the Bedford 
decision as well as explore the changes in each provision challenged by the applicants of 
the Bedford case. The next chapter will also explore the themes found in the Bedford 
decision, the aftermath of the Bedford decision, implementation issues of Bill C-36 and 
scholar criticism of Bill C-36.   
70 
 
V. THE BEDFORD DECISION 
The study of discourse is at the core of this dissertation; therefore, it is necessary 
to provide the context from which changes in discourse occur. This chapter establishes 
and explores the socio-political setting before and after the implementation of Bill C-36: 
The Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act. First, I present the events 
prior to the Bedford case to establish a socio-political context. Second, I breakdown the 
Bedford case with a focus on the three provisions challenged, their historical changes and 
the reason for their unconstitutionality. Third, I uncover the themes found in the Bedford 
decision which gives an insight to themes in Canadian common law during 2010 and the 
socio-legal perspective on prostitution discourse. Fourth, I explore the aftermath of the 
Bedford decision, with is the implementation of a neo-abolitionist approach to sex work 
legislation (also known as the Nordic model). Fifth, I highlight the implementation issues 
of Bill C-36 to uncover the negative outcomes sex workers face and scholarly criticism 
on the neo-abolitionist approach to sex work legislation. Sixth, I bring attention to the 
legislative change of Bill C-75: An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act, and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, which 
reveals a step towards decriminalization of sex work.  
Events Prior to the Bedford Case 
On December 20, 2013, the Global News1 website produced a brief article 
attempting to summarize the Canadian history of sex work legislation (Global News, 
 
1 The year 2013 marks the year the Bedford decision ended. News articles from the year 2013 report on: 
oppositional perspectives on sex work as showcased in Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264, an 
explanation as to why the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) struck down the provisions s. 210, s. 212(1)(j) 
and s. 213 and the court experience and opinions of Terri-Jean Bedford (Fine, 2013; MacCharles, 2013; 
Supreme Court strikes down Canada's prostitution laws, 2013). The article A Chronology of Canadian 
Prostitution Laws (2013) was picked amongst other articles to emphasize the depiction of amendments to 
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2013). The article provided 11 instances of legislative changes in Canada to diverse laws 
that addressed sex work throughout Canadian history; which is not representative of the 
numerous legislative changes of prostitution provisions throughout Canadian history, as it 
will be seen later on in this chapter. The article reinforced the idea that prostitution has 
been portrayed as undesirable in Canadian legislation between 1800s to the late 1900s (A 
chronology of Canadian prostitution laws, 2013); the lack of context, plus the missing 
information fails to recognize the origin of the social undesirability and the existence of 
the voices that are in favour sex work. While this study does not aim to question the 
uncritical sense of ‘objectivity’ in the article, it does seek to highlight the lack of equal 
representation on matters that address sex work. As one of the key events in history, the 
article mentions the legal case of Robert Pickton (A chronology of Canadian prostitution 
laws, 2013). 
In the 1980s, there was a rise of female homicides in Port Coquitlam and area, 
that went uninvestigated (Cameron, 2010). Reporters Pemberton and Hall (from the 
Vancouver Sun) pressed the police and continuously reported on various deaths and 
disappearances of women, who also happened to be sex workers (Cameron, 2010). They 
understood the victims were seen as “throwaways”, thus investigations regarding their 
disappearances and deaths were never performed (Cameron, 2010, p. 62). Sex workers 
grew anxious about the killings; as a means to emphasize to law enforcement their 
 
prostitution law the general public had access to. The article represents the information consumed by the 
general population of Canada, thus it demonstrates the language the general population was exposed to 
regarding the topic of sex work and the limited information to be tentatively consumed by the general 
population upon reading the article. The article simplifies sex work through a lack of comprehensive 
legislative changes, which has occurred throughout time prior to the Pickton case. This ultimately 




concerns over an increased amount of disappearances and killings, sex workers reported 
every attack, robbery or assault they experienced to the point that within two years (from 
1987 to 1989) reports on sex worker attacks increased by 75% (Cameron, 2010). Given 
the lack of investigations and resolutions, the Downtown East-side Women’s Centre2 was 
advising sex workers to decline offers to take them for work to Port Coquitlam (Keller, 
2012). Regardless of the Downtown Eastside Women’s Centre’s advice, the killings and 
disappearances continued until early 2000s.  
In 2000, a sex worker reported encountering Robert William Pickton, who offered 
to take her to Port Coquitlam, and admitted to having dead corpses of sex workers on his 
property (Keller, 2012). The police did not take the sex worker’s report seriously, yet 
Robert William Pickton had already been one of the primary suspects of the killings since 
early 1990s (Cameron, 2010). In 2002, Robert Pickton was arrested and convicted of 
murdering six female sex workers from Vancouver's downtown east side (Matas, 2010). 
Mr. Pickton had 26 murder charges, but the maximum sentence under the Canadian legal 
system was amounted after 6 murder charges. Therefore, the 20 outstanding charges were 
stayed (Cameron, 2010; Matas, 2010). The Pickton case unveiled pre-existing issues with 
and perceptions of sex work.  
A major flaw of the Canadian criminal justice system was a lack of thoroughness 
of law enforcement in their investigations and lack of compliance with the community’s 
demand for action. Another shortcoming was their perception of sex workers as 
 
2 The Downtown East-Side Women’s Centre was formed around 1989. It consisted mostly of Indigenous 
women who were friends, family members of the victims –the women that had gone missing and or been 
killed since the early 1980s– and advocates of sex workers. They came together initially to urge law 
enforcement on the issue of the missing and dead women. Noting the negligence and dismissal of their 
concerns, the Centre decided to educate sex workers on protective strategies against potential kidnapping, 
assaults and death threats (Cameron, 2010). 
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disposable victims. Legal scholarship emphasizes that, before the Pickton case took 
center stage, individuals from Vancouver’s downtown east side were perceived as 
subhuman and disposable (Baddorf, 2007; Craig, 2014; Matas, 2010); sex workers were 
perceived as insignificant and disposable, which delayed investigations and closure of 
cases for more than two decades (Cameron, 2010; Craig, 2014). Despite Pickton’s 
conviction, sex workers from the Vancouver Downtown Eastside faced socio-legal 
issues. 
Sex workers in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside experienced a rise in violence, 
due to increase in patrolling post-Pickton (Pablo, 2008). Advocates of sex workers 
unsuccessfully demanded a moratorium from local police, which would allow sex 
workers to report the violence against them without being criminalized (Pablo, 2008). 
Libby Davies, Democratic Party Member of Parliament, noted a lack of civil action, and 
attempted to meet the demands of the community by becoming an advocate for sex 
workers. 
When Pickton was charged in 2002, Libby Davies voiced her concerns regarding 
the dangers provisions s. 210, s. 212(1)(j) and s. 213 posed for sex workers (Davies, 
2002a). Davies stated that sex work provisions were putting workers at risk and they 
should be reviewed (Davies, 2002b). Davies initiated a motion with the Standing 
Committee on Justice and Human Rights to review federal laws around solicitation, 
which resulted in the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws (SSL), which was a study of 
Canada’s criminal prostitution laws (Davies, 2003). In addition, sex workers around 
Vancouver’s downtown east-side were pressing the Mayor to legalize brothels for the 
upcoming winter Olympics in 2010 (Baddorf, 2007), and demanded the decriminalization 
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of sex work. The Pickton case reached a conclusion in 2007 with a life sentence. Craig 
(2014) emphasizes that Pickton’s ability to carry out the murders of numerous women is 
due to structural inequality in Canada, which is maintained through the dehumanization 
of sex workers. 
 The year of 2006 exemplified the relation between the hegemonic structures in 
Canada and sex work legislation. The report by the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws 
(SSL), titled The Challenge of Change: A Study of Canada’s Criminal Prostitution Laws 
came out in December 2006, shortly after the Conservative party took federal office in 
February of the same year (Marques, 2006). While the SSL “had a mandate seeking to 
improve the safety of individuals selling sexual services and communities overall”, 
different political parties had diverse reasons and approaches to sex work legal reform 
(House of Commons Canada, 2006, p. 2).  
There was a disagreement between the Conservative government and the other 
parties (Liberal, New Democratic and Bloc Québécois) on the nature of sex work and 
legal reform. In the SSL report, members from the Liberal, New Democratic, and Bloc 
Québécois parties wanted acknowledgement and action taken on the contradictory 
prostitution laws. The parties understood that sex work was legal, but it was nearly 
impossible to practice it without breaking the law (Marques, 2006). The three parties 
concurred that sexual transactions between consenting adults should not be regulated by 
the government, and emphasized that the focus should be on protecting sex workers 
without discriminating against the manner in which they did their work. The three parties 
were inclined to legislative reform with the goal of decriminalizing of sex work when the 
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transaction is consensual (Marques, 2006). As discussed below, the Conservative party 
had a different socio-legal approach to and overall perception of sex work.  
The Conservative party wanted a socio-legal reform that criminalized clients, 
pimps and exit plans for sex workers. Unlike the other three parties, the Conservative 
party believed that decriminalization was not the solution (House of Commons Canada, 
2006). In the SSL report, the chapter The Conservative Perspective described sex work as 
a form of violence, where clients and pimps are abusers and sex workers are victims. The 
opinion of the Conservative party on sex work is not only radical in nature, it also ignores 
voluntary practices in the sex industry. Due to the fact that multiple political parties had 
opposite approaches to legal and social reform the SSL was rendered inconclusive 
(Marques, 2006).  
Even though the SSL final report was ambiguous, advocates of sex workers’ 
rights still persisted on their efforts to ameliorate working conditions. From 2007 to 2010, 
Libby Davies kept encouraging the government to reform sex work legislation (Davies, 
2007a; 2007b; 2009; 2010b). Davies’ stance questioned the perspective of the 
Conservative party, stating that sweeping regulatory changes was an irresponsible 
approach (Davies, 2010a). Davies was not able to obtain a response from the 
Conservative party from 2006 onwards. Subsequently, in 2010, the Bedford application 
was initiated.  
The Bedford Case 
In 2009, Terri Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovitch and Valerie Scott challenged the 
constitutionality of s. 210 keeping common bawdy house, s. 212(1)(j) living on the avails 
of prostitution, and s. 213(1)(c) communicating for the purpose of prostitution because 
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the three provisions violated their section 7 right to life, liberty and security of the person 
(Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] O.J. No. 2739). The applicants also 
challenged the constitutionality of s. 213(1)(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada because it 
violated their section 2(b) right to freedom of thought, belief and opinion in addition to 
freedom of expression (Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] O.J. No. 
2739). The Christian Legal Fellowship, REAL Women of Canada, and Catholic Civil 
Rights League were not accepted as friends of the court (Bedford v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2009] O.J. No. 2739), yet this decision was appealed and upheld in September 
of 2009 (Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] O.J. No. 3881). The case, which 
is recognized as the Bedford decision was carried out in 2010 (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 
ONSC 4264). The three provisions were found unconstitutional by Justice Himel (2010 
(Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). In the same year, the Attorney General of 
Canada appealed for a stay of Justice Himel’s judgement (Bedford v. Canada (Attorney 
General), 2010 ONCA 814). Justice Rosenberg allowed the stay of  Justice Himel’s 
judgement until the appeal was to be argued (Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), 
2010 ONCA 814). The appeal was carried out in 2012, the Justices Doherty, Rosenberg, 
Feldman, MacPherson and Cronk partially allowed the appeal of Himel’s judgement 
(Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186). Bedford, Lebovitch and Scott 
were granted a cross-appeal which required the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) to 
review judgement of the Court of Appeal for Ontario (Canada (Attorney General) v. 
Bedford, 2013 SCC 72). The SCC recognized that the three provisions were violations of 
the Charter, by upholding the provisions challenged by the appellants (previously 
referred to as applicants) (Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72). 
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In the 2010 application, the three provisions —s. 210, s. 212(1)(j) and s. 
213(1)(c)— were challenged on the grounds that they violated their rights under section 
seven of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). 
The three provisions were s. 210 keeping or being found in a common bawdy house, s. 
212(1)(j) living on the avails of prostitution and s. 213(1)(c) communicating in public for 
purposes of prostitution. The appellants argued that the legislation violated their 
constitutional right to security, since the provisions created an unsafe environment and 
practices for their lawful jobs.  
The appellants argued a pro-decriminalization stance. The appellants argued that 
suspending the stated provisions would benefit the overall safety of sex workers, 
moreover, allow them to safely practice their legal jobs (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 
4264). The appellants were sex workers who willingly and consensually exchanged 
sexual services for money. The appellants intention was to ameliorate working conditions 
and thus the overall well-being of sex workers (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). 
The stance they took on sex work was that engagement in the sex industry is voluntary, 
between two consenting adults. Thus, the exchange of sexual services for money should 
not be sanctioned, decriminalization is the most beneficial legal model. From their 
perspective sex work is a form of labour; therefore, as workers, the appellants had the 
right to be protected under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Bedford v. 
Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). 
The case was opposed by the Attorney General of Ontario (AG Ontario), 
Christian Legal Fellowship, REAL Women of Canada and the Catholic Civil Rights 
League (respondents) who took an anti-prostitution stance (Bedford v. Canada (Attorney 
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General), [2009] O.J. No. 2739). The respondents argued against the suspension of the 
provisions, since from their perspective the practice is inherently violent (Bedford v. 
Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). The respondents believed that sex work leads to negative 
psychological repercussions, and argued that prostitution is linked to sex trafficking 
(Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). The respondents’ perspective on sex work was 
that the practice is inherently coercive; therefore, sex workers are seen victims. The 
respondents advocated for sex work to be criminalized due to its alleged inherent violent 
nature towards women (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). 
The Bedford case involved conflicting views on sex work. The opposing sides of 
the case represented two diverse approaches to sex work legislation —criminalization 
versus decriminalization—and overall perspectives on the practice itself, voluntary versus 
coerced. The next section will include: the historical changes of each provision and the 
reason why each provision was argued to be unconstitutional.  
Section 210: Keeping or Being Found in a Common Bawdy House. 
The provision s. 210 keeping or being found in a common bawdy house 
originated from earlier legislation that addressed the vagrancy offence (Bedford v. 
Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). In An Act Respecting Vagrants (S.C. 1869, c. 28), the term 
vagrant included keepers of bawdy houses, a synonym for a “house for the resort of 
prostitutes”. The early provision also defined clients as vagrants, since the provision 
criminalized people who frequented such establishments. A few decades later in An Act 
Respecting Offences against Public Morals and Public Convenience (R.S.C. 1886, c. 
157, s. 1), the inmates of bawdy houses were also defined under the term vagrant, which 
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ultimately criminalized the practice of sex work and individuals who facilitated the 
practice. 
In 1892, the first Canadian Criminal Code classified the provision that addressed 
bawdy houses as a nuisance, which fell under the broader category of “Offences against 
Religion, Morals and Public Convenience” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264; 
Criminal Code, 1892).The term bawdy house was defined as “a house, room, set of 
rooms or place of any kind kept for purposes of prostitution” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 
ONSC 4264 at para. 231). In 1913, an amendment was made to the provision, which 
criminalized individuals who owned the place that was being used as a bawdy house by 
knowingly allowing the location to be used for such purposes (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 
ONSC 4264). During that time the legislation was rephrased to criminalize individuals 
who were “found in” the bawdy houses (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 
234).  
In subsequent years, being an inmate in a common bawdy house was criminalized 
and also the provision was removed from the vagrancy section (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 
ONSC 4264). The provision underwent amendments that led it to include acts of 
indecency in 1917 (An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act, 
S.C. 1917, c. 14). Furthermore, in 1947, it was criminalized to transport a person to a 
bawdy house and the maximum penalty for such provision was increased (Bedford v. 
Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). Major changes to the provision before the Bedford decision 
were made between 1953-1954 when the bawdy house offences were moved into Part V 
of the Criminal Code Disorderly Houses, Gaming and Betting, in an attempt to distance 
the provision from vagrancy and nuisance provisions. Besides the classification change, 
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there was also a definition change to “a place that is (i) kept or occupied, or (ii) resorted 
to by one or more persons for the purpose of prostitution or the practice of acts of 
indecency” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 236). The provision 
underwent a few changes throughout times and the Bedford decision posed a new change 
to the provision. 
Terri Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovitch, and Valerie Scott argued that indoor 
practices reduce if not completely eliminate violence against sex workers (Bedford v. 
Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). The claim made by the appellants was not only based on 
their personal experiences, but also expert evidence which established that indoor 
practices give the sex worker control over the negotiations with the clients which leads to 
violence avoidance (Krüsi et al., 2012). In the decision, the expert evidence of the 
appellants stated that “working in-call is the safest way to conduct prostitution; however, 
it is illegal due to the bawdy house provisions” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at 
para. 127). The ability to carry out their practices indoor enables the sex worker to gain 
control over their practice by establishing boundaries with clients, which renders indoor 
environments safer for the sex workers in terms of violence prevention (Krüsi et al., 
2012). 
Even studies done from an anti-prostitution framework suggest that indoor 
environments have less physical violence than outdoor environments (Raphael & 
Shapiro, 2004). Scholars from an anti-prostitution stance attempt to minimize such 
findings by unsuitably defending the idea that prostitution is inherently violent (Farley, 
2005; Raphael & Shapiro, 2004). The expert evidence of the respondents did not address 
the constitutionality of the legislation, it addressed prostitution in general as “violent or 
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harmful because of a systemic power imbalance between female prostitutes and male 
clients” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 131).  
 The appellants argued that the impact the provision had on sex workers was 
grossly disproportionate to its original purpose (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). 
Based on expert evidence from the appellants and the respondents, it appears that the 
provision s. 210 compromises the physical security of sex workers, which automatically 
compromises their rights under s. 7of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
  Section 212(1)(j): Living on the Avails of Prostitution. 
Section 212(1)(j), living on the avails of prostitution, was originally part of the 
vagrancy offence, which defined vagrancy as “Everyone is a loose, idle or disorderly 
person or vagrant who . . . having no peaceable profession or calling to maintain himself 
by, for the most part supports himself by gaming or crime, or by the avails of 
prostitution” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 256). In 1913, the procuring 
provision included s. 216(l) “(ii) being a male person, lives wholly or in part on the 
earnings of prostitution” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 256).  
Once the amendment to the offence of procuring was made, the Criminal Code 
had two provisions—s. 238(j) and s. 216(l)—that addressed living on the avails of 
prostitution. Judge Mackenzie explained the difference between the provisions by stating 
that: 
“The distinction between the two sections really seems to be that s. 238(j) is 
intended for the transient who wanders about and occasionally falls back upon the 
avails of prostitution as a means of eking out a precarious existence, while s. 
216(l) is aimed at the man who engages himself in gleaning the earnings of 
prostitution as a business or stable means of livelihood. As supporting this view 
reference may be had to the second paragraph of s. 216” (Bedford v. Canada, 




The passage above also blatantly describes the perpetrators of such crime in the eyes of 
the common law. The comment made by Judge Mackenzie reflected how, as early as 
1939, there was a perception that the transgressors of such crime were males. The use of 
such an example to distinguish between the nature of the two provisions shows how 
arguments are made in court decisions, which exemplifies how specific discourse prevails 
in common law.  
The Criminal Code amendment in 1953-1954 led to the change of wording in the 
procuring provision to be living on the ‘avails’, instead of ‘earnings’ (An Act to amend 
the Criminal Code, 1947). The amendment in 1953-1954 also removed any prostitution 
related offenses from the vagrancy offense, thus, living on the avails became part of the 
procuring offense (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). The last three amendments 
made to the procuring provision were designed to address child prostitution.  
The appellants in Bedford argued that the provision problematizes business 
relations between the sex worker and others, such as individuals who were not in the sex 
industry but have a business relationship with the sex worker. This made it difficult for 
sex workers to have intimate relationships without having their partners infringing the 
law. The provision was also problematic since any financial transaction made by the sex 
worker, puts the recipient of the money at risk of being charged.  
In the realm of labour, the provision was problematic because it prevented sex 
workers from hiring personnel that could assist them. For example, the appellants 
mentioned how the sex workers are not able to hire drivers, security personnel, and 
assistants since it would make them live on the avails of prostitution. The appellants 
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emphasized that being able to hire such personnel “can reduce or eliminate the incidence 
of violence faced by prostitutes” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 11). The 
fact that sex workers could not spend their income without criminalizing the recipient 
demonstrates that sex work was not recognized as labour.  
Nussbaum (1998) presented the idea that sex work should have a labour discourse 
since sex workers use their body parts, just like any other worker, to make a financial 
gain. Considering this idea in conjunction with the fact that sex work was not illegal at 
the time of Bedford case, the provision deprived sex workers of using their earnings by 
criminalizing the recipients of the money, intimate partners or any dependents. The 
expert evidence of the appellants stated that “Some strategies to reduce these risks, such 
as hiring a driver or bodyguard or meeting a client in a public place beforehand, run afoul 
of the law” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 127). The expert evidence of 
the appellants proved that the provision prevented safe practices because the sex workers 
were unable to hire drivers or body guards for protection.  
Respondents’ expert evidence did not address every specific provision. Their 
expert evidence addressed prostitution in general, upholding how harmful it is since 
“prostitution is a form of violence against women” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 
4264 at para. 131). The expert evidence of the respondents did not justify the provision as 
constitutional, but the appellants’ argument supported the claim that the provision 
compromised the livelihood, thus the safety and security of the sex workers. The 
provision was found to be overbroad, since it could criminalize people whose intentions 
are non-coercive or exploitative and grossly disproportionate to its original intent 
(Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264).  
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Section 213: Communicating in Public for Purposes of Prostitution. 
The origins of the s. 213, communicating in public for purposes of prostitution, 
derived from the vagrancy laws, where being a prostitute was an offense. The legislation 
read “s. 175(1)(c) being a common prostitute or night walker is found in a public place 
and does not, when required, give a good account of herself” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 
ONSC 4264 at para. 273). In 1972, s. 175(1)(c) was replaced with a provision that 
addressed solicitation, the new legislation read “s. 195.1 made it a summary conviction 
offence to solicit any person in a public place for the purpose of prostitution” (Bedford v. 
Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 273). The Fraser Committee advised Parliament to 
repeal s. 195.1 and make respective amendments. In 1985, as a response to the Fraser 
Committee findings Bill C-49 was enacted, which led to the introduction of s. 213 (1)(c). 
The communicating provision underwent a few changes overtime prior to the Bedford 
decision.  
The appellants in Bedford stated that the provision s. 213 is unconstitutional 
because it led sex workers to make “hasty decisions without properly screening 
customers when working on the streets, thereby increasing their risk of danger” (Bedford 
v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 11). In this sense, due to the existence of the 
provision, sex workers were not able to speak about the transactions involving their work, 
which was technically legal. Expert evidence from Dr. John Lowman for the appellants 
mentioned: 
“how various law enforcement initiatives to enforce the communicating provision 
in Vancouver have had the effect of displacing street prostitutes from some of the 
city's traditional strolls into a more isolated commercial and industrial area. Dr. 
Lowman described this area as an "orange light district", which was not actively 
patrolled by police in order to diminish complaints from residents in more 
populated areas. He says that from 1995 to 2001, approximately 50 women who 
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worked in this orange-light district went missing” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 
ONSC 4264 at para. 130).  
 
The appellant’s expert evidence exemplified how the provision about communicating in 
public compromised the physical safety of the sex workers. However, the provision 
should have been justified by the respondents in order to sustain its place in the Criminal 
Code. 
As mentioned earlier, the respondent’s expert evidence supported general views 
on prostitution, which did not explicitly argue for the constitutionality of the provision 
about communicating in public. The lack of expert evidence addressing the necessity of 
the provision about communicating in public further validated the points made by the 
applicant’s expert evidence. Considering the overall expert evidence, the applicant’s 
expert evidence defended and supported that s. 213(c) was unconstitutional given how it 
compromised s. 7of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
Justice Himel recognized that “the law as it stands is currently contributing to 
danger faced by prostitutes” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 536). Justice 
Himel proceeded to voice how the provisions should not have “force and effect” taking 
into consideration the violation of the Charter (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at 
para. 536). Justice Himel commented on the responsibility of the Parliament to amend 
legislation, but accepted the decision of the sex workers. The Bedford case is considered 
a landmark in scholarship and Canadian legislative history. The themes found in the 
decision emphasize discourses that construct prostitution. The themes found in the 
Bedford decision will be discussed in the next section. 
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Themes Found in The Bedford Decision 
The Bedford decision, articulated by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, is 
filled with descriptive language that addressed issues surrounding sex work. This section 
will explore themes presented throughout the decision. The themes under exploration are: 
character construction, moralization of prostitution, prostitution as a nuisance, 
prostitution as a threat to the public and prostitution as coercive and oppressive. 
Character Construction. 
Throughout Bedford v. Canada (2010 ONSC 4264), Justice Himel depicted the 
actors in the sex industry setting by citing previous court decisions and legislations. 
Justice Himel expressed that individuals living on the avails of prostitution were male, for 
example “while s. 216(l) is aimed at the man who engages himself in gleaning the 
earnings of prostitution as a business or stable means of livelihood” (Bedford v. Canada, 
2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 256). The use of masculine nouns and pronouns established the 
gender of the beneficiary of sex work in such circumstances, which genders the 
construction of the participants in the sex industry.  
At certain points throughout history, legislation has been constructed by gendered 
language (Lauritsen, 2010). In the decision, Justice Himel highlighted provisions that 
addressed living on the avails of prostitution, which blatantly states: 
“(1) It is an offence for a man knowingly to live wholly or in part on the earnings 
of prostitution. 
  (2) For the purposes of this section a man who lives with or is habitually in the 
company of a prostitute or who exercises control, direction or influence over a 
prostitute's movements in a way which shows he is aiding, abetting or compelling 
her prostitution with others shall be presumed to be knowingly living on the 
earnings of prostitution, unless he proves the contrary” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 
ONSC 4264 at para. 260). 
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The excerpt above ascribed a feminine pronoun to the sex worker. On the other hand, 
third parties financially benefiting from the transaction were described as male. 
Therefore, the characters of the pimp (third party or beneficiary) and the sex worker were 
presented as dominant males versus susceptible females.  
The dominant-susceptible dichotomy is problematic. Embracing such dichotomy 
perpetuates the idea that sex workers are victims of violence and coercion, which further 
feeds into the discourse of sex workers as individuals at risk (Kantola & Squires, 2004; 
Law, 2015; Wright et al., 2015). This perpetuates the conflation of sex work discourse to 
coercive and oppressive discourse. Additionally, it prevents sex work discourse to be 
associated to voluntary engagement in the sex industry nor labour discourse.  
Moralization of Prostitution. 
The Bedford decision discussed the applicability of morality as a constitutionally 
valid legislative objective. The appellants argued that the provisions had a historical 
moral objective that should no longer be considered constitutional (Bedford v. Canada, 
2010 ONSC 4264). While the decision did not further expand on the appellants’ 
argument, the respondent’s arguments were developed as follows: 
“The CLF argues that prostitution is immoral, should be stigmatized and that it 
demeans the dignity of the prostitute and her client and harms women and the 
community at large. The CLF takes the position that morally based legislative 
objectives are constitutionally permissible where the laws are a reflection of 
society's core values that are otherwise compatible with Charter values” (Bedford 
v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para.219). 
The excerpt depicted that the concept of sex work was referred to in terms of 
immorality and indignity. The comment further problematized sex work since it did not 
88 
 
comply with society’s core values. The respondent further developed their argument 
when stating: 
“all sexual gratification in exchange for payment is inconsistent with respect for 
the human dignity of the seller of sexual services. Because the law requires that a 
criminal prohibition must be founded upon a demonstrable apprehension of harm, 
the AG Ontario argues that the term "harm" should be interpreted to include the 
commodification of sex and attitudinal harm that would accrue to women as a 
result of legally sanctioned prostitution. Accordingly, [page390] the prevention of 
harm to and exploitation of prostitutes and the protection of their dignity as 
human beings are valid constitutional objectives” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 
ONSC 4264 at para. 220). 
 
The excerpt above exemplified the moralization of sex work through the entanglement of 
sexual services to discourses of harm in common law. The respondent's stance was that 
harm is a commodification of sex. This brought forward a negative association of sex 
work, since the plea identified sex work discourse as violent. The transaction of sexual 
services for financial gain was perceived as an act that lacked dignity for the person who 
provided sexual services. In this excerpt, the dignity of a woman is reduced to the use of 
their genitalia; this limits the definition of dignity as one-dimensional. The dignity of a 
woman is solely defined in relation to their body. This is reflective of Nussbaum’s (1998) 
idea that female sexuality is moralized to delineate a specific standard of appropriate and 
inappropriate sexuality without justification. In this sense, the excerpt referred to women 
as a commodity themselves, by taking their agency. The appellants proposed the ability 
of women to commodify their own sexual services. Furthermore, the use of words about 
the women’s dignity being ‘protected’ fed the victim discourse, which ultimately fed into 
the idea that sex workers do not have agency over their own bodies. Protecting women’s 
dignities also allocates great importance to what women do sexually; this entails that 
women’s worth is measured in relation to their sexual capacities.  
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Justice Himel concluded the discussion about morality by saying “These decisions 
recognize that a law grounded in morality remains a proper legislative objective so long 
as it is in keeping with Charter values” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 
225). The framework from which the provisions and expert evidence was examined 
emanated from the perspective that sex work is a moral matter. This framework is 
problematic, since prostitution at the time was not illegal, therefore it should not have 
been up for moral debate. The expert evidence of the respondents addressed sex work 
from the perspective of morality; yet this perspective needs to be considered from a 
historical context to comprehend the reason the topic was originally moralized.  
The reason to call for historical context is to depict the changes Canadian law has 
undergone. For example, in the first Canadian Criminal Code, prostitution laws fell under 
"Offences against Religion, Morals and Public Convenience" (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 
ONSC 4264 at para. 230). Later on, the provisions s. 210 for bawdy-houses and s. 213 
were moved to the section titled Disorderly Houses, Gaming and Betting. This change 
illustrates legislative amendment as a similar structure to the Foucauldian (1978b) 
approach to discourse change (see Chapter III). The appellants’ concern was due to the 
lack of consideration of how historical context played a role in the moralization of sex 
work. Such a lack of context establishes the development of discourses that have 
historically problematized sex work. The moralization of sex work is convoluted, since it 
creates an inappropriate link between discourses of nuisance, coercion, oppression, and 
public threat. Such discourses fuel the conceptualization of sex work as wrong, which 
serves to moralize the term.  
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Prostitution as a Nuisance. 
In the Bedford decision, sex work is referred to as a public nuisance. For example, 
when speaking about provision s. 210, the Justice Himel stated that the objective of the 
legislation was about “control of common or public nuisances” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 
ONSC 4264 at para. 255). Justice Himel also addressed that s. 213 is in place to control 
“the social nuisance associated with street prostitution” (para. 278). In this sense, 
nuisance discourse contributes to the idea that sex work is a matter that needs to be 
contained. Nuisance discourse problematized sex work by ascribing a negative 
connotation to the practice, since it allegedly affected the general population (Hubbard, 
1998). 
Prostitution as a Threat to the Public. 
The discourse of sex work as a threat to society conceptually overlaps with 
nuisance discourse. By deeming sex work as a threat to the public, it further 
problematizes it. The respondents in the Bedford decision argued that while Parliament 
makes amendments, the provisions should not be suspended in order to protect the public 
(Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264).The continuous labeling of sex work as a threat 
to society throughout the decision further stigmatized the practice (Kantola & Squires, 
2004; O’Connell Davidson, 2014). The stigmatization of sex work supports the duality of 
at risk versus risky, which represents the sex worker as either a victim or a threat.  
The discourse of sex work as a threat to the public, binds the practice to a fixed 
context in which sexual services are exchanged. The ideology that sex work is a threat to 
society overlooks the fact that relationships between individuals have commercial 
transactions similar to sex work, but they are deemed as courtship (Nussbaum, 1998). In 
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this sense, the transaction of sexual services for financial gain has been constructed to be 
appropriate in the context of romantic relationships, but inappropriate and thus illegal, in 
the context of labour (Nussbaum, 1998). The explanation Nussbaum (1998) gave for such 
criminalization of sex work was due to its association to immorality. Furthermore, 
Nussbaum (1998) asserts that: 
“prostitution (frequently at least) is bound up with gender hierarchy, with ideas 
that women and their sexuality are in need of male domination and control, and 
the related idea that women should be available to men to provide an outlet for 
their sexual desires” (p.77).  
 
Nussbaum (1998) explained the gender hierarchy, where female sexuality was perceived 
as dangerous, and thus a threat to the patriarchal control of women. In this sense, 
delineating the standards in which sex work could be carried out represents patriarchal 
control over women’s bodies.  
Prostitution as Coercive and Oppressive. 
The nature of sex work was a topic brought up throughout the decision by the 
respondents and by Justice Himel. For example, the respondent’s expert evidence focused 
on delivering the message that: 
“prostitution is inherently violent, regardless of the legal regime in place or how 
or where prostitution is practiced, citing high rates of violence against prostitutes 
internationally. Most of their opinions did not deal directly with the legal regime 
in Canada or its impact, or lack thereof, on violence against prostitutes” (Bedford 
v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 344). 
The theme of coercion and oppression from part of the ideological framework of anti-
prostitution stance in the respondent’s expert evidence. Justice Himel made a comment 
on the respondent’s expert evidence submitted by Farley (2005): 
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“I found the evidence of Dr. Melissa Farley to be problematic. Although Dr. 
Farley has conducted a great deal of research on prostitution, her advocacy 
appears to have permeated her opinions. For example, Dr. Farley's unqualified 
assertion in her affidavit that prostitution is inherently violent appears to 
contradict her own findings” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 353) 
 The evidence provided by Farley was also seen as problematic by Weitzer (2005b, 
2005c). Weitzer (2005b, 2005c) explained that Farley’s ideology interfered with the 
rationalization of her research findings. Weitzer (2005b, 2005c) also argued that such 
ideology ignores the existence of voluntary and consensual sex work practice, since from 
an anti-prostitution standpoint, coercion and oppression are inherent in the practice to 
some degree.  
Coercion and oppression discourses problematize sex work since it fails to 
recognize its basic conceptualization. The term sex work entails the provision of 
voluntary and consensual sexual services (George et al., 2010). Therefore, attaching 
coercion and oppression discourses to sex work nullifies the core of its definition. The 
association of coercion and oppression as inherent in sex work feeds into the discourse of 
victim and at risk which takes away the agency of the sex worker (Weitzer, 2005b, 
2005c). Coercion and oppression disocurses correspond to activities done without 
consent, therefore corresponding to the term of trafficking (George et al., 2010). 
Overall, the themes surrounding sex work found in the Bedford decision 
demonstrate the dominant negative discourse attached to sex work practices. Such 
ideologies emanate from an anti-prostitution stance which moralizes sex work, on the 
grounds that sex work is social problem that should be contained due to its alleged 
inherent evil nature. This account fails to recognize the voice and research of pro-
prostitution individuals who continuously emphasize the erroneous conceptualization of 
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sex work as coercive and oppressive. Scholars continuously attempt to normalize the 
discourse of sex work as labor, voluntary and consensual (Krüsi et al, 2012; Nussbaum, 
1998; Shaver, 1994; Weitzer, 2005b). 
The Bedford decision noted where and how the law of sex work was created 
(Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264). The decision exposed the issues with sex work 
legislation, thus, uncovering the regulation of sex work throughout Canadian history. The 
act of exchanging sexual services for financial gain was not illegal when the decision was 
made, but all the activities surrounding such transaction were illegal. Lowman (2004) 
emphasizes that the legislative approach at the time of the decision allowed the Canadian 
government to criminalize sex work without explicitly having a law that prohibited the 
transaction of sexual services for money. Some of the themes found in the Bedford 
decision form part of themes found in the court decisions, while other themes lead to the 
discovery of alternate themes in the data, as stated in Chapter IV.  
Bedford Aftermath: Bill C-36 
In 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeals decision 
finding stated the provisions in question unconstitutional due to the dangerous conditions 
they posed for sex workers (Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72). The 
provisions were struck down, and the word ‘prostitution’ was removed from the Criminal 
Code. Even though the Supreme Court of Canada showed a thorough understanding of 
the negative impact the provisions had on sex workers, the provisions were in effect for a 
year, until Parliament amended the Criminal Code. The Canadian government was under 
the ruling of the Conservative party when Parliament delivered the amendments on 2014.  
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In 2014, Parliament proposed Bill C-36, Protection of Communities and Exploited 
Persons Act (Protection of Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25). The 
Bill’s objective —which can be found in the Background section of the legislative 
summary— was: to reduce the demand for sexual services, protect victims of sexual 
exploitation, and protect communities from the harms caused by prostitution (Protection 
of Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25). Bill C-36 introduced the 
application of the Nordic model or a neo-abolitionist legal approach to sex work 
legislation, which will be further discussed later in the current chapter. The provision of 
sexual services in the public setting remained legal (Protection of Communities and 
Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25). 
Provision Changes. 
This section will address the amendments made by the Parliament on the 
provisions s. 197(1), s. 210, s. 212(1)(j), s. 213(1)(c). 
(a) Bawdy House Provision.  
Section 197(1) was amended (Protection of Communities and Exploitation Act, 
S.C. 2014, c. 25). Prior to Bill C-36, s. 197(1) included the definition of prostitution, 
which was repealed in 2014. Under the section of Description and Analysis, section s. 
197(1) kept the definition of common bawdy houses as “the practice of acts of indecency, 
a place that is kept or occupied or resorted to by one or more persons” (Protection of 
Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25, section 2.11). The provision s. 210 
was amended to have it comply with the removal of the word prostitution, which was 
changed to sexual services for consideration (Protection of Communities and 
Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25). Additional comments emphasized prohibition from 
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frequent or regular use of the same locations for sex work (Protection of Communities 
and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25).  
(b) Living on The Avails Provision.  
The provision s. 212 was repealed in its entirety and replaced with s. 286(1) 
offence to obtain sexual services of an adult for consideration and s. 286(3)(1) offence to 
procure an adult (Protection of Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25, 
section 2.17.1). Bill C-36 stated that the new legislation was amended to reprimand 
people who parasitically benefitted from the financial gain of sex work. Therefore, the 
new law did not criminalize individuals who hold non-exploitative relationships with the 
sex worker (Protection of Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25). 
(c) Communicating Provision.  
The provision s. 213(1)(c) was repealed and replaced by s. 213(1)(1). Section s. 
213(1)(c) stated “anyone that stops or attempts to stop any person or in any manner 
communicates or attempts to communicate with any person everyone” (Criminal Code, 
1892). The new legislation reads: “anyone is guilty of an offence punishable on 
summary conviction who communicates with any person–for the purpose of offering or 
providing sexual services for consideration–in a public place, or in any place open to 
public view, that is or is next to a school ground, playground or daycare center” 
(Protection of Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25, section 2.13). 
Public place is defined under s. 213(2) as including “any place to which the public have 
access as of right or by invitation, express or implied, and any motor vehicle located in a 
public place or in any place open to public view” (Protection of Communities and 
Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25, section 2.13). Additional legislation made it an 
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offence to advertise sexual services for sale and gave common law power to remove such 
material from the internet (Protection of Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, 
c. 25). 
Bill C-36 seemed to not have taken into consideration the SCC’s ruling and the 
appellant’s expert evidence that emphasized the importance for sex workers to control 
their environment in order to maintain their safety and well-being (Jeffrey & MacDonald, 
2006; Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale, 2000; Lewis, 2010; O'Doherty, 2007). The provisions 
in 2010 did not allow sex workers to control their work environment, therefore the 
provisions should have been struck down and reformed. Parliament did not seem to grasp 
the rationale behind striking and suspending the provisions, since the provisions were 
only amended (Protection of Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25). The 
new legislation regarding sex work introduced a novel legislative approach in Canadian 
law. 
Legislative changes continued to criminalize the activities surrounding sex work, 
without explicitly criminalizing the act of selling sexual services. Bill C-36 recognized 
the difficulty of engaging in sex work without committing a crime (Protection of 
Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25). The changes brought forward by 
Bill C-36 for each provision were minimal, with the most relevant change being the 
removal of the word prostitution form the Criminal Code. The next section will explore 
the issues in implementation and scholarly criticism of the bill. 
Implementation Issues of Bill C-36 
 Bill C-36 implemented amendments to the provisions challenged on the Bedford 
case and also implemented a neo-abolitionist approach to sex work legislation. Bill C-36 
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refers to the neo-abolitionist approach to sex work legislation as the Nordic model. 
Nordic countries have different approaches to sex work legislation and also had diverse 
reasons for implementing their law systems, therefore, is not appropriate to call the neo-
abolitionist approach the Nordic model (Skilbrei & Holmström, 2011, 2016). This section 
focuses on the consequences after the enactment of Bill C-36.  
As discussed in Chapter II, the neo-abolitionist approach to sex work legislation 
criminalizes buying sexual services, while it does not criminalize selling them. Even 
though street prostitution remained legal under Bill C-36, the practice of sex work 
involves breaking the law according to s. 286.1 (obtaining sexual services for 
consideration), s. 286.4 (advertising an offer to provide sexual services for 
consideration), s. 210 (keeping or being found in a bawdy house) and s. 213(1)(c) 
(communicating in public places for the purpose of exchanging sexual services). Bill C-
36 states to provide legal immunity to sex workers of charges; yet, such immunity does 
not protect sex workers from mental or physical consequences that Bill C-36 has enabled.  
The enactment of Bill C-36 compromised the physical safety of sex workers. It 
has been found that constant police enforcement over certain areas pushes sex workers to 
minimize safety tactics (Krüsi et al., 2014). The legislation post-Bedford leads sex 
workers to not screen clients properly and displace them to remote areas, where they are 
at risk of violence and being forced to have unprotected sex (Krüsi et al., 2014). The 
partial criminalization of sex work compromises the physical safety of workers by 
promoting displacement of the sex worker, which leads to potential violence and abuse. 
Nevertheless, sex workers have also faced mental and psychological impacts after the 
implementation of Bill C-36. 
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The post-Bedford sex work law created stigma against sex workers, which 
affected their working conditions. After Bill C-36 was enacted, it was found that as the 
stigmatization of sex workers increases, depression in the sex workers also increases 
(Benoit et al., 2015). Benoit et al. (2016) found that sex workers were dismissing their 
mental and physical needs after the implementation of Bill C-36 due to fear of 
discrimination and stigmatization. Some sex workers that were interviewed revealed that 
there was apprehension to reach out to health services due to fear of being judged by 
healthcare practitioners and possible police involvement (Benoit et al., 2016). The last 
ideas demonstrate the detrimental effects of Bill C-36 on sex workers, which isolates the 
sex worker due to their fear of being stigmatized and charged.  
The neo-abolitionist approach to sex work law perpetuates unwarranted violence 
against sex workers. Some studies defend the idea partial criminalization of sex work 
compromises the legal protection of the sex worker (Amnesty International, 2015; 
Deering et al., 2014). For example, Amnesty International (2015) reported that adoption 
of the neo-abolitionist system in Norway led to a decrease of ‘good’ buyers; which meant 
that clients requesting services were less likely to respect the agreements made with the 
sex worker (Amnesty International, 2015). The report also highlighted that sex workers 
were still being criminalized and marginalized for their jobs, even though they were 
supposed to be protected under the law (Amnesty International, 2015). The neo-
abolitionist approach leads to isolation of sex workers, which increases violence and 
abuse incidents; ultimately, this creates apprehension in sex workers to reach out to 
health services or law enforcement (Amnesty International, 2015; Anderson et al., 2016; 
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Shannon & Csete, 2010). In addition to perpetuating of violence, Bill C-36 dismisses the 
voices of practicing sex workers.  
Bill C-36 did not include the opinions of non-coerced sex workers on the 
legislative changes discussed for living on the avails, keeping a bawdy house and 
communicating for the purposes of sexual services transactions. Research carried out 
after the change in legislation proved that sex workers felt that their policy 
recommendations were not being heard (Benoit et al., 2017). The newly adopted neo-
abolitionist model used oppressed and coerced discourse (victim or at-risk discourse) to 
represent sex workers, which was not a representation of the Bedford appellants and other 
practicing workers (Lowman & Louie, 2012). Furthermore, Bill C-36 denied recognizing 
sex work as a profession by ignoring the voices of the advocates of sex work.  
The sex work legislation implemented in 2014 (s. 210, s. 286(1), s. 286(3)(1), s. 
286.4 and s. 213(1)(1)) still did not recognize sex work as a profession. This is reflected 
in Bill C-36 where the sex industry is referred to as a public nuisance and also when 
overtly stating that the new legislation attempts to eradicate the demand for such 
services (Protection of Communities and Exploitation Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25). The 
disregard of sex work from the context of labour through its moralization leads to 
discrimination and stigmatization against workers who engage in the sex industry (Benoit 
et al., 2016). Unfortunately, the enactment of Bill C-36 has not been the only instance 
when sex workers were stigmatized and discriminated against. 
Bruckert and Hannem (2013) conveyed that sex workers have faced structural 
stigmatization throughout legislative history. The themes discussed earlier (prostitution as 
inherently coercive and oppressive, prostitution as a nuisance, prostitutes as victims and 
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at risk) derive from the ideology that sex work is inherently violent and confuses it with 
sex trafficking. Regardless, Parliament used such themes as the reason to amend the 
previous legislation (Bruckert & Hannem, 2013). As discussed before, taking a negative 
approach to sex work mutes the voices of sex workers who willingly work in the sex 
industry (Weitzer, 2005b, 2005c). The previous abolitionist and the current neo-
abolitionist approaches to sex work legislation are described in literature as filled with 
discourse of immorality that portray sex workers as victims (Bruckert & Hannem, 2013). 
Some scholars explain the association of immorality with sex work to the construction of 
the early Canadian constitution based on Judeo-Christian beliefs, meaning the rubric from 
which common law performs is currently tainted with such beliefs (Bruckert & Hannem, 
2013). Lauritsen (2010) reasoned that the stance Parliament took with the new 
amendments reflects the gendered history of sex work legislation. 
The legislative amendments made in Bill C-36 partially criminalizes prostitution, 
which enables the recurring pattern between the worker and structural 
stigmatization. Scholars recognize the importance of the Bedford case, as it opened a 
conversation about the socio-legal issues that sex work and the experience of sex workers 
(Campbell, 2015; Sampson, 2014). In literature, researchers urge municipal lawmakers to 
consider Justice Himel’s ruling and conclusion on the case, when she validated the 
unconstitutionality of the provisions challenged in Bedford (Craig, 2011). Considering 
discourses found in Bedford and the role they play in common law improves the 




New Horizons: Bill C-75  
Bill C-75, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act 
and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, was introduced on 
March 29, 2018, and received royal assent on June 21, 2019. The purpose of the Bill was 
to “make the criminal justice system more modern and efficient and to reduce delays in 
criminal proceedings” (Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 
25, section 1). The Bill removed certain provisions from the Criminal Code that had been 
ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada (Act to amend the Criminal Code, 
the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential 
amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 25).  
In the legislative summary of Bill C-75, under description and analysis, the 
provisions regarding bawdy houses (s. 210 and s. 211) were repealed due to the 
discriminatorily use “against the LGBTQ community and no longer serve a legitimate 
criminal law purpose” (Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 
25, section 2.1.1). The s. 210 provision was not listed in section 2.1.9 Unconstitutional 
Provisions because it did not form part of the proposed amendments of Bill C-39 or Bill 
C-32. Regardless, the wording “repeals provisions that have been ruled unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Court of Canada” was misleading (Act to amend the Criminal Code, 
the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential 
amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 25, section 2.1.9). The wording implied that all 
the provisions ruled as unconstitutional in the past, such as s. 212(1)(j) and s. 213(1)(c) 
were to be removed from the Criminal Code.  
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A Comment on Bill C-75. 
While the removal of s. 210 from the Criminal Code was a step towards 
decriminalizing sex work, there were some issues with the repeal. First, the repeal made 
it seem like only the LGBTQIA community was negatively affected by the 
criminalization of keeping a bawdy house. As proposed in this chapter, the appellants of 
the Bedford decision established that sex workers, regardless of their gender or their 
sexual orientation, could have benefitted from decriminalizing s. 210. Second, the repeal 
of s. 210 and s. 211 read as an afterthought on the legislators’ minds, since it was 
addressed in a small paragraph that followed a list of provisions that were to be repealed. 
Addressing the decriminalization of s. 210 should have included not only the negative 
effect on the LGBTQIA community, but also the negative effect on the working 
conditions the criminalization of s. 210 posed for all sex workers. The decriminalization 
of s. 210 should have mentioned the Bedford decision and the main argument of the 
appellants to remove s. 210 from the Criminal Code. Third, it is insufficient to only 
decriminalize s. 210. Criminalizing s. 210 keeping a bawdy-house was a provision 
through which police punished consensual queer sex (Hooper, 2019), thus the reason to 
decriminalize it was to appease the LGBTQIA community. LGBTQIA sex workers are 
negatively affected by other sex work related provisions (Chu & Glass, 2013; Lewis, 
Maticka-Tyndale, Shaver, & Schramm, 2005); this entails that both LGBTQ sex workers 
and non-LGBTQIA sex workers are endangered by sex work related provisions. Fourth, 
repealing s. 210 did not annul the implementation of the Nordic model. Even though 
keeping or being found in a bawdy-house is legal, it also implies involvement in illicit 
activities through the purchase of sexual services and other sex work related activities. 
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Sex work is still criminalized to this day, which negatively affects sex workers (Benoit et 
al., 2015; Benoit et al., 2016; Benoit et al., 2017; Campbell, 2015).  
Conclusion 
The Pickton case and the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws were crucial to 
understanding the issue the appellants of the Bedford decision proposed (Bill C-36). The 
appellants of the Bedford decision addressed an issue that was previously identified by 
Libby Davies, which was supposed to be addressed by the Subcommittee on Solicitation 
Laws report. Similarly, to the outcome of the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws, the 
Bedford decision led to a ‘solution’ where sex work was still problematized since 
discourses of violence, at risk and public nuisance were present in Bill C-36. Discourses 
in Bill C-36 are reflective of the themes found in the Bedford decision. Post Bill C-36 
research emphasize the psychological and physical issues sex workers face after the 
implementation of Bill C-36 (Benoit et al., 2015; Benoit et al., 2016; Benoit et al., 2017; 
Campbell, 2015). While Bill C-75 was a step towards decriminalizing sex work, there is 
an issue on solely decriminalizing s. 210. This chapter has demonstrated that Davies’ 
petition and the Bedford case has established recurring patterns in the Canadian socio-
legal setting. The current chapter explored the events that led up to the Bedford decision, 
the themes found in the Bedford decision and the aftermath of Bill C-36 and Bill C-75. 
The next chapter will focus on common law setting and the themes found in court 
decisions pre and post Bill C-36.   
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VI. DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS FOUND IN CANADIAN COURT 
DECISIONS BETWEEN 2010 AND 2018 
Research findings reflected several overarching categories:(a) the construction 
and practice of discourse addressing sex industry stakeholder, (b) sex work ideology, and 
(c) legislation in the legal setting. I separated the findings into two chapters—this chapter 
(Chapter VI) and the next chapter (Chapter VII)—in order to organize and present 
findings as either discursive constructions or discursive practices in the legal setting. In 
this chapter I present findings that represented discursive constructions which further 
shape prostitution discourse and perpetuate ideologies regarding sex work. Discursive 
constructions refer to the abstract, conceptual and ideological boundaries, and 
underpinnings of language found in court decisions. Through the use of discourse 
analysis on court decisions I found three major themes: the definition of prostitution, 
moralization of prostitution and the conflation of sex trafficking with sex work. The three 
major themes constitute the three parts of this chapter. Each section presents dominant 
themes, where findings of the pre-Bill C-36 dataset will be presented first, followed by 
the post-Bill C-36 dataset findings. Prior to the three sections reflecting the findings of 
the current study, I briefly discuss the structure of court decisions and legislative 
development since the creation of the Canadian criminal justice system. 
Part I. Definition of Prostitution and Use of Sex Work Discourse 
This section will uncover discursive constructions found in both pre and post-Bill 
C-36 datasets regarding the definition of prostitution, and the use of the term ‘sex work’ 
versus ‘prostitution’. As outlined in the literature review, there does not exist a consensus 
in the academic literature as to the status and meaning of the terms ‘prostitution’ and ‘sex 
work’. The terms ‘sex work’ and ‘prostitution’ co-exist as evidence that scholars cannot 
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agree on conceptualizations of and legislative approaches to sex work (Weitzer, 2005a, 
2005b, 2005c). These debates were also found in the case law, whereby the definition of 
prostitution was discussed as well as the use of the terms ‘sex work’ versus the use of 
‘prostitution’.  
Definition of Prostitution.  
The definition of the term prostitution was found in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset as 
“lewd acts for payment for the sexual gratification of the purchaser” (Bedford v. Canada, 
2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 248). The definition appeared three times in the pre-Bill C-36 
dataset. The definition used the discourse of indecent or vulgar acts to refer to sexual 
services; furthermore, this recycled definition defined prostitution in relation to the buyer. 
This definition dismissed the involvement, thus the agency, of the prostitute or sex 
worker who is the individual providing the services. In contrast, definitions of 
prostitution in the literature are inclusive of the seller and the buyer (Perkins & 
Bennett,1985; Høigård & Finstad, 1992), or are solely centered on the sex worker (Plant, 
1990).  
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset the definition of prostitution changed to “the 
exchange of sexual services in return for payment” (R. v. Griffiths, [2015] O.J. No. 5674 
at para. 38). This definition was used twice in the post-Bill C-36 dataset. The term was 
defined according to the functionality of the transaction; the definition of prostitution in 
post-Bill C-36 changed to a technical definition without centering on the participants of 
the sex transaction. This was done in an attempt to use neutral language, that is, language 
that attached neither negative nor positive meaning. Phoenix (1995) proposes that 
prostitution involves complex relations and activities; thus, neutral definitions of 
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prostitution are limited to the worker-client relationship. However, the new definition 
does not limit prostitution; it describes the exchange of sexual services, which involves 
the seller and the buyer.  
Defining prostitution also involves defining the sexual services or acts the sex 
worker provides. In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset the term ‘sexual services’ was used 22 
times, while ‘sexual acts’ appeared three times (see Appendix B). In the pre-Bill C-36 
dataset the term ‘sexual services’ was not explicitly defined, but it was mentioned that 
‘blowjobs’ and ‘sexual intercourse’ were forms of sexual services. It was not identified 
what comprises sexual intercourse, but judges stated that the users of sexual services 
were male. Furthermore, in R. v. Samuels ([2013] O.J. No. 4200), the terms ‘erotic 
services’ and ‘sexually explicit photographs’ were used; the terms did not disclose if the 
erotic services, sexual services or sexually explicit photographs referred to female or 
male masturbation, penetration by means of dildos or male genitalia, vaginal, oral or anal 
sex. Overall, the context and language surrounding sexual services was restrictive and 
ambiguous.  
In the post-Bill C-36, ‘sexual services’ was mentioned 143 times and ‘sexual acts’ 
appeared 16 times (see Appendix B). However, in some court decisions the debate 
centered around the definition of sexual services. In R. v. Griffiths ([2015] O.J. No. 
5674), the judge cited R. v. Mara ([1996] O.J. No. 364) and stated that performing lap 
dances was a form of prostitution. In R. v. N.A. ([2017] O.J. No. 1369), the Crown stated 
that sexual services entailed engaging in ‘sexual acts’ with men, with stripping not 
constituting a sexual act. The two examples shed light on the lack of consensus around 
what comprised ‘sexual services’ or ‘prostitution’. The post-Bill C-36 dataset also had 
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ambiguity in the discursive construction of sexual services. One important insight is that 
judges defined sex work terminology based on previous court decisions that were decades 
old; the use of sex work definitions from such old court decisions implies that discourse 
used in common law is outdated.  
The word ‘prostitute’ was used in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset 82 times (see 
Appendix B). One definition found in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset proposed that a series of 
negative experiences such as teenage motherhood, foster care and lack of education 
constructed a prostitute. In another instance, it was said that being a prostitute was not 
illegal. On the other hand, the word ‘prostitute’ was mentioned 130 times in the post-Bill 
C-36 dataset (see Appendix B); prostitute was defined as “a person who offers or 
provides sexual services for consideration” (R. v. Evans, [2017] O.J. No. 3424, at para. 
136). This definition was not always used, at times the term ‘prostitute’ was defined as a 
consequence of “the group home system and had been manipulated, exploited and 
prostituted by a pimp when she was a minor” (R. v. Safieh, [2018] O.J. No. 3880, at para. 
12). Defining prostitute as a by-product of negative experiences demonstrates the 
negative discourses and stigma attached to the term ‘prostitute’. The shift in the definition 
of prostitute from the pre-Bill C-36 to post-Bill C-36 dataset seems virtually non-existent 
except for the inclusion of a definition with neutral language. 
Sex Work versus Prostitution. 
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset the terms ‘prostitute’, ‘prostitution’, ‘sex trade’ and 
‘sex trade workers’ were commonly used. The judge in R. v. Samuels ([2013] O.J. No. 
4200) questioned the appropriate term to be used by referring to the sex worker as an 
“escort” and referring to sex work as “escort prostitution services” (at para. 31). The 
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Bedford decision used the term ‘survival sex workers’ to define sex workers who were 
homeless and drug addicts; in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset this was the only court decision 
that used the language of ‘sex work’ which was conflated with discourses of 
homelessness and drug addiction. The term ‘sex trade’ was used six times and ‘sex work’ 
was used four times, which is minimal when comparing such numbers to the use of the 
word ‘prostitution’ —108 times— and the word ‘prostitute’, which was used 82 times 
(see Appendix B).  
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset the term ‘prostitution’ was used 183 times, even 
though such language was struck from the Criminal Code as of November 6, 2014 (see 
Appendix B). The abolishment of the term ‘prostitution’ should be no surprise 
considering that since the 1970s, sellers of sexual services and their advocates protested 
against poor work conditions, lack of beneficial legislative reform and overall social 
stigma (McClintock, 1993). As a result, sellers of sexual services prefer the term ‘sex 
work’ and ‘sex worker’, as it derives from the description of their jobs. The lack of regard 
for the word ‘prostitution’ was found in R. v. Majdalani ([2017] O.J. No. 1252) where the 
sex worker stated that “she was an escort, a term she prefers to prostitute” (at para. 108). 
Regardless, in the post-Bill C-36 dataset, the word ‘sex work’ was only used 27 times, 
while ‘sex worker’ was used only 22 times (see Appendix B). When comparing such 
numbers with the 130 instances that the word ‘prostitute’ was used, and the 183 times the 
term ‘prostitution’ was used, it reflected a lack of understanding in common law 




The shift from the pre-Bill C-36 dataset to the post-Bill C-36 dataset laid in the 
theoretical removal of the word ‘prostitution’ on November 6, 2014, yet the term 
‘prostitute’ remained prevalent in both datasets. This demonstrates the lack of 
understanding in Canadian common law regarding the need to improve the work 
conditions of sex workers by means of legal reform and prohibiting social stigma against 
sex workers. 
Part II. Moralization of Prostitution 
This section will present instances from both pre and post-Bill C-36 datasets in 
which sex work was referenced in relation to morality. The literature surrounding the 
moralization of prostitution comprised discourses of religion, male domination, and over-
concern with women’s sexuality (Backhouse, 1985; Brundage, 2009; Engels, 1972; 
Hallgrímsdóttir et al., 2008; Kantola & Squires, 2004). References to morality was found 
in both pre and post-Bill -36 datasets. The topic of sex work was moralized by deeming 
the commodification of sexual services as inappropriate, deviant and a danger to society.  
Commodification of Sexual Services as Inappropriate. 
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset the term ‘morality’ was mentioned three times; two of 
the three instances addressed morality as the grounding based of Canadian legislation 
(see Appendix B). There were four times in which the term ‘immoral’ was used (see 
Appendix B). In two of those instances, it was said that “prostitution is immoral” 
(Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 219); while the two other mentions were 
to explain that because of the immorality of prostitution, and specifically the compromise 
of social values, sex work should be stigmatized (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC). Prior 
to the implementation of Bill C-36 prostitution discourse was conflated with immorality 
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and disruption of social values. Furthermore, legislation —law— was used to define the 
citizen’s integrity, and thus shape which acts are immoral. In terms of the citizen’s 
integrity, another principle meshed in prostitution discourse is dignity.  
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, ‘dignity’ appears four times (see Appendix B). In one 
of those instances it is stated that: 
Excerpt 1 
“all sexual gratification in exchange for payment is inconsistent with respect for 
the human dignity of the seller of sexual services. Because the law requires that a 
criminal prohibition must be founded upon a demonstrable apprehension of harm, 
the AG Ontario argues that the term ‘harm’ should be interpreted to include the 
commodification of sex and attitudinal harm that would accrue to women as a 
result of legally sanctioned prostitution. Accordingly, [page390] the prevention of 
harm to and exploitation of prostitutes and the protection of their dignity as 
human beings are valid constitutional objectives” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 
ONSC 4264 at para. 220).  
 
In Excerpt One, the construction of citizens’ integrity was referred to as the 
commodification of sexual services as both an endangerment of the dignity of the seller 
as well as an act that causes harm to the seller of the services. The passage did not expand 
on the conceptualization of dignity; therefore, to state the dignity of the seller was at risk 
was vague. It was problematic to solely focus on one person involved in the exchange, 
when there are two people involved. In general, relationships amongst individuals are 
transactional (Nussbaum, 1998). In a romantic relationship there are exchanges of gifts, 
sexual acts, and emotional services, amongst the most common exchanges (Nussbaum, 
1998). The same concept is applicable to the exchange of skills for money, in other 
words, employment (Nussbaum, 1998); Excerpt One emphasized that the 
commodification of sexual acts has been framed in law as an undignified act, as immoral, 
without discussing the components of dignity of the citizen. Yet, Excerpt One actively 
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constructed the dignity of the seller and dismissed the dignity of the buyer or client. The 
client’s dignity was not endangered, even though their actions —which are buying and 
forming part of the sexual act— were part of a process deemed undignified. The 
‘endangerment of dignity’ referred by the judges in pre-Bill C-36 cases targeted the 
dignity of the seller, thus the sex worker. Furthermore, Excerpt One highlighted the 
manner in which prostitution acquired the language of exploitation by means of harm 
towards the seller; in this sense, prostitution was constructed to be a ‘risky’ or 
‘dangerous’ activity.  
On the other hand, in the post-Bill C-36 dataset, the term ‘morality’ was not 
present, but the word ‘moral’ was used four times (see Appendix B). The four uses 
represented diverse instances, from judges recognizing the moral blame of the criminal 
system to the moral culpability of a young sex worker (R. v. A.S., [2016] O.J. No. 5838; 
R. v. Gray-Lewis, [2018] O.J. No. 4304; R. v. Robitaille, [2017] O.J. No. 5954; R. v. 
Safieh, [2018] O.J. No. 3880). Even though the terms ‘moral’ and ‘morality’ were 
scarcely used, there were instances where sex work was moralized. Similar to the pre-Bill 
C-36 dataset, the idea that the commodification of sexual services compromised the 
human dignity of the seller was found in the post-Bill C-36 dataset. The word ‘dignity’ 
appeared in the dataset four times (see Appendix B). One of the most compelling findings 
was the absence of the word’ immorality’ in the post-Bill C-36 dataset; sex work was 
moralized in the post-Bill C-36 dataset through the use of adverbs. 
The post-Bill C-36 dataset relied heavily on adverbs to indicate the 
inappropriateness of exchanging sexual services for money. For example, “Accordingly, 
in a very real and practical sense, pimps’ traffic in the human resources of prostitutes, 
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callously using their sexual services as an endlessly available commodity to be simply 
bought and sold in the market place” (R. v. Lopez, [2018] O.J. No. 4145 at para. 52). The 
adverb ‘callously’ attributed a negative intention on behalf of the pimps to use the sex 
workers; therefore, the act —sexual services— was described in a problematic context. In 
other instances, sex work was also deemed as inappropriate because it was equated to 
trouble or danger. For example, “C.S. claimed she had never done stuff like that before 
and that she was ‘always the type of girl who didn't get into trouble’” (R. v. Dykes, [2018] 
O.J. No. 2979 at para. 12). The example illustrated the association of sex work as a 
deviant activity which was outside the normal standards that regulate the activities 
categorized as appropriate and inappropriate.  
Identifying prostitution as inappropriate was also perpetuated in both datasets by 
defining it as a dangerous activity and a lewd act. In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, 
prostitution was defined as a lewd act; furthermore, judges constantly analyzed the effect 
of prostitution on the community. In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, the criminalization of 
prostitution was established as a means to protect the public from the nuisance of 
prostitution. Correspondingly, in the post-Bill C-36 dataset prostitution was referred as a 
danger 14 times (see Appendix B). For example, “The social ills and dangers associated 
with prostitution” (R. v. Safieh, [2018] O.J. No. 3880 at para. 18); the risk the passage 
refers to is the risk prostitution poses on society. Therefore, through the moralization of 
prostitution, the discourse prostitution as a threat to society was accepted and embraced 
by judges in Canadian common law.  
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Prostitution as a Threat to Society. 
The continuous depiction of prostitution as an inappropriate act enables the 
discourse of endangerment of dignities. Additionally, the risks of prostitution in the pre-
Bill C-36 dataset were portrayed as having an effect on the general public. In the Bedford 
decision, the effect of sex work on the community was discussed when referring to 
bawdy-houses as 
Excerpt 2 
 “detrimental to the public, as they promote cheating and other corrupt practices; 
and incite to idleness and [page395] avaricious ways of gaining property persons 
whose time might otherwise be employed for the good of the community” 
(Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 238). 
 
The s. 210 provision that criminalized keeping or being found in a bawdy-house has been 
repealed with Bill C-75 in 2019; yet, the language used prior to Bill C-36 implied that sex 
workers practiced acts that put the community at risk. Sex workers and sex work were 
portrayed in a damaging light. The language of ‘avarice’, ‘idleness’, ‘corruption’ and 
‘cheating’ further feeds into the perception that prostitution and its industry are 
dangerous, and thus a threat to the integrity of citizens. This framing makes sex workers 
responsible for the decision making of others, such as infidelity.  
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset prostitution was depicted as a threat to society given 
the alleged correlations to crime, and exposure of children to such crime and potential 
exploitation. For example, 
Excerpt 3 
“Prostitution also negatively impacts the communities in which it takes place 
through a number of factors, including: related criminality, such as human 
trafficking and drug-related crime; exposure of children to the sale of sex as a 
commodity and the risk of being drawn into a life of exploitation; harassment of 
residents; noise; impeding traffic; unsanitary acts, including leaving behind 
dangerous refuse such as used condoms or drug paraphernalia; and, unwelcome 
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solicitation of children by purchasers” (R. v. Boodhoo, [2018] O.J. No. 6413 at 
para. 52). 
 
Excerpt Three was filled with discourse that associates prostitution to crimes, human 
trafficking, and a focus on the potential negative effect on children. Excerpt Three (a) 
responsibilizes the sex industry as a whole for the negative effects of sex work in the 
community, and (b) assumed that harassment, noise, impeding traffic as well as polluting 
the environment with condoms and paraphernalia solely exists because of prostitution. 
Such discourse feeds the language of sex work as risky (Wright et al., 2015); such 
normative ideas of a safe community create resistance to integrate sex worker as citizens 
of the community (Wright et al., 2015). Additionally, embracing the discourse of 
prostitution as a threat to society deemed the language of sex workers as unwanted.  
Similarly, to the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, the post-Bill C-36 dataset also deemed the 
commodification of sexual services as inappropriate. For example,  
Excerpt 4 
“Prostitution reinforces gender inequalities in society at large by normalizing the 
treatment of primarily women's bodies as commodities to be bought and sold. In 
this regard, prostitution harms everyone in society by sending the message that 
sexual acts can be bought by those with money and power. Prostitution allows 
men, who are primarily the purchasers of sexual services, paid access to female 
bodies, thereby demeaning and degrading the human dignity of all women and 
girls by entrenching a clearly gendered practice in Canadian society” (R. v. 
Boodhoo, [2018] O.J. No. 6413 at para. 52). 
 
The example used gendered and moralized views of prostitution to argue that prostitution 
is a threat to society. Excerpt Four generalized that sex workers were women and the 
buyers were men. These findings resembled findings from the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, in 
which the human dignity that was compromised belonged to the sellers, not the buyers. 
This led to over-preoccupation with women, which was not a new concept (Engels, 
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1972). One striking difference between datasets is the explicit referral of women as the 
sex workers, thus the stakeholders whose dignities are being ‘degraded’ and ‘demeaned’.  
The shift from ‘endangered dignities’ to ‘demeaned’ and ‘degraded dignities’ 
delineated a change from total loss of dignity to a partial loss of dignity. In the pre-Bill C-
36 dataset, when the dignity of the sex worker was said to be endangered, it illustrated 
that the dignity itself was at risk, therefore engaging in prostitution presumably took 
away all of the dignity of the prostitute. On the other hand, to have the dignity demeaned 
or degraded imparted the idea that by engaging in prostitution the prostitute lowers or 
loses part of their dignity. Nevertheless, the shift from a total loss of dignity to a partial 
loss of dignity moralized prostitution by upholding sexuality to be what constructs the 
dignity of women (Engels, 1972; Nussbaum, 1998). Additionally, the moralized 
discourse of prostitution that constructed the dignity of women demonstrated its 
regulative power over women’s bodies. 
Overall, both datasets deemed prostitution as inappropriate. The pre-Bill C-36 
dataset explicitly used the language of ‘morality’ and ‘immorality’ to regard prostitution 
as inappropriate; while the post-Bill C-36 dataset relied on adverbs like ‘callous’ and the 
use of ‘dangerous’ to imply the inappropriateness of the commodification of sexual 
services. In both datasets the language used to describe prostitution as a threat to society 
was moralized in an attempt to make discourse more enticing; the pre-Bill C-36 dataset 
moralized language referred to the endangerment of dignity while the post-Bill C-36 
dataset moralized language spoke about the degradation of dignity.  
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Part III. Conflation of Sex Trafficking and Sex Work 
The conflation of the terms ‘sex trafficking’ and ‘sex work’ occurs due to the lack 
of discernment between voluntary engagement in the sex industry and the coercion of 
individuals into sex trafficking. This idea is constantly debated when different feminist 
theorists do not agree on the nature of sex work, whether the engagement is voluntary or 
coerced and have different legal models (Weitzer, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). I will explore 
the following themes to understand the conflation of sex work to sex trafficking: 
voluntary and consensual practices, victim blaming sex workers, and the belief that third 
parties are the sole financial beneficiaries of sex work. The former idea refers to instances 
when sex work is perceived as coercive and lack of agency on behalf of sex workers. The 
last topic of the section will be the erroneous conceptualization of sex work as sex 
trafficking, and as a consequence of such, the normalization of prostitution as inherently 
evil. 
Voluntary Engagement in Sex Work. 
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset the judges used phrases like ‘decided to’ and ‘her own 
choice’ to demonstrate the willingness of the sex worker to engage in the sex industry. 
For example, in R. v. Salmon ([2014] O.J. No. 4887) the judge made a comment that “she 
was prostituting herself by her own choice, without any pressure from him” (R. v. 
Salmon, [2014] O.J. No. 4887 at para. 20). Here, the judge recognized the agency of the 
sex worker, as well as that involvement in the sex industry can be a voluntary practice; 
yet, the judge still used the pejorative phrasing of ‘prostituting herself’, as if the standard 
of the sex industry was to have someone else ‘prostitute’ the individual (Weitzer, 2005a). 
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This is relevant when considering comments made in the Bedford decision where the 
respondents side supported that the practice of sex work is never completely voluntary. 
 In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, sex workers were at times described as independent 
from pimps. This independence referred to the control of transactions, and the ability of 
sex workers to decide their transactions. For example, “Ms. Hughes who controlled the 
appointments she made with clients. The appointment lists were in her handwriting 
according to her testimony. She contacted clients, she set her fees and controlled if and 
when she worked as an escort” (R. v. Soulliere, [2013] O.J. No. 3174 at para. 120). The 
free will of the sex worker was represented as the ability to establish her transactions. In 
R. v. Burton ([2013] O.J. No. 1748) free will was presented by stating “A.S. testified that 
she could have gone to someone else, but she did not want to” (R. v. Burton, [2013] O.J. 
No. 1748 at para. 21). The previous example acknowledged the freedom that sex workers 
have over their work, contrary to often-touted perspectives that all sex workers lack free 
will, or agency, over the commercial sexual exchange (Farley, 2005). 
Free will, agency and voluntary involvement in the sex industry were also spoken 
about from the context of consent. The judges in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset expressed that 
the sex workers’ consent was irrelevant. For instance: “Again, consent is not relevant. 
And even if it was somehow relevant, I find that M.B. never consented to the activities 
which form the subject-matter of any of these offences” (R. v. K.O., [2014] O.J. No. 2792 
at para. 176). Contrarily, some other judges treated voluntary engagement as a crucial 
factor. For example, “Both these women were over the age of 18 and were escorts by 
choice” (R. v. Byron, [2013] O.J. No. 5396 at para. 18). Consent or voluntary engagement 
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should not be treated as irrelevant, because it is a key factor when distinguishing sex 
work and sex trafficking.  
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset when the judges referred to the willingness of the sex 
worker to perform sexual acts, the language used included the terms ‘coercion’, and 
‘trafficked’. This can be seen in R. v. A.R ([2016] O.J. No. 6184) when the judge stated 
“A. does not believe she was coerced by her boyfriend to enter the sex trade” (R. v. A.R., 
[2016] O.J. No. 6184 at para. 35). In R. v. Dykes ([2018] O.J. No. 2979) a sex worker 
expressed “she was not being trafficked” (R. v. Dykes, [2018] O.J. No. 2979 at para. 53). 
The language of ‘decided’, ‘agreed to’, and ‘it was her idea’ were present in the dataset. 
For example, “The complainant agreed to leave London and return to York Region to 
work in the sex trade with Ms. Najafi” (R. v. Moradi, [2016] O.J. No. 7031 at para. 2) and 
“C.R. testified that it was her idea to do extras” (R. v. Griffiths, [2015] O.J. No. 5674 at 
para. 17). At times judges emphasized that the pimps rarely had to coerce workers which 
reflects the erroneous belief that sex work entails a nonconsensual practice. 
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset, free will or voluntary practice was portrayed as sex 
worker independence and control over their transactions. For example, 
Excerpt 5 
“She decided where to work and she set her own rates. On her own volition she 
moved around numerous clubs in order to maximize her earnings, rather than 
working exclusively at one club. She covered her essential living needs by staying 
in motels and taxing to and from work. She sold cocaine to supplement her 
income. And she was no pushover: on one occasion, she smashed a bottle over a 
customer's head who tried to ‘finger’ her without her permission. Overall, I am 
not persuaded she ceded much influence to anyone” (R. v. Morgan, [2018] O.J. 
No. 3377 at para. 41).  
 
Excerpt Five described the sex worker’s autonomy to emphasize that the sex worker was 
not influenced by others. The willingness to participate in the sex industry was found in 
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other court decisions through the use of the terms “in control at all times” and “out of her 
own volition” (R. v. Korof, [2017] O.J. No. 963 at para. 193; R. v. Rocker, [2018] O.J. 
No. 3193 at para. 23). The concept of ‘consent’ was dominant in the post-Bill C-36 
dataset. This could be due to the necessity to discern between sex trafficking and sex 
work since it is necessary to prove if the worker was trafficked or was practicing sex 
work on her/his own accord. 
Victim Blaming Sex Workers. 
In the process of differentiating voluntary engagement of the sex worker from 
them being sex trafficked, the discourse of victim blaming appeared in the data. There 
were moments in the data when judges recognized the agency and autonomy of the sex 
worker, which was used to responsibilize sex workers for their assaults or abuse. This is 
problematic because sex workers and their advocates refer to these instances as poor 
working conditions. Bedford, Lebovitch and Scott were striving to improve these 
working conditions in their 2010 Charter challenge.  
Judges engaged in victim blaming when they questioned the decisions of the sex 
worker. For example, “The defence questioned why she did not seek help then but instead 
allowed herself to return with Mr. Byron” (R. v. Byron, [2013] O.J. No. 5396 at para. 32). 
The word ‘help’ was vague and did not fully explain the types of resources the sex 
worker could have used or that were available. The use of the word and phrase ‘instead’ 
and ‘allowed herself’ attributed responsibility to the sex worker for any assault or abuse 
that occurred once she worked again with Mr. Byron. Furthermore, other language used 
in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset was ‘could have’ (R. v. Burton, [2013] O.J. No. 1748) and 
‘opportunity to flee’ (R. v. K.O., [2014] O.J. No. 2792) to refer to opportunities sex 
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workers had to disengage from providing sexual services. Such discourse was used in the 
context when sex workers were assaulted or mistreated; therefore, the judges took these 
instances to remind sex workers that they had the ability to prevent the physical or verbal 
assaults by disengaging their sexual services. The engagement of victim blaming 
discourse negatively affected sex workers, as the implementation of Bill C-36 did.  
Responsibilizing the sex worker for poor working conditions in Canada’s sex 
work industry is analogous to negative experiences of sex workers after the 
implementation of Bill C-36. Sex workers were displaced; they were forced to perform 
their work in remote areas, which made them vulnerable to violence and assault 
(Campbell, 2015; Krüsi et al., 2014). The issue did not exclusively pertain to the 
displacement of sex workers; another outcome of this issue was that sex workers did not 
attend to their mental and physical health, which was perpetuated by their fear of being 
discriminated and stigmatized (Benoit et al., 2016). Therefore, when judges 
responsibilized sex workers for poor working conditions, they engaged in discrimination 
and stigmatization of sex workers.  
Similarly, the post-Bill C-36 dataset had victim blaming language that targeted 
sex workers. The common words and phrases used in the post-Bill C-36 dataset were ‘did 
not leave’, ‘despite of’, ‘instead of going to the police’, and ‘she knew what she was 
getting into’. In 10 examples, judges emphasized the option of leaving due to 
maltreatment on behalf of pimps. The phrase “she knew what she was getting into” (R. v. 
Lucas-Johnson, [2018] O.J. No. 3685 at para.239) was an example of victim blaming 
discourse and described the sex industry as inherently violent. The appearance of victim 
blaming discourse in the post-Bill C-36 was contradictory. 
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 The contradiction in victim blaming language in the post-Bill C-36 dataset 
denoted that (a) blaming the victim for the violence and coercion they underwent goes 
against the functionality of Bill C-36, and (b) voluntary engagement of sexual services 
existed but has restrictive socio-legal barriers. As of November 6, 2014, sex work was 
deemed inherently exploitative and coercive. Therefore, all sex workers should have been 
treated as victims, to comply with the idea that sex workers lack the ‘option’ to leave the 
situation they are in; yet, it was demonstrated in both datasets that even judges 
recognized that all individuals presented before the court were not victims. Furthermore, 
to comply with the language and ideology used in Bill C-36 would be to say that judges 
blamed individuals for the violence, coercion and oppression they faced. Judges are 
agents that further conflate sex work to coercive and oppressive activities through the use 
of victim blaming. 
Police officers were also found to be a barrier in the socio-legal setting. Judges in 
three cases from the post-Bill C-36 dataset stated that sex workers were not going to the 
police for help. Apprehension to be involved in legal issues, discrimination and 
stigmatization were some of the reasons sex workers in Canada did not reach out to 
police officers (Benoit et al., 2016). This was seen in the post-Bill C-36 dataset when 
“Constable Bentley testified that she was concerned about that narrative because MCW 
implied she had been held against her will, yet indicated that she was left alone in the 
room. The officer thought she could have simply got up and left” (R. v. Majdalani, 
[2017] O.J. No. 1252 at para. 51). The use of the word ‘yet’ undermined the statement 
provided by the sex worker and insinuated that the sex worker could have prevented 
being ‘held against her will’. The example demonstrated that police officers recognized 
122 
 
that sex workers were not victims, yet they were not willing to help sex workers in 
circumstances when they were confined, assaulted or abused. 
Financial Beneficiaries of Sex Work. 
One of the reasons sex work is conflated with sex trafficking is due to the belief 
that the monetary gain goes to other people, rather than the sex worker. The former idea 
implies that the existence of a third party increases the risk of sex worker exploitation. 
The section aims to provide instances in the datasets that overtly or covertly state that the 
beneficiaries of sex work transactions are usually third parties. 
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset the financial beneficiaries of sex work are said to be 
“humiliating” the sex worker (R. v. Salmon, [2014] O.J. No. 4887 at para. 22). Feminists 
who believe women cannot benefit from sex work also believe it is a form of violence 
and oppression against women (Farley, 2005; Gerassi, 2015; Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 
2013). On the other hand, in the 13 instances in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset when there was 
a referral to money exchanged for sexual services, it was not specified that the recipient 
of the money would be someone other than the sex worker. The language used was the 
client ‘offered’ (R. v. K.O., [2014] O.J. No. 2792), the sex worker ‘charged’ (R. v. 
Soulliere, [2013] O.J. No. 3174) or the sex worker was ‘paid’ (R. v. Wasser, [2010] O.J. 
No. 2526). This can be interpreted as the recognition on behalf of judges that sex workers 
financially benefitted from their sexual services.  
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset, there were instances where it was bluntly put that 
only third parties benefit from the practice of sex work. For example,  
Excerpt 6 
“Third parties promote and capitalize on this demand by facilitating the 
prostitution of others for their own gain. Such persons may initially pose as 
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benevolent helpers, providers of assistance and protection to those who ‘work’ for 
them. But the development of economic interests in the prostitution of others 
creates an incentive for exploitative conduct in order to maximize profits” (R. v. 
Boodhoo, [2018] O.J. No. 6413 at para. 52). 
 
In Excerpt Six, the language of exploitation and manipulation is used to depict how third 
parties benefit. Additionally, the post-Bill C-36 dataset had language such as ‘capitalize 
on her vulnerability’, which further emphasized the perception of the sex worker as a 
weak individual who was being used. The language of perceiving the sex worker as 
vulnerable and a victim is reflective of the implementation of Bill C-36, since the 
language of victim, vulnerable, and at-risk was used in this Bill.  
 The language used in the post-Bill C-36 dataset as reflected in Excerpt Six was 
blunt; yet, out of the 22 instances when money was exchange for sexual services there 
was only one case where the sex worker provided someone else all their earnings. 
Moreover, there were four instances when the third party —the alleged pimp— split the 
money with the sex worker, to cover the costs of transportation, booking and overall 
protection of the sex worker. However, in only one of the four cases a judge admitted that 
“No exploitation had occurred” (R. v. Victorine, [2017] O.J. No. 2960 at para. 41). This 
demonstrated that even though the discourse of third parties as financial beneficiaries 
existed, the language of sex workers as primary financial beneficiaries also existed in 
common law. Therefore, sexual services exchanged for money without exploitation exists 
and the terms ‘sex work’ and ‘sex trafficking’ should differ in conceptualization.  
Erroneous Conceptualization of Sex Work and Sex Trafficking. 
The previous themes found in part three explained the conflation of sex work and 
sex trafficking at a theoretical level through: the discussion of voluntary and coercive sex 
work engagement, the responsibilization of sex workers for poor working conditions as 
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well as the belief that sex work entails exploitation of the sex worker to the financial 
benefit of third parties. This current theme will pin-point instances where the definitions 
of sex trafficking ideology was confused, and thus attached to sex work. 
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset one of the most relevant markers of this conflation 
was that prostitution “was generally described as being a harmful activity with links to 
drugs, violence, organized crime, child exploitation and human trafficking (one officer 
called prostitution a form of ‘slavery’)” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 
90). The definition provided in the Bedford decision added a crucial aspect to the 
conceptualization of prostitution: ‘a form of slavery’, ‘child exploitation’ and ‘human 
trafficking’. This crucial part referred to practices where the person being enslaved, 
exploited, and trafficked did not do so voluntarily; therefore, those practices were 
coercive, oppressive and exploitative. Similar definitions of the sex industry and sex 
workers were found in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset through the terms ‘coercive control’, 
‘exploitation’ and ‘forced into’. The words used in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset denoted that 
individuals were forced into the sex industry and thus conceptualized the discourse of 
prostitution as a nonconsensual exchange.  
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, prostitution was conceptualized to be evil and also a 
form of slavery. This was due to the alleged disadvantage of sex workers because they 
were “characterized as victims, commonly poverty-stricken, abused and drug-addicted” 
(Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 90). These descriptors were not 
representative of sex workers. They were representative of individuals being sex 
trafficked. Regardless, the Crown’s characterizations and judges’ comments from the 
Bedford decision persisted on describing sex workers with “physical and psychological 
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harms” due to “the inherent inequality that characterizes the prostitute-customer 
relationship, and not from the Criminal Code” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at 
para. 90). The example defended that the legislation surrounding the criminalization of 
prostitution did not create inequality for sex workers; this responsibilizes the prostitute-
customer relationship for any potential harms sex workers undergo. Moreover, the 
example did not recognize the negative effect of sex work criminalization on sex 
workers, which perpetuates violence in the sex industry. Thus, legislation prior to Bill C-
36 supports a lack of sex workers labour rights.  
The post-Bill C-36 dataset had examples of judges who understood the difference 
between sex work and sex trafficking. For example, in R. v. D’Souza ([2016] O.J. No. 
4992) the judge indicated that: 
Excerpt 7 
“here is a distinction between voluntary prostitution and forced sex trafficking; 
that there is no standard definition of exploitation; that there is a great debate 
between commentators on whether existing definitions of human trafficking are 
too narrow or too broad; and that there is an even more vociferous debate between 
commentators on whether it is harmful to conflate the concepts of prostitution and 
human trafficking” (R. v. D'Souza, [2016] O.J. No. 4992 at para. 41). 
 
Excerpt Seven referred to the erroneous conceptualization as a conflation of the terms, 
which will be seen in the next chapter when the terms are used in common law 
interchangeably. The example also reflected upon the heated debate between pro-sex 
work and anti-sex work perspectives. The judge brought awareness to the conceptual 
debate scholars such as Weitzer (2005b) and Farley (2005) engaged in: rather than 
viewing the concept from one perspective by complying and perpetuating an anti-sex 
work stance. The attention centered on diverse feminist frameworks that depicted the 
various socio-legal approaches to sex work, which were described in Chapter II.  
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Different feminist theories contributed to the conflation of sex work and sex 
trafficking. The scholar Ronald Weitzer gave expert evidence, to which the judge of the 
court decision commented:  
Excerpt 8 
“[Ronald Weitzer] harshly criticizes what he calls ‘radical feminism’ and its 
efforts to equate prostitution with human trafficking. He thinks that it is absurd 
and argues that there is nothing wrong with recognizing that many prostitutes 
voluntarily choose that life and are not victims of sex trafficking” (R. v. D'Souza, 
[2016] O.J. No. 4992 at para. 42). 
 
Even though scholars like Weitzer (2005a, 2005b, 2005c) attempted to shed light on the 
conceptual differences between the two terms, the use of language such as ‘exploitation’, 
and ‘coercion’ appeared respectively 54 and 17 times in the post-Bill C-36 dataset (see 
Appendix B). The predominance of the language can be attributed to the greater number 
of court decisions in the post-Bill C-36; another reason such language prevailed could be 
due to the language from Bill C-36, which was analogous to the language of oppression 
and coercion.  
Similar to the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, the post-Bill C-36 dataset contained language 
that explicitly demonstrated a lack of voluntary engagement in the sex industry. 
Discourses used were: ‘coercive exploitation’, ‘controlling actions’, ‘form of slavery’ and 
‘disadvantaged women’. There were new terms introduced, such as ‘degradation’ and 
‘subordination of women’. The use of degradation moralized sex work in an attempt to 
deem it an inappropriate line of work. In literature, the subordination of women has been 
understood to be the patriarchal control of women through their labour and reproductive 
capacities (Engels, 1972). The appearance of ‘subordination of women’ discourse in post- 
Bill C-36 data was an attempt to establish sex trafficking as a form of subordination of 
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women. De Beauvoir (2012) argues that women have always been subordinated. If 
women have always been subordinated, yet, it only appeared in the post-Bill C-36 
dataset, there is a possibility that a. the language of subordination of women was different 
in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset or b. subordination of women post-Bill C-36 existed but not 
with an affinity to sex trafficking. The implementation of Bill C-36 catapulted the use of 
the language of subordination. Discourse of subordination of women both contributed to 
belief in sexual subordination, where the sexual act takes power from women and enables 
their domination, and further perpetuated the subordination of women by wrongly 
associating the term with acts where women are not coerced (Wolken, 2006).  
Due to the erroneous conceptualization of sex work as sex trafficking, in the post-
Bill C-36 dataset the idea of prostitution as inherently evil was perpetuated through 
discourses such as: ‘form of slavery’, ‘subordination of women’ and ‘coercive 
exploitation’. For example, the pimp-sex worker relation was considered “inherently 
exploitive, coercive and controlling” and the control of sex workers through “a variety of 
tactics including emotional blackmail, verbal abuse, threats of violence and/or pure 
physical violence and brutality” (R. v. Lopez, [2018] O.J. No. 4145 at para. 52). The 
discourse of prostitution as inherently evil was preserved through stereotypes attached to 
sex workers, pimp-sex worker relationships and the sex industry. Stereotypes based on 
anti-sex work ideology negated sex worker agency and free will—as seen in part two of 
the current chapter—and the continuous moralization of the topic deemed 
commercialization of sexual services inappropriate. 
The data found in post-Bill C-36 exemplified the normalization of prostitution as 
inherently evil by constructing the sex industry as coercive and exploitative in nature. For 
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example, “The Defence counters by saying that perhaps the reasonable observer equates 
prostitution with exploitation, and thus, nothing further is needed” (R. v. D'Souza, [2016] 
O.J. No. 4992 at para. 78). The phrase ‘reasonable observer’ attempted to normalize the 
subsequent phrase ‘equates prostitution with exploitation’ by seeking to make the 
statement that could not be invalidated nor disputed. Moreover, the normalization of 
prostitution as inherently evil was seen in metaphors such as “guided the girls as they 
descended into the seedy world of the sex trade” (R. v. J.L., [2016] O.J. No. 513 at para. 
13). The judge did not question the nuances of the sex industry, the judge used the 
adjective ‘seedy’ to describe the sex industry as dangerous, evil and shameful. 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented key discursive constructions found in both pre-Bill C-36 
and post-Bill C-36 datasets. The themes found in both datasets were subjected to a 
comparison to understand discourse changes in the themes found before and after the 
implementation of Bill C-36. Overall, the current chapter found an almost imperceptible 
shift in the definition of prostitution and prostitute by attempting to adopt a more neutral 
and gender inclusive language in the post-Bill C-36 dataset. The moralization of sex work 
was portrayed differently in both datasets. In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset sex work was 
described as an inappropriate activity due to its immorality, while the post-Bill C-36 
dataset mostly used adverbs to moralize sex work. Another significant finding was the 
shift from endangered dignities to degraded or demeaned dignities of the sex workers. A 
major finding from Part Three revealed the acknowledgement that sex work existed in the 
absence of exploitation but judges resisted such idea through engaging in victim blaming 
discourse in both pre and post-Bill C-36 datasets. The erroneous conceptualization of sex 
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work as sex trafficking was prevalent in both datasets but the post-Bill C-36 had an 
example that addressed the harm of conflating the two terms. In both datasets prostitution 
was conceptualized and normalized to be inherently evil; the post-Bill C-36 data used 
metaphors to describe the sex industry as an evil charged setting. The slight changes in 
discursive constructions demonstrated the slow changes in discursive constructions that 
still held a positionality that reflected radical feminist believes, moralization of the topic, 
victim blaming discourse and a criminalization legal approach to prostitution. The next 
chapter, Chapter VII, will present discursive practices found in Canadian common law 
that shape stakeholder construction and sex worker protective strategies, discursive 
practices that oppose negative sex work ideology, and discursive practices that accept 
negative sex work ideology.   
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VII. DISCURSIVE PRACTICES FOUND IN CANADIAN COURT DECISIONS 
BETWEEN 2010 AND 2018 
This chapter is the second chapter of findings and analysis. The previous chapter, 
Chapter VI, presented the discursive constructions of the sex industry in Canadian 
common law. In this chapter I uncover and analyze discursive practices. Discursive 
practices refer to discourses or languages used in Canadian common law. Examining 
discursive practices from caselaw uncovers language used to describe or address 
stakeholders, legislation, safety strategies and overall sex work ideology. The discourse 
analysis led to the discovery of two major themes: sex worker protective strategies and 
judicial approaches to sex trafficking model. In sex worker protective strategies, I address 
discourses surrounding health and physical protection. In the second section I provide a 
range of approaches to the sex trafficking model within the judiciary that at times can 
lead to contradictions. Similar to Chapter VI, the two major themes represent the two 
parts of this chapter. Each section provides dominant themes, where findings of the pre-
Bill C-36 dataset are presented first, followed by the post-Bill C-36 dataset findings.  
Part I. Sex Worker Protection Strategies 
The discursive practices related to protection strategies reveal the manner in 
which protection has been framed from 2010 to 2018 in common law. 
Health Protection.  
The topic of sex workers’ health is usually explored as a result of their envisioned 
exposure to sexually transmitted diseases (STD). While some studies are concerned with 
the knowledge surrounding AIDS, STDs and condom use as a preventative measure 
(Basuki et al., 2002; Hor, Detels, Heng, & Mun, 2005), others are concerned with the 
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frequency of condom use and socio-demographic factors that affect sex workers’ condom 
use (Basuki et al., 2002; Pickering, Quigley, Hayes, Todd, & Wilkins, 1993; Pilkington, 
Kern, & Indest, 1994). The data found in both datasets gave importance to the use of 
condoms.  
The word ‘condom’ appeared 11 times in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset while it 
appeared 22 times in the post-Bill C-36 dataset (see Appendix B). In the pre-Bill C-36 
dataset ‘condoms’ were referred as items supplied by third parties to sex workers, and 
also instances where a third party forced the sex worker to perform sexual services 
without condoms, which was said to endanger the sex worker’s “health” (R. v. Byron, 
[2013] O.J. No. 5396 at para. 41). The health of the sex worker was endangered because 
“over time the services IB offered on her web pages provided little or no protection from 
her from sexually transmitted diseases or infections” (R. v. Byron, [2013] O.J. No. 5396 
at para. 13). The judge from R. v. Byron ([2013] O.J. No. 5396) expressed concern for the 
sex worker’s exposure to STDs and was aware that unprotected sex was not a common 
service.  
Condoms are considered a barrier that separates work sex from non-work sex. 
Non-work sex is sex in the personal lives of sex workers, where they may not use 
condoms (Sanders, 2002). Positive feelings, such as love and trust, evoked by romantic 
partners have been found to make the individual be less likely to use condoms (Murray et 
al., 2007; Pilkington et al.,1994). On the other hand, work sex is usually performed with 
condoms (Sanders, 2002). Even though literature delineates condom use as an emotional 
or intimacy barrier, the multiple uses of the word ‘condom’ in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset 
linked the word to the health of the sex worker.  
132 
 
‘Health’ was mentioned seven times in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset (see Appendix 
B). In one instance, the sex worker clarified that she liked “being healthy” and the 
services she provided were “safe” (R. v. Soulliere, [2013] O.J. No. 3174 at para. 71). 
Even though the sex worker did not explicitly mention how she was being safe, it was 
understood that the services were performed with condoms.  
Unlike the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, the post-Bill C-36 data placed emphasis on 
discerning whose idea was it to use condoms. For example, “Condoms were provided, 
although on one occasion the victim engaged in sexual intercourse with a customer and a 
condom was not used. There is no evidence before the court that Mr. Finestone ordered 
this, knew about it or had any role in it” (R. v. Robitaille, [2017] O.J. No. 5954 at para. 
73). The data also presented multiple instances where pimps emphasized to sex workers 
to “use condoms always” (R. v. Badali, [2016] O.J. No. 544 at para. 32). In this sense, 
condom use became a health practice, which was part of the job.  
The term ‘health’ was only mentioned 4 times (see Appendix B), for diverse 
reasons, one being the difficulty of the sex worker to engage in healthy relationships (R. 
v. Badali, [2016] O.J. No. 544). The minimal presence of the word ‘health’ could be due 
to the predominance of the condom use rule third parties were imposing on sex workers. 
On the other hand, in R. v. Lopez ([2018] O.J. No. 4145) a third party forced a sex worker 
to engage in “bare-back” (at para. 19) (unprotected) sexual services to the point of 
contracting two sexually transmitted diseases. The reinforcement of third parties condom 
use rule could be interpreted as a concern of third parties on the physical health of sex 
workers. Another interpretation could be that third parties recognized the distinction 
between work sex and non-work sex. Considering R. v. Lopez ([2018] O.J. No. 4145) 
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leads to believe that sex workers do not voluntarily engage in unprotected sexual 
services. Therefore, condom use was a reference to the health of the sex worker and also 
the difference between work sex and non-work sex.  
Physical Protection.  
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, the physical protection of sex workers included 
“working in a familiar environment; having regulars as clients; verifying price, services 
and contact information with a potential client before a session; and hiring a driver to 
wait during appointments” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 86). The pre-
Bill C-36 data addressed the lack of physical protection due to barriers pre-Bill C-36 
legislation posed on sex workers. 
 The post-Bill C-36 dataset had instances that exemplified how sex workers 
maintained physical protection. Physical safety was addressed in the context of indoor 
practices, since “working in massage parlours was safer. There was better control over 
who got in and there were other people around” (R. v. Evans, [2017] O.J. No. 3424 at 
para. 25). The use of body guards promised the sex workers physical safety, in case 
clients attempted to assault or attack the sex worker.  
The need for physical protection declared in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, was 
exemplified in post-Bill C-36 data. Physical protection is needed due to the possibility of 
violence against sex workers (Sanders, 2004). Just as mentioned in both datasets, 
strategies for protection include screening clients through pre-non-sexual meetings, use 
of chaperons, and have third parties outside the room or house (Sanders, 2004). The use 
of violent and theft prevention strategies resembles protocols from organizations and 
companies to ensure the safety of workers and employees.  
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Overall, discursive practices surrounding protection strategies reveal the existence 
of disease discourse to be associated with forced engagement in the sex industry. While 
health discourse was present, it was as discussed as the topic of third parties imposing the 
rule of condom use. This finding leads to the discernment between work sex and non-
work sex. The necessity for physical protection was exemplified in post-Bill C-36 data.  
Part II. Judicial Approaches to The Sex Trafficking Model 
A vast amount of discursive practices in common law had discourses that derive 
from sex trafficking ideology. That is, the discursive practices had discourses of 
exploitation, coercion and oppression. This section showcases discursive practices that: 
shape stakeholders involved in the sex industry, perpetuate and oppose the conflation of 
sex work to sex trafficking.  
Descriptions of Stakeholders Involved in The Sex Industry.  
In literature, the most commonly described actors in commercial sexual exchange 
are: pimps, sex workers, clients (‘johns’), and law enforcement. Depending on the 
approach to sex work, scholars implicitly describe the stakeholders of the sex industry. 
For example, when sex work is described from an economic framework, the actors of the 
sex industry are referred to as principals (sex workers and clients) and intermediaries 
(pimps and brothel owners) (Farmer & Horowitz, 2013). When sex work is framed from 
an anti-prostitution stance the stakeholders are called victims (sex workers) and 
victimizers or perpetrators (pimps and clients) (Raphael & Myers-Powell, 2010). The 
previous framework is based on sex trafficking ideology. Another popular framework is 
pro-prostitution, which views sex work as viable employment; the stakeholders are sex 
workers, the clients and third parties (pimps) (Lewis & Shaver, 2006; Wright et al., 
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2015). Similarly, the stakeholder constructions found in the datasets were deeply 
intertwined with beliefs about the roles and the nature of the stakeholders. Discursive 
practices were influenced by narratives such as: at risk versus risky, the moralization of 
prostitution, and prostitution as inherently evil.  
  Pimp. 
 In both datasets, pimps were referred to as the ‘defendant’ or the ‘accused’, that 
is, the charges were laid against them. In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset there were 10 court 
decisions where pimps were charged. The most common charge was s. 212(1)(j) living 
on the avails of prostitution, followed by s. 212(1)(d) procuring a person to become a 
prostitute. Both s. 212(1)(j) and s. 212(1)(d) established that the target was to criminalize 
third parties, not the sex workers. Of the 10 third parties accused, only one was female; 
which established a male dominance in the data. The discursive practices of judges also 
prescribed a masculine gender to the accused third parties. 
The pre-Bill C-36 dataset demonstrated that judges used masculine pronouns and 
masculine nouns to describe pimps. Pronouns and nouns such as ‘he’, ‘himself’, ‘male 
person’, and ‘man’ were used to referred to pimps or individuals who took advantage of 
the sex worker. For example,  
Excerpt 9 
“a person may fairly be said to be living in whole or in part on the earnings of 
prostitution if he is paid by prostitutes for goods or services supplied by him to 
them for the purpose of their prostitution which he would not supply but for the 
fact that they were prostitutes” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 
264)  
 
In Excerpt Nine, the judge assumed that a person who lived on the avails of prostitution 
was male, because the pronoun ‘him’ was used. This was also reflected when legislation 
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was discussed. For example, a judge mentioned that “while s. 216(l) is aimed at the man 
who engages himself in gleaning the earnings of prostitution as a business or stable 
means of livelihood” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 256). The judge did 
not state ‘pimp’ but referred to men as collectors of money that derived from sex work, 
therefore, the people charged in the court decisions were procurers or people living on the 
avails of sex work. After such stakeholders were deemed individuals charged and 
accused, the judges of the court decisions referred to them as pimps.  
 In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset pimps were described to be “a bad person and low-life 
pimp, who exploited women and deserved to be punished” (R. v. Samuels, [2013] O.J. 
No. 4200 at para. 54). They were said to have a self-grandiose perception. They were also 
described as ‘manipulative’, ‘abusive’, ‘exploitative’, and even ‘malevolent’. The use of 
the word “malevolent” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 263) is important 
here, as it served to establish pimps as innately evil doers, a discursive construction that 
changes in the later dataset, as will be discussed later in this section. Furthermore, the 
other discourses described the pimp as a dominant subject, which created a power 
dynamic within the pimp-sex worker relationship. This power dynamic has been referred 
to as something horrifying that should not be glorified in the context of sexual 
exploitation of women (Sharpley-Whiting, 2007). The role of pimps was framed in 
relation to sex trafficking, which was consistent with the words used to describe pimps 
and their overall behaviour; this entailed an exploitative conduct and engaging in non-
consensual activities. 
The description of pimps occurred from a moralistic framework of sex work, 
which views sex work as an immoral activity. This was reflected when pimps were 
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described as the violators of the sex workers’ “sexual integrity” (R. v. K.O., [2014] O.J. 
No. 2792 at para. 96). This responsibilized pimps for: the victimization of sex workers, 
perpetuated the dominant-submissive narrative, and promoted characterizations of sex 
work as sex trafficking. Additionally, the belief that pimps are coercers and oppressors 
seemed to be deeply ingrained in judges’ opinions. For example, when speaking about 
the possibility of pimps providing protective services to sex workers, Lord Reid (from the 
British House of Lords) stated that “even if their relationship were dressed up as a 
contract of service; and a man could not escape because he acted in some such capacity 
for a number of women. His occupation would still be parasitic” (as cited in Bedford v. 
Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 266). Lord Reid emphasized that pimps are inherently 
related to prostitutes in a parasitic manner. The reference to pimps as parasites also exists 
in literature, along with pimps as abusers or diseased (Henry, 1970; Moore 2006; Shelby, 
2002). Lord Reid implied that pimps could not have a labour relationship when stating in 
the above quote, as an aside, ‘even if their relationship were dressed up as a contract of 
service’. The use of ‘dressed up’ indicated that contracts between pimps and sex workers 
were facades, therefore, such contracts did not possibly exist.  
On the other hand, the post Bill C-36 dataset had 35 court decisions where pimps 
were charged, of which only two of the accused were women. The most common charge 
was s. 286.3 procuring, followed by s. 286.2 material benefit from sexual services, and s. 
286.4 advertising sexual services. A common charge that accompanied the charges 
previously stated was s. 279.01 trafficking in persons, which should be no surprise 
considering the heavy-laden sex trafficking ideology of Bill C-36. The descriptions of 
pimps post-Bill C-36 shared similarities to the descriptions of pre-Bill C-36 pimps.  
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Specifically, the post-Bill C-36 data described pimps as masculine. The words 
and common phrases to describe them were ‘dangerous criminals’, ‘coercers’, 
‘oppressors’, and individuals who ‘prey on women’. For example,  
Excerpt 10 
“Pimps prey upon these young women's need for love, security or money. They 
use romance, blackmail or violence to coerce these young women into having 
sexual relations with johns. These pimps are dangerous criminals, deserving of 
the most serious sanctions” (R. v. Joseph, [2018] O.J. No. 4241 at para. 19).  
 
The judge from Excerpt Ten took an anti-prostitution position to inform descriptions of 
the pimps. Additionally, the discourse ‘dangerous criminals’ was a novel description of 
pimps. ‘Dangerous’ entailed that the individual may or may not cause harm or injury to 
the sex worker; on the other hand, ‘criminal’ described the pimp as deviant. The phrase 
‘prey on women’ referred to a power dynamic that was immanent in the pimp-sex worker 
relation, where the animals at risk were women. Therefore, the shift from ‘violators of 
sexual integrity’ and ‘malevolent’ to ‘dangerous criminals’ and ‘prey on women’, 
described a shift from pimps as ill-intentioned and innately evil to a potential cause of 
harm, and the belief that is in their animalistic nature to be dominant. There was a shift in 
the data from describing pimps as ill-intentioned to responsibilizing them for their ill-
intentioned actions.  
Additionally, pimps went from being described as violators of women’s sexual 
integrity to preying on women. This shift delineated the existence of ideologies such as 
vulnerable women and strong men. Discourses of dominant or strong men resemble the 
social construction of hegemonic masculinity (Bird, 1996). Connell’s study (as cited in 
Bird, 1996) states that hegemonic masculinity entails “the maintenance of practices that 
institutionalize men's dominance over women” (p.120). Connell (as cited in Bird, 1996) 
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notices that hegemonic masculinity is established “in relation to women” (p. 120). This is 
reflected in both pre and post-Bill C-36 datasets, since the descriptions of pimps were 
done in relation to sex workers, which determined that pimps preserved power over them. 
Some scholars do not comply with the idea that pimps are born, they are made (Raphael 
& Myers-Powell, 2010). The construction of pimps as ill-intended could potentially 
derived from their potential problematic pasts. 
The construction of pimps in literature focuses on the experience of diverse types 
of maltreatment during childhood, which leads individuals to become pimps. In a study 
by Raphael and Myers-Powell (2010), the equifinality into pimping can be due to 
experiences of physical abuse, childhood sexual assault, and substance use during 
childhood. The discursive practices of the pimp stakeholder could derive from the pre-
conception of pimps as individuals with a troubled past. Regardless, part of the literature 
overlooked the nature versus nurture debate and associated pimps as perpetrators of 
violence against sex workers (Bruckert & Law, 2013).  
 The discursive practices in the post-Bill C-36 dataset surrounding the stakeholder 
of the pimp were mostly done from an anti-prostitution and sex trafficking framework. 
The pimps were said to use manipulation to groom individuals to join the sex industry, 
where the sex workers were not consenting to exchange sexual services. The language 
used was “exercise control over” the sex worker, which is similar language judges used 
to determine that sex trafficking had occurred (R. v. Rocker, [2018] O.J. No. 3193 at para. 
17). In scholarship, the term ‘pimp’ is used in the context of sex trafficking by depicting 
pimps as traffickers, and describing them as coercers and exploiters (Fox & Reid, 2019: 
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Jackson et al., 2009; Wolfe, 2018). However, there were instances in the datasets when 
pimps were described from a labour and pro-prostitution framework. 
Pimps in the post-Bill C-36 dataset were described by sex workers as “someone 
who was supposed to protect” them (R. v. Evans, [2017] O.J. No. 3424 at para. 71). The 
role of the pimp from the perspectives of sex workers was to provide physical protection, 
“clothes, drugs and beauty products” (R. v. Campbell, [2017] O.J. No. 633 at para. 7). In 
the post-Bill C-36 dataset the word ‘protection’ was invoked 17 times (see Appendix B). 
Such instances described the concern of pimps with the protection of the sex worker, to 
make the sexual service transaction safer for sex workers (R. v. Korof, [2017] O.J. No. 
963 at para. 24). In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, there were no instances where protection 
was discussed by pimps. However, in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset there were instances 
where pimps provided services that helped sex workers “earn money in the sex trade” (R. 
v. Michon, [2013] O.J. No. 2484 at para. 1). Furthermore, protection was discussed in the 
pre-Bill C-36 dataset in the Bedford decision by the applicants, who established that third 
parties like bodyguards and drivers are the means to the physical protection of sex 
workers. 
Sex Worker.  
Sex workers, similar to pimps, were described depending on the framework used 
to understand prostitution. There are scholarly perspectives of sex workers as vulnerable 
victims of sexual exploitation (Farley, 2003, 2004, 2005; Poulin, 2003), while other 
scholars perceive sex workers as workers and individuals with agency (Bruckert & Law, 
2013; Nussbaum, 1998; Lewis et al., 2005; Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale, 2000; Lewis & 
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Shaver, 2006; Shaver 1994, 2005). Both datasets had discursive practices similar to the 
ones found in literature.  
In all 58 court decisions that comprised the data, the sex workers were female. 
Only in the post-Bill C-36 dataset were three sex workers charged for s. 286.3 procuring, 
s. 286.2 receiving material benefit from sexual services, and s. 211 keeping a bawdy 
house (this was before s. 211 was repealed in 2019). In Excerpt One, found in Chapter 
VI, the judge explained that harm should be encompassing of the commodification of 
sexual services and attitudinal harm, which was understood to be the ‘protection’ of 
women. This discursive practice constructed the sex worker as female and also 
established that the voluntary commodification of sexual services was implausible, which 
is a perspective that has been influential since the late 1800s (McLaren, 1986). This 
perspective feeds the anti-prostitution, sex trafficking ideology that sex work is sexual 
exploitation and engaging in the sex industry could never be voluntary (Bruckert & Law, 
2013; Farley, 2003, 2004, 2005). 
Discourses present in pre-Bill C-36 caselaw included ‘victim’, ‘vulnerable’, 
‘poverty-stricken’, ‘abused’, ‘drug-addicted’, and ‘turning her into a prostitute’. The 
language described sex workers as coerced, oppressed and manipulated individuals. Fake 
relationships and emotional manipulation were the means through which the sex workers 
are allegedly manipulated. All these discursive practices built a susceptible stakeholder. 
This description feeds into the discourse of at risk or victim, which are pre-existing 
discourses in literature (Kantola & Squires, 2004; Law, 2015; Wright et al., 2015). 
Additionally, judges used similes to emphasize the disadvantage sex workers endure in 
the sex industry. For example, “For 18 months he used her body as his wallet” (R. v. 
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McPherson, [2013] O.J. No. 1254 at para. 30). Even though judges engaged in discursive 
practices that establish sex workers as victims, they also engaged in discursive practices 
that blame female sex workers for the behaviour of others.  
Discursive practices in Canadian common law responsibilize sex workers for the 
conduct of others. In the Bedford decision, Lord Reid was quoted discussing that the 
occupations of pimps “would still be parasitic; it would not exist if the women were not 
prostitutes” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 266). Prior to the above 
statement, the provision living on the avails of prostitution was discussed. The passage 
presents a problematic idea, which is that prostitute women are responsible for the 
exploitative existence of pimps. The assumptions made are that (a) pimps exist due to 
prostitution and (b) pimps’ function solely in an exploitative manner. Therefore, the 
discursive practices limit the characterizations of pimps, while responsibilizing female 
prostitutes for the destructive behaviour of pimps. Clearly, the sex worker was also 
discursively constructed to be a stakeholder who can exist outside the conceptualization 
of victim and at risk.  
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset judges commented on the court behaviour of sex 
workers that did not benefit their credibility. The judges perceived their testimonies as 
contradictory and untrustworthy if the sex workers “had an agenda to assist” the pimps, 
and if their testimonies were perceived as “rambling”, “incoherent” or “inconsistent” (R. 
v. Soulliere, [2013] O.J. No. 3174 at para. 72). For example, “That evidence is 
inconsistent with and contradicted by her testimony" (R. v. Salmon, [2014] O.J. No. 4887 
at para. 59). The evidence presented by sex workers is perceived as unreliable and 
contradictory by judges if their in-court behaviour “became aggressive”, “combative” or 
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if the sex worker “attempted to obfuscate her conduct” (R. v. Soulliere, [2013] O.J. No. 
3174 at para. 72). The phrase ‘attempted to obfuscate her conduct’ refers to sex workers 
denying their involvement in the sex industry. Such discursive practices shaped sex 
workers to be untrustworthy, inconsistent and problematizes a positive working 
relationship between third parties and sex workers. Moreover, such discursive practices 
did not consider the feelings of apprehension sex workers potentially had due to fear of 
being charged for activities that were legal at the time. 
 The post-Bill C-36 dataset clearly established that sex workers are “often women 
and children forced into the sex industry, but also include men, women and children” (R. 
v. D'Souza, [2016] O.J. No. 4992 at para. 60). Including men to the definition of the sex 
worker came at the expense of sex workers’ agency. While the legislative definition of 
sex worker evolved to include men, unfortunately the definition was rooted in sex 
trafficking ideologies. The term ‘forced’ discursively constructed sex workers as 
oppressed and coerced, contrary to individuals who choose to engage in sex work. An 
anti-prostitution conflation of sex work with sex trafficking also formed part of the 
construction of the sex worker.  
The word ‘victim’ was used 105 times in the dataset (see Appendix B). Other 
discourses such as ‘vulnerable persons’, ‘power imbalances’ referred to sex workers, 
which constructs a susceptible and powerless subject. Additionally, the theme at risk was 
found in the post-Bill C-36 dataset, since sex workers were said to be engaging in  
Excerpt 11 
“an extremely dangerous activity that poses a risk of violence and psychological 
harm to those subjected to it, regardless of the venue or legal framework in which 
it takes place, both from purchasers of sexual services and from third parties” (R. 




In Excerpt Eleven, the sentence ‘regardless of the venue or legal framework in which it 
takes place’ attributed permanency to the risk sex workers are exposed to. Additionally, 
there were other risks sex workers were exposed to. The judges assumed that pimps use 
sex workers as “nothing more than a captive sexual slave” (R. v. Alexis-McLymont, 
[2018] O.J. No. 983 at para. 133). The body and the mind of the sex worker were 
compromised, in addition to their possible subordination. Such discursive practices 
rendered sex workers as individuals at risk.  
The behaviour of sex workers in court was also scrutinized in the post-Bill C-36 
dataset. Similar to the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, the sex worker was perceived as 
untrustworthy if their demeanor was interpreted as either “mocking”, “sarcastic”, or if 
they are “unresponsive” (R. v. Moradi, [2016] O.J. No. 7031 at para. 18). Multiple judges 
from the caselaw gave importance to instances when sex workers were inconsistent when 
reporting how and when they engaged in the sex industry. Additionally, there were times 
in the post-Bill C-36 dataset when sex workers were perceived as credible stakeholders. 
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset there were times when the sex worker’s court 
behaviour was perceived as sincere or genuine. For example, “Having said all of that, I 
generally found KJ to be a sincere witness. She did not display any particular vitriol for 
Mr. Evans, but gave her evidence in a matter-of-fact style” (R. v. Evans, [2017] O.J. No. 
3424 at para. 57). The example illustrated that when sex workers expressed themselves 
with certainty, they were perceived as credible. Moreover, the example identified the 
standard judges held for a person to be considered to be a credible witness or to have a 
credible testimony. The standard entailed vocalizing the testimony with certainty, no 
rambling, no expression of emotions, answering questions when asked and no changes in 
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the testimony. Meeting the stated standard entailed increasing the credibility of sex 
workers in common law. Therefore, engaging in this discursive practice subjects sex 
workers to meet the credible criteria. Judges used the in-court sex worker behaviour to 
deem and differentiate between victims and non-victims.  
One of the most interesting findings was that judges had an established script for 
victims. In the post-Bill C-36 dataset there was a comment made about a relation between 
having a strong personality and the inability of someone to coerce the individual into the 
sex industry. For example,  
Excerpt 12 
“B.M.'s response at trial that she was too scared to ask cannot be reconciled with 
her subsequent explanation that she agreed to give M.M. all her money because 
he promised her that he would use the money to get a rent-to-own condo and to 
hire a lawyer who could help her regain custody of her daughter. Neither of those 
explanations can be reconciled with B.M.'s personality. B.M. may have been 
young but it was evident that she was strong and defiant who marched to her own 
tune. She was determined and she did not come across as somebody who would 
tolerate being used or abused” (R. v. M.M., [2018] O.J. No. 781 at para. 204). 
 
Excerpt Twelve exposed the problem of having a victim script. The sex worker did not fit 
into the victim script because of her personality. The personality of the sex worker 
deemed it implausible to abuse her. While the sex worker was voicing her concerns, the 
judge was focused on discerning whether she could be coerced or not. Furthermore, the 
judge used the word ‘defiant’ to describe the sex worker, which normalized discourses 
that represent sex workers as risky or a threat. This description of the sex worker as 
defiant entails that the sex worker was not behaving in the manner that was expected. The 
sex workers’ behaviour was disobedient, or resistant, which did not comply with the 
codes of conduct in common law. Common law, in this sense has a regulatory power over 
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the conduct of individuals in it. Furthermore, the language of sex workers as risky 
described their bodies as possible threats to society (Dasgupta, 2018).  
Both pre-Bill C-36 and post-Bill C-36 datasets demonstrated that sex workers 
were being described as vulnerable victims. Yet, the post-Bill C-36 data emphasized that 
sex workers were not only susceptible subjects, they were also at risk or were risky 
individuals. The post-Bill C-36 dataset saw the sex workers in a relationship with a 
power imbalance. This major shift towards powerlessness discourse made sex work an 
urgent topic to be addressed. Discursive practices regarding in-court behaviour of sex 
workers revealed the standard that sex workers need to meet in order to be deemed a 
trustworthy and credible witness. On the other hand, the non-victim in-court behaviour of 
sex workers changed from problematic to deviant and uncontrollable. These descriptions 
of sex workers limit them to be either risky individuals or individuals at risk.  
 Law Enforcement.  
Police officers are key stakeholders in the sex industry who play an important 
role, since their presence can negatively affect the work conditions of sex workers 
(Campbell, 2015; Krüsi et al., 2014). Scholars have addressed the effect of police officers 
on the physical and mental health of sex workers (Benoit et al., 2016; Krüsi et al., 2014). 
The depiction of police officers in both datasets was limited to the function of police 
officers to collect evidence and charge individuals.  
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset officers were described as “poorly trained”, “a waste 
of taxpayer’s monies” and “a disservice to the criminal justice system” (R. v. McPherson, 
[2013] O.J. No. 1254 at para. 17). The descriptions addressed the lack of thoroughness 
when collecting evidence, which was described to be a “significant oversight by the 
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police in the conduct of their investigation” (R. v. Soulliere, [2013] O.J. No. 3174 at para. 
98). In the passage above, the judge was dissatisfied with the investigation etiquette of 
law enforcement. This is because law enforcement are crucial subjects who facilitate the 
criminalization of sex work, who provide part of the evidence for trials. Therefore, judges 
want the evidence that is used by the prosecutor (crown) to be irrefutable. Nonetheless, 
there were instances when the evidence provided by law enforcement was subpar.  
In the court decision R. v. Soulliere ([2013] O.J. No. 3174) the detectives were not 
able to record conversations made between the accused and the complainant. There were 
utterances that “that were too low and they did not record” (R. v. Soulliere, [2013] O.J. 
No. 3174 at para. 109). The few notes the detectives took were not used by the crown 
since the judge deemed that  
Excerpt 13 
 
“Words do not become admissible merely because they are uttered out of the 
mouth of the accused. It is for the party tendering the evidence to prove the 
connection between the evidence tendered and the fact...The issue here is not 
whether the officer is telling the truth that the accused uttered these words, but 
whether any meaning can be put on the words. Are they an admission? Certainly 
if they are, they are relevant and highly probative. ... In this case the factual 
question is whether or not there is a statement discernible of meaning. 
Authenticity of the words is not in issue - meaning is” (R. v. Soulliere, [2013] O.J. 
No. 3174 at para. 104) 
 
In Excerpt Thirteen, the judge recognized the need of evidence from which meaning 
could be extracted upon. The judge stated that ‘authenticity of the words is not in issue —
meaning is’, which implied that officers should have attributed a meaning to the 
utterances made between the third party and the sex worker. This could be problematic, 
since officers could have the liberty to ascribe a meaning to the utterances and 
conversations among other sex industry stakeholders as positive or negative.  
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On the other hand, the post-Bill C-36 dataset provided more information 
regarding officers, their relation with the sex industry, and their negative effect on the 
stakeholders of the sex industry. Police officers were involved in the narrative of sex 
workers as victims. In R. v. Evans ([2017] O.J. No. 3424) the police officers suggested to 
the sex worker ‘that she was a victim’, this occurred after the officers charged the sex 
worker. In the end the sex worker “came forward with a second statement in which she 
implicated Mr. Evans in criminal activity. The charges against her were dropped shortly 
thereafter” (R. v. Evans, [2017] O.J. No. 3424 at para. 92). In their desire to target pimps, 
police officers in R. v. Evans ([2017] O.J. No. 3424) deemed sex workers victims of 
accords that were consensual. This is problematic because of the erroneous and 
manipulative imposition of the victim discourse to sex workers discourse, and also the 
inaccurate criminalization of individuals. The wrongful criminalization of individuals can 
be detrimental to the individual and question the adeptness of law enforcement.  
In R. v. Joseph ([2018] O.J. No. 4241) the judge implicitly reflected on the role of 
law enforcement on the victim discourse associated with sex workers, since police 
officers attributed the victim discourse to sex workers and wrongfully charged a third 
party causing him “irreparable damage” (R. v. Joseph, [2018] O.J. No. 4241 at para. 17). 
Furthermore, officers seemed to not comprehend the nuances of consent since a judge 
commented that  
Excerpt 14 
“The officers appeared to have difficulty gleaning what had happened. They did 
not have the luxury of judicial reflection or the organized presentation of 
evidence. They failed to understand that MCW had willingly engaged in 
prostitution on a prior occasion, but not this occasion. They also failed to 
understand what MCW was telling them when she said the perpetrators were 
trying to have her become a prostitute. She was explaining a scenario whereby she 
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had been taken to the motel room against her wishes, but ultimately no clients 
attended and she did not provide any sexual services that evening” (R. v. 
Majdalani, [2017] O.J. No. 1252 at para. 135). 
 
Excerpt Fourteen exemplifies the reasons sex workers after Bill C-36 were apprehensive 
to speak with law enforcement (Benoit et al., 2016; Krüsi et al., 2014), because of the 
inability of officers to understand that assault and coercion occurs as a result of lack of 
legislation that protects sex workers’ labour rights and physical safety (Benoit et al., 
2017; Benoit et al., 2015; Kantola & Squires, 2004). Additionally, there were other 
instances where officers “did not seem to care” that the sex worker “had been held 
against her will or that her daughter had been involved” (R. v. Majdalani, [2017] O.J. No. 
1252 at para. 38). This conflicts with research post-Bill C-36 implementation that has 
indicated that officers were concerned with the safety of sex workers (Krüsi et al., 2014). 
One possible explanation is that officers were concerned with the sex workers’ safety if 
the sex worker fit the victim script. The examples depicted a shift from presenting law 
enforcers not thorough in their investigative practices to pin-point the involvement in the 
normalization of the victim discourse, while perpetuating stigma and discrimination 
against sex workers and third parties. The data found in the post-Bill C-36 dataset 
exposed law enforcement of their shortcomings.  
Clients.  
Clients or customers, (or pejoratively, ‘johns’) are the usual names attributed to 
the individuals purchasing sexual services. They are crucial to the transaction of sexual 
services for money. The common context they are described within is sex trafficking, 
which portrays them as perpetrators of violence against sex workers and carriers of 
disease (Hor et al.,2005; Karandikar & Prospero, 2010; Weitzer, 2007).  
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In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset there were two court decisions where the client was 
charged. In one of the two cases, the sex worker was an undercover police officer posing 
as a female adolescent. On the other hand, the post-Bill C-36 dataset had seven court 
decisions where the client was charged. All the clients from both datasets were male.  
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset the word ‘client’ appeared 28 times, while the word 
‘customer’ appeared only four times (see Appendix B). Surprisingly, in the post-Bill C-
36 dataset the word ‘client’ was used 36 times and the word ‘customer’ was used 38 
times (see Appendix B). Even though the words ‘client’ and ‘customer’ are synonyms of 
each other, the word ‘client’ refers to an individual seeking advice or services (Client, 
n.d.), while ‘customer’ is defined as an individual who buys a service or commodity 
(Customer, n.d.). The prominent use of the word ‘customer’ in the post-Bill C-36 dataset 
recognized that sexual services were paid for, which also contributes to the labour 
discourse of sex work, which will be discussed in the second section of this chapter. 
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset clients were perceived as ‘well-intentioned’ if they 
helped the sex worker exit the sex industry. One judge commented that the client  
Excerpt 15 
“Mr. Derouchie was a well-meaning man on that evening, but his initial hope was 
to enjoy the company of a prostitute. I find that once he realized that E.D. was 
being forced into this activity, he facilitated her escape by providing clothing, 
food and the taxi to get her to safety which he paid for” (R. v. K.O., [2014] O.J. 
No. 2792 at para. 71) 
 
Excerpt Fifteen demonstrated that the judge shamed the client through the use of the 
sentence ‘but his initial hope was to enjoy the company of a prostitute’. This sentence 
established that ‘well-meaning’ and ‘enjoying the company of a prostitute’ were not 
notions that could be coupled, nor exist simultaneously. The implicit shaming done by 
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the judge resembled the negative representation of client-sex worker relations, which 
leads to the stigmatization of individuals who purchase sexual services (Weitzer, 2018).  
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset, judges characterized purchasers of sexual services as 
male by using the noun “men” (R. v. Badali, [2016] O.J. No. 544 at para. 46). There was 
a variety of descriptions for clients: at times they were described as “honest”, and 
“mortally embarrassed” if they did not engage in sexual intercourse with the sex workers 
(R. v. H.H., [2015] O.J. No. 388 at para. 23). In other instances, the clients were 
described as “wary” and “intelligent” when the clients questioned if the sex workers were 
undercover police officers (R. v. Haniffa, [2017] O.J. No. 4048 at para. 27). The positive 
description of clients due to a lack of sexual intercourse reinforces the moralized 
stakeholder of the client, where paying for sexual services was deemed an act for which 
one should be ‘embarrassed’. Furthermore, the descriptions of clients did not provide a 
standardized illustration of the stakeholder.  
In client literature, there seems to be an understanding that purchasers of sexual 
services vary greatly in characterizations (Weitzer, 2007, 2012). Weitzer (2012) noted 
that the diversity of clients is so great that one should abstain from categorizing and 
generalizing. Yet, Weitzer (2012) commented on differences between indoor and street 
sex work clients. The street clients vary more than indoor clients. In-door clients have 
more opportunities than their counterparts to build a rapport with sex workers, by 
engaging in non-sexual activities, which can be deemed romantic (Weitzer, 2012). The 
prevalence of male clients seeking to purchase sexual services from minors, as reflected 
in the results, can be attributed to the vast difference of clients and their diverse purpose 
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and intentions when purchasing sexual services (Weitzer, 2007). Regardless, this finding 
should not generalize the intention and characteristics of all clients.  
In summary, stakeholder construction of third parties, sex workers and clients was 
evident in both datasets through the framework of sex trafficking ideology. Pimps 
became responsibilized for their ill-intended actions, while being urged to be protectors. 
Sex workers were described as either at risk or risky, and the shift in post-Bill C-36 data 
emphasized the power imbalance in the pimp-worker relation. Law enforcers were 
described as tools of normalization of victim discourse and perpetrators of stigma and 
discrimination. Clients varied in their descriptions, which is consistent with literature.  
Discursive Practices in Common Law that Contribute to the Conflation of 
Sex Work with Sex Trafficking.  
  Based on the discursive constructions found in Chapter VI, this section will 
present the discursive practices that conflate sex work with sex trafficking. Part of this 
conflation is due to the construction of sex industry stakeholders from a sex trafficking 
framework, and the constant moralization of sex work, deeming it an inappropriate 
exchange —thus, not accepting sex work as a legitimate form of employment. 
Furthermore, the section will present instances where judges used the terms ‘prostitution’ 
and ‘sex trafficking’ interchangeably, and also will highlight similarities between sex 
work and sex trafficking legislation.  
Interchangeable Use of The Terms Prostitution and Sex Trafficking.  
The term ‘sex trafficking’ was not found in the pre-Bill C-36 data, however, the 
word ‘trafficking’ appeared 10 times in the pre- Bill C-36 dataset (see Appendix B). 
While the terms ‘prostitution’ or ‘sex work’ were not explicitly interchanged in the pre-
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Bill C-36 data, prostitution was found to be used in the context of trafficking or human 
trafficking. For example, “Mr. Burton engaged in human trafficking and prostitution-
related offences in relation to three young women” (R. v. Burton, [2013] O.J. No. 1748 at 
para. 1). Upon further analysis, it was found that in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset prostitution 
and trafficking were treated as different concepts. In the Bedford decision prostitution 
was linked to “a number of harmful activities, such as violence, drug and alcohol 
addiction, organized crime and human trafficking” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 
4264 at para. 133). Thus, the pre-Bill C-36 data deemed prostitution as equally pernicious 
as trafficking, but the two terms had different conceptualizations.  
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset the term ‘sex trafficking’ was found three times, yet 
the term ‘trafficking’ was encountered 65 times (see Appendix B). This demonstrated the 
popularity of the term ‘trafficking’ over ‘sex trafficking’, since trafficking was also 
popular over sex trafficking in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset. Humans are trafficked for 
diverse reasons, one of them being for sexual slavery (Kempadoo, Sanghera, & Pattanaik, 
2015). Sex trafficking is the most common form of trafficking (Barrows & Finger, 2008). 
The lack of specificity even in the post-Bill C-36 data regarding sex trafficking led to a 
common social belief that there was no wish to detangle the many types of trafficking. 
Human trafficking is a modern term for slavery (Barrows & Finger, 2008; Kempadoo et 
al., 2015) that recognizes the diverse reasons for which humans are trafficked. The 
interchange of prostitution and trafficking was found in post-Bill C-36 data.  
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset judges used prostitution and trafficking 




“It is beyond doubt that severe harm can be caused even by the least serious cases 
of child trafficking. The horrors and evils of child prostitution are well 
documented both in the case law and in the academic literature which has been 
referenced by the intervenor” (R. v. Safieh, [2018] O.J. No. 3880 at para. 18). 
 
The interchangeable use of the terms invoked victim discourse and prevented sex work 
discourse to be separated from exploitation discourse. On the other hand, one possible 
explanation for the interchange of the terms could be the involvement of a minor. The 
judge used the enticing language to make a point, of course, at the expense of sex work. 
The post-Bill C-36 data also had the term ‘human trafficking’ in the context of 
prostitution. For example, when referring to Bill C-36 a judge mentioned “the intention 
of Parliament in enacting the human trafficking and related provisions” (R. v. Crosdale, 
[2018] O.J. No. 6028 at para. 145). The ‘related provisions’ referred to the changes to sex 
work legislation post-Bill C-36, which entailed that the changes of provisions referred to 
human trafficking provisions rather than sex work provisions. George et al. (2010) argues 
that radical feminists use the terms interchangeably, since for them both sex work and sex 
trafficking represent the same activity. The lack of the interchangeable use of the terms in 
the pre-Bill C-36 data aggravated the problematization of sex work after the 
implementation of Bill C-36.  
Similarities Between Sex Work and Sex Trafficking Legislation.  
In the pre-Bill C-36 data the phrase ‘control, direction or influence’ appeared 
three times (see Appendix B). It was revealed that the provision s. 212(1)(j) included 
such phrase because 
Excerpt 17  
“In 1913, the procuring provisions were expanded to include living on the earnings 
of prostitution. 1. for the purposes of gain, exercises control, direction or influence 
over the movements of any woman or girl in such a manner as to show that he is 
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aiding, abetting or compelling her prostitution with any person or generally; or 
being a male person, lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution” 
(Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 256) 
 
The phrase ‘control, direction, or influence’ is relevant because it appears in prostitution 
as well as human trafficking provisions. This was highlighted by the judge in R. v. Gray-
Lewis ([2018] O.J. No. 4304). The phrase appeared 20 times in the post-Bill C-36 dataset 
(see Appendix B).  
The Technical Paper: Bill C-36, Protection of Communities and Exploited 
Persons Act also pointed out that the previous procuring offense (s. 212(1)(h)) and the 
trafficking offence (s. 279.01) used “some of the same language as found in new section 
286.3” (Department of Justice Canada, 2014). The new provision addressing procuring 
reads 
Excerpt 18 
“286.3 (1) Everyone who procures a person to offer or provide sexual services for 
consideration or, for the purpose of facilitating an offence under subsection 
286.1(1), recruits, holds, conceals or harbours a person who offers or provides 
sexual services for consideration, or exercises control, direction or influence over 
the movements of that person, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years”(Criminal Code, 1985). 
 
For clarification purposes, the trafficking persons provision reads 
Excerpt 19 
“279.01 (1) Every person who recruits, transports, transfers, receives, holds, 
conceals or harbours a person, or exercises control, direction or influence over the 
movements of a person, for the purpose of exploiting them or facilitating their 
exploitation is guilty of an indictable offence and liable” (Criminal Code, 1985). 
 
Excerpt Eighteen and Nineteen have similar wording which criminalizes the coercion and 
exploitation of a person; yet, it is problematic to use similar language to criminalize both 
the commodification of sexual activity and human trafficking. First, the separate sections 
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presume that there are two completely different offenses, nonetheless, both address 
coercion and exploitation of a person. Second, sex work discourse becomes further 
polluted with the language of illicit and illegitimate.  
Overall, the predominant use of the term ‘trafficking’ over ‘sex trafficking’ 
further conflated sex work with harmful practices. While the pre-Bill C-36 data 
distinguished between prostitution and sex trafficking, the post-Bill C-36 data used the 
terms interchangeably and in so doing worsen the problematization of sex work. The 
similarities in human trafficking and procuring provisions demonstrated the goal of 
conflating the two terms through the criminalization of both. Discursive practices that aid 
the conflation of the two terms demonstrate the role of the judiciary in the perpetuation of 
exploitation discourse when speaking about sex work.  
Discursive Practices in Common Law that Oppose the Conflation of Sex 
Work with Sex Trafficking. 
This section seeks to present discursive practices that do not comply with the 
conflation of sex work to sex trafficking. Sex work is presented as labour, and existent as 
a non-coercive nor oppressive type of employment. The themes explored are: the use of 
labour discourse, recognizing sex work as viable labour, admitting that legislation 
infringes sex workers’ rights, and reflections of judges of Bill C-36.  
Use of Labour Terminology. 
 In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset sex work was referred to with language that pertained 
to the commercialization of products and services. Language such as ‘business’, 
‘marketing discussions’, ‘business relationship’, ‘generate more business’, and 
‘advertise’ were used. The language used to refer to the exchange of sexual services was 
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framed from a business context. The examples demonstrated the various aspects sex 
workers and third parties must consider when engaging in the sex industry: creating 
marketing strategies to sell the services, establishing business relationships with third 
parties as well as clients, and the maintaining the supply-demand of the service. 
Even though the commodification of sexual services is only referred to twice as a 
sex industry, the word ‘working’ was used 32 times to refer to the labour of sex workers 
(see Appendix B). The acknowledgement on behalf of judges to state that sex workers 
were working demonstrated that sex work has acquired labour discourse. Furthermore, 
the word ‘business’ was used 12 times, once to state ‘an indoor prostitution business’ and 
also ‘lawful business’ in the Bedford decision (see Appendix B). Studies of sex work and 
the sex industry from economic frameworks utilize business discourse, which are 
popularized by pro-prostitution literature, such as the terms ‘business transactions’, 
‘principals’, ‘intermediaries’, and ‘third parties’ (Farmer & Horowitz, 2013; Bruckert & 
Law, 2013).  
The post-Bill C-36 data comprised words and phrases such as ‘well versed in the 
business’, ‘promote and capitalize’, ‘advertised’, ‘enterprise’, and ‘business’. The new 
word ‘enterprise’ appeared 13 times (see Appendix B). While the word ‘enterprise’ is a 
synonym of business, it entails engaging in a difficult or complicated project (Enterprise, 
n.d.). This could be reflective of the complexity of the sex industry, since sex workers 
encounter socio-legal barriers to practice their work (Campbell, 2015; Kantola & Squires, 
2004). This slight, but significant, shift recognizes the nuanced labour of sex workers. 
The word ‘working’ appeared 69 times while the word ‘business’ was encountered 53 
times, which further emphasized sex work discourse conflated with business language 
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(see Appendix B). Another major finding was the appearance of administrative like job 
titles.  
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset there were instances where the stakeholders of the 
sex industry were attributed administrative like job titles. For example, “There was 
substantial evidence that Ms. H.H. played a supervisory role in the prostitution 
transactions” (R. v. H.H., [2015] O.J. No. 3881 at para. 25). The judge recognized the 
similarity between roles of stakeholders of the sex industry to hierarchical roles found in 
companies or organizations. Furthermore, the use of the term ‘worker’, which was used 
28 times more than in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, recognized and attributed the employee 
discourse to sex workers (see Appendix B). Another word that pertains to the business 
discourse but is commonly overlooked is the word ‘services’. The word ‘services’ 
appeared 38 times in the pre-Bill C-36 dataset and 186 times in the post-Bill C-36 dataset 
(see Appendix B). A judge in the post-Bill C-36 dataset made a comment that “any form 
of services, not just sexual services, can qualify for services” (R. v. N.A., [2017] O.J. No. 
1369 at para. 100). This idea emphasized that sexual services were already interpreted to 
be a commercialized service.  
Recognition of Sex Work as Viable Labour.  
The constant moralization of sex work has become a barrier to speak about labour 
and sex work conjointly in the political and legislative spheres (Law, 2015), even though 
the language used to refer to actions within it come from a business perspective. Sex 
work is body work, where the worker needs to manage their own body, their emotions, 
and the emotional responses of the customer (Wolkowitz, Cohen, Sanders, & Hardy, 
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2013). There were instances in both datasets were judges recognized sex work as 
employment, where individuals use different parts of their bodies to perform work tasks.  
The pre-Bill C-36 dataset had instances where judges recognized sex work as 
employment by (a) normalizing the use of the business discourse, and also by (b) 
recognizing sex work exists outside of coercive and oppressive practices. Even though 
judges normalized the use of the business discourse, at times, they discredit sex workers. 
For example, a judge stated that a sex worker “moved to another hotel, presumably to 
generate more business. She had Mr. Salmon take pictures of her while she was dressed 
in lingerie. She then put an ad in a local newspaper advertising her services” (R. v. 
Salmon, [2014] O.J. No. 1461 at para. 10). The use of the word ‘presumably’ can be 
interpreted in two different ways. The word could have been used to reiterate the actions 
of the sex worker; thus, ‘presumably’ is interpreted as legal jargon used to speak of 
events without attributing negative nor positive meaning to the actions of the sex worker. 
An alternate interpretation removes the certainty that the goal of the sex worker was to 
generate business. The uncertainty instilled by the judge could have aided to disrupt the 
credibility of the sex worker. Additionally, the judge speaks of the agency of the worker 
by stating that she initiated the actions of taking pictures and putting advertisements 
online. The recognition that sex work existed without the oppression and coercion of 
third parties also helped framed sex work as viable employment.  
A judge made a comment about the relationship between a sex worker and a third 
party. The judge stated 
Excerpt 20 
“Ms. Hughes was consistent in her evidence that Mr. Soulliere did not put 
pressure on her to work as an escort to earn money. Consequently, I am of the 
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opinion that there is evidence before me that satisfies me on a balance of 
probabilities that Mr. Soulliere was in a common law relationship with Ms. 
Hughes where they both shared in mutual expenses” (R. v. Soulliere, [2013] O.J. 
No. 3174 at para. 128). 
 
Excerpt Twenty emphasized the lack of coercion put on the sex worker to engage in the 
sex industry. This entailed that judges were able to recognized voluntary engagement and 
willingness to participate in sex work. Furthermore, the judge accepted the common law 
relationship as normal, where there was more than one financial provider for the 
household.  
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset, sex work was recognized as viable employment 
through the use of business discourse and also testimonies of sex workers who willingly 
engaged in the sex industry. Language such as ‘enterprise’ and ‘earned’ normalized the 
use of business discourse in sex work. There were instances that the word ‘enterprise’ 
replaced sex workers and their engagement in the sex industry. Additionally, the word 
‘earned’ was used 27 times and it entailed that sex workers were performing work tasks 
that were exchanged for money, which further normalized the business discourse (see 
Appendix B). 
In the post-Bill C-36 dataset there were 27 examples where sex workers willingly 
engaged in the sex industry. For example, “Mr. Crosdale did not ‘recruit’ T.T. because 
she was already interested in participating in the sex trade, and she told the police that she 
acted of her own free will, and by choice” (R. v. Crosdale, [2018] O.J. No. 6028 at para. 
165). There was an emphasis that the sex worker was not recruited, that she engaged by 
her own free will. The over-emphasis made it seem like it was expected for the sex 
worker to be coerced into the sex industry. In comparison to the findings of pre-Bill C-
36, the shift went from judges creating uncertainty to establishing an expectation of sex 
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workers being coerced. The over-emphasis of voluntary engagement is interpreted to be a 
shift to accepting sex work as viable employment, but the traces of moralization could be 
seen in the data.  
The data did not represent the conventional means to establish sex work as 
employment. Scholars such as Nussbaum (1998) and Wolkowitz et al. (2013) established 
the use of the body of sex workers as the tool to perform their jobs, thus, comparing sex 
work to other jobs in which individuals utilize different parts of their body. Hakim (2010) 
commented that erotic capital is commonly controlled through disdain and contempt. 
This explains the use of uncertainty and the expectation of coercion towards sex work, 
even though the heavy use of labour discourse was present. The view of the human body 
as a tool to execute work tasks renders the business and labour discourse pertinent in the 
context of sex work.  
Recognition of Legislation that Infringes Sex Workers’ Rights. 
 Discursive practices that recognized that legislation violated sex workers’ rights 
constituted an important version of opposition to the conflation of sex work to sex 
trafficking ideology. The criminalization of sex work is problematic, because 
prohibitionist legislative approaches have multiple effects on sex workers, not solely 
displacing sex workers to unknown areas (Campbell, 2015; Hakim, 2010; Kantola & 
Squires, 2004).  
In the pre-Bill C-36 dataset, as discussed in Chapter V, the Bedford decision 
addressed how the applicants challenged the provisions s. 210, s. 212(1)(j) and s. 213 due 





“These laws, individually and together, force prostitutes to choose between their 
liberty interest and their right to security of the person as protected under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the ‘Charter’). I have found that these 
laws infringe the core values protected by s. 7 and that this infringement is not 
saved by s. 1 as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society” (Bedford v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at para. 3). 
 
Excerpt Twenty-one referred to the violation of the sex workers’ right to safety, as per 
directed under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The provisions 
went against the pillars of the Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety 
(CCOHS)3, who regulate the rights of workers at the federal level. As seen so far, there 
were findings that demonstrated the normalization of labour discourse for sex work, 
therefore, the rights that other Canadian workers have should be granted to sex workers. 
This is eminent due to the poor working conditions sex workers faced (McClintock, 
1993). 
 Similarly, in the post-Bill C-36 dataset the unconstitutionality of certain 
provisions was discussed, because they breached the right to security. For example, 
Excerpt 22 
“The applicants argue that s. 286.4 is in breach of the right of sex workers to 
security of the person, because it makes sex work more dangerous, because ‘it 
limits their ability to work together and limits their ability to create referral 
opportunities for one another that can enhance safety, and could have a chilling 
effect on the ability of sex workers to use websites as sources of pre-screening 
information by limiting their ability to work together’” (R. v. Boodhoo, [2018] 
O.J. No. 6413 at para. 42). 
 
 
3 The Occupational Health and Safety Act deems the three basic worker rights, which are: 
1. The right to know about health and safety matters. 
2. The right to participate in decisions that could affect their health and safety. 




Provision s. 286.4 advertising sexual services was one of the new provisions created post-
Bill C-36. The applicants of R. v. Boodhoo ([2018] O.J. No. 6413) explained the danger s. 
286.4 posed on their bodies and prohibiting protection strategies known to be successful. 
The pre-Bill C-36 dataset provided instances where sex workers explained in detail the 
effect of legislation on their work, such as the sex workers did in Excerpt Twenty-two. 
There was no change between both datasets, which could be attributed to the detrimental 
effect of neo-abolitionist legislation on sex workers (Anderson, 2002; Campbell, 2015; 
Craig, 2011; Hakim, 201; Krüsi et al., 2014; Kantola & Squires, 2004; Miller & 
Schwartz, 1995).  
Judges’ Reflections on Bill C-36.  
Some judges complied with the amendments made to the legislation post-Bill C-
36, and thought that such legislation was not “overbroad or grossly disproportionate, and 
do not offend s. 7 of the Charter” (R. v. Boodhoo, [2018] O.J. No. 6413 at para. 36). Yet, 
the same judge reminded the people of the court that Bill C-36 attempted to “reduce the 
demand for prostitution with a view to discouraging entry into it, deterring participation 
in it, and ultimately abolishing it to the greatest extent possible” (R. v. Boodhoo, [2018] 
O.J. No. 6413 at para. 23). Additionally, the judge commented that Bill C-36  
Excerpt 23 
“reflects a significant paradigm shift away from the treatment of prostitution as 
‘nuisance’, as found by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bedford, toward 
treatment of prostitution as a form of sexual exploitation that disproportionately 
and negatively impacts on women and girls. Bill C-36 signals this 
transformational shift both through its statement of purpose, as reflected in its 
preamble, and its placement of most prostitution offences in Part VIII of the 
Criminal Code, Offences Against the Person” (R. v. Boodhoo, [2018] O.J. No. 
6413 at para. 23).  
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Excerpt Twenty-three was the disagreeing response the judge gave when a sex worker 
stated that the purpose of Bill C-36 was “to enhance the safety, security, and dignity of 
people involved in sex work” (R. v. Boodhoo, [2018] O.J. No. 6413 at para. 22). Clearly, 
the judge understood that Bill C-36 was implemented to eradicate sex work, not to 
protect sex workers.  
 Overall, both datasets had business or labour discourses, yet the post-Bill C-36 
data had language that reflected the complexity of sex work, and job titles reflective of 
administrative roles. The use of a labour discourse and examples of voluntary 
engagement in the sex industry were the methods in which sex work was recognized as 
employment. It was found that judges resisted the labour discourse through the 
introduction of uncertainty and expectation of exploitation. Therefore, sex trafficking 
discourse present in the judiciary was used to resist pro-prostitution sex work discourse. 
It was found in both datasets that sex workers voiced the violation of their rights due to 
insensitive legislation. One judge made a point that the purpose of Bill C-36 was not to 
enhance the safety, security, and dignity of individuals in the sex industry, it was to 
reduce, if not eradicate its demand. 
Conclusion 
The current chapter analyzed key discursive practices found in both pre-Bill C-36 
and post-Bill C-36 datasets. The themes found in both datasets were subjected to a 
comparison to understand discourse changes in the themes found before and after the 
implementation of Bill C-36. Sex workers protective practices entailed the use of 
condoms, body guards, and third parties. The most practiced protection practice was 
condom use, imposed by third parties on sex workers. Thus, health safety of the sex 
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worker was referred to as condoms. A major finding was that sex trafficking ideology is 
present in diverse discursive practices in the judiciary. Stakeholder construction of pimps, 
sex workers and clients were done through the framework of sex trafficking ideology. 
The stakeholders of law enforcement engaged in the stigmatization and discrimination of 
sex workers, as it was reflected in the literature. The interchangeable use of prostitution 
and trafficking, in addition to their legislative similarity, contributed to the conflation of 
sex work to sex trafficking. Discursive practices that opposed to the conflation of sex 
work and sex trafficking included the heavy-laden use of labour and business discourse. 
It was found that even though judges used labour or business discourse, they resisted 
through the use of uncertainty and expectation of exploitation. It was also found that pre- 
and post-Bill C-36 legislation was perceived as a violation to sex workers’ rights, and 
was not created to protect sex workers. The themes and changes in discursive practices 
reflected the prevalence of moralization of sex work and its conflation with sex 
trafficking. The next chapter, Chapter VIII Discussion and Conclusion, will seek to 
comprehend the reason such themes appeared and the changes within them with the help 
of governmentality and anti-carceral feminist theory.   
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VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I synthesize the major findings of this research using Foucauldian 
governmentality and anti-carceral feminist theory to understand the changes in Canadian 
common law. The theoretical framework that I established in Chapter III will aid in the 
analysis of the detrimental effect of the punitive system on sex workers. I uncover the 
progressive language in the findings; this is due to discourses that promote the separation 
of sex work ideology to sex trafficking ideology. The limitations and contributions of this 
study are also addressed.  
Regulation of Prostitution Discourse 
This study explored whether, and how, prostitution discourses changed in 
Canadian common law from 2010 to 2018. This time period is significant as it included a 
landmark change to Canadian criminal regulation of prostitution in 2014. Prostitution 
discourses encompass concepts related to sex work, such as the definition of the term 
itself and stakeholders of the sex industry. Prostitution discourse also refers to discourses 
in it, such as morality, nuisance, threat to the public, amongst others; also, prostitution 
includes narratives such as sex workers as risky individuals or individuals at risk. This 
study separated the data to report changes in the form of discursive constructions, 
Chapter VI, and discursive practices, Chapter VII. This section will present the major 
changes in the sections from Chapters VI and VII to analyze the manners in which 
prostitution discourse changed after the implementation of Bill C-36. 
Major Findings from Discursive Constructions. 
The discursive constructions, presented in Chapter VI, demonstrated that even 
though the word ‘prostitution’ was removed from the Canadian Criminal Code in 
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November 6, 2014, the word was still in circulation in common law after 2014. This is 
representative of the importance of discourse and the cycle of supplier and recipient of 
discourse. Judges were the suppliers of prostitution discourse, which deemed the other 
stakeholders of common law recipients who may become suppliers of such discourse; this 
perpetuates the cycle of usage of the word ‘prostitution’ to refer to sex work. The 
removal of the word prostitution from the Criminal Code of Canada did not permeate 
common law. The lack of permeability is a form of resistance to accept, thus use, terms 
such as ‘sex work’. The use of the term ‘sex work’ entails embracing definitions of the 
commodification of sexual services that do not have derogatory connotations. The 
derogatory connotations found in the data were partly due to the moralization of 
prostitution.  
The moralization of prostitution was found in both datasets. The use of the words 
‘morality’ and ‘immorality’ shifted to the use of terms like ‘callous’ and ‘dangerous’ to 
refer to prostitution; this marked the activity in both datasets as inappropriate. Yet, this 
change is an adaptation of inappropriateness to mask the moralization of prostitution to 
blatantly deem it a perilous activity. This also occurred with dignity discourse, shifting 
from the endangerment of dignity to the degradation of dignity; in both instances dignity 
discourse established stated and unstated—or legal and social—rules of prudence for 
Canadian population. The codes of prudence enable Canadian inhabitants to engage in 
self-subjectification, thus disciplining themselves, which prevents them from engaging in 
prostitution. Derogatory connotations of prostitution were also found to be due to the 
conflation of sex trafficking to sex work. 
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The conflation of sex trafficking and sex work was a contradictory finding. Both 
datasets demonstrated that judges recognized that prostitution was a voluntary and 
consenting activity. Yet, judges engaged in victim blaming discourse to responsibilize the 
sex worker for any abuse or assault experienced. Moreover, the engagement of law 
enforcement and judges in victim blaming discourse prevented sex work to free itself 
from derogatory connotations and work equality for sex workers in the socio-legal 
setting. Even though pro-prostitution literature has consistently sought to differentiate sex 
work and sex trafficking (Gerassi, 2015; Weitzer, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c), the conflation of 
the terms in common law reconceptualizes sex work as exploitative. The conflation of the 
terms imposes a reconceptualization on sex work, which is facilitated by the moralization 
of prostitution and enticing language such as metaphors that contravene consensual 
sexual services. The judge from R. v. D'Souza ([2016] O.J. No. 4992) recognized that 
“there is a distinction between voluntary prostitution and forced sex trafficking” (at para. 
41). The judge recognized also the “vociferous debate between commentators on whether 
it is harmful to conflate the concepts of prostitution and human trafficking” (R. v. 
D'Souza, [2016] O.J. No. 4992 at para. 41); the awareness of the judge and the 
vocalization of the conflation is a step in the direction of detangling the conflation of sex 
work to sex trafficking.  
Major Findings from Discursive Practices. 
The discursive practices found in Chapter VI demonstrated the range of sex 
trafficking ideology on prostitution discursive practices. The construction of stakeholders 
in the sex industry was usually done through the framework of sex trafficking ideology, 
especially post-Bill C-36. Prior to Bill C-36 pimps were described as ill- intended, this 
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shifted to descriptors that legally responsibilized pimps for the oppression and coercion 
of sex workers. Descriptors in the post-Bill C-36 dataset emphasized the power dynamic 
between the pimp and sex worker, where the sex worker assumed a position with less 
power. The character of the sex worker was described in a contradictory manner. Usually 
sex workers were described as victims, yet when sex workers did not fit the description of 
victim, the judges reconciled by engaging in victim blaming discourse. For example, 
when the sex worker from R. v. Lucas-Johnson ([2018] O.J. No. 3685) reported on the 
violent relationship with the third party the judge made comments such as “ML knew full 
well what she was getting into at the Spa” (at para. 239) and “ML was fully aware of the 
implications of that. She was not a stranger to the sex trade” (at para. 239). The last 
comment of the judge implies that the sex industry is inherently disadvantageous to 
female sex workers. Law enforcers, similar to judges, normalized victim discourse, 
engaged in victim blaming discourse and perpetrated stigma and discrimination. This 
demonstrates that the prostitution framework has a direct impact on discourse that shapes 
the stakeholders of the sex industry. Moreover, it demonstrates that discourse is a power 
mechanism in Canadian common law. The prostitution framework also establishes 
different narratives from which actors are described, for example, sex workers were 
described from the risky and at risk (victim) narrative; this limits the portrayal of actors 
of the sex industry.  
  The discursive practices surrounding sex workers were also limited to scripts 
imposed by judges on sex workers. Upon further analysis, I comprehended that the 
‘script’ that enabled judges to discern between victims and non-victims formed part of 
the politics of victimhood. Victim discourses have important components as well as 
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diverse uses. It is essential “to clarify how we are to think about victims, how we even 
determine who they are, what it means to take their view, and what is involved in giving 
victims their due (Lu 2017, 66)” (Gordon, 2018, p.16). Judges and law enforcement as 
noted earlier have the discursive power to establish the status of victimhood upon sex 
workers. An important component of victim discourses is that “victim claims are not 
neutral discursive appeals, but rather are deeply intertwined with relations of power” 
(Gordon, 2018, p.17). The victim discourse is produced by stakeholders of the criminal 
justice system, which entails that the producers hold positions of power. Furthermore, 
discourses of victimization are used in affective contexts, which facilitates the 
manipulation of the topic. In this study, the sex trafficking discourse was used to mobilize 
the victim discourse onto sex workers (Gordon, 2018). Victim and victim blaming 
language in the findings were used as tools of power, meaning that such language 
perpetuates derogatory ideologies regarding sex work.  
The data also reported on instances when sex workers were victimized. While 
discussing condom use in Chapter VII, the sex worker from R. v. Lopez ([2018] O.J. No. 
4145) was forced to provide unprotected sexual services. This served as reminder that sex 
workers can be the recipients of abuse, or maltreatment. It is important to differ between 
victimization of sex workers with the goal of depicting sex work as inherently 
exploitative from victimization of sex workers due harmful legislation, that do not protect 
their safety. Sex workers undergo abuse and assault, those are instances where they are 
victims of the actions done upon them. Yet, the literature tells us that due to apprehension 
of being discriminated against or being stigmatized sex workers do not report incidents to 
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law enforcement, and even avoid seeking medical services (Amnesty International, 2015; 
Anderson et al., 2016; Benoit et al., 2016; Shannon & Csete, 2010).  
There were instances in the data where sex work discourse differed from sex 
trafficking discourse. The opposition to conflating the terms was asserted through labour 
discourse. Both datasets demonstrated the use of business discourse. Additionally, judges 
often emphasized the voluntary engagement of the sex worker in the exchange of sexual 
services and engaging in the administrative aspects of sex work. This demonstrated that 
sex work should be defined within the parameters of entrepreneurship, consumerism of 
sexual services, in other words, discourses pertaining to the economic sector. While sex 
workers were spoken in discourses of business and labour, the sex worker is not viewed 
as a “responsible consumer/entrepreneur” (Marques, 2010, p. 329), thus society “is 
morally indifferent to them” (Marques, 2010, p. 329). Social disregard is analogous to the 
resistance of judges to using labour discourse; this resistance took the form of judges’ 
expectations of exploitation and uncertainty. Court resistance to business discourse 
normalizes unacceptability of sex work as labour, which becomes part of the current 
regulations of sex work discourse.  
Major findings of this study included shifts in discursive practices that contributed 
to the conflation of sex work to sex trafficking. It was noted in Chapter VII that in the 
pre-Bill C-36 dataset the terms were conceptually different, yet both terms referred to 
activities of similar gravity. On the other hand, the implementation of Bill C-36 indicated 
that the terms were used interchangeably, which erroneously conceptualize sex work in 
relation to sex trafficking ideology. Conflating sex work to sex trafficking thrived prior to 
the implementation of Bill C-36 due to similarities in legislation language. As a 
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consequence, the interchangeable use of trafficking and sex work further conflates the 
terms and calls into question the decision to implement Bill C-36, an exploitation 
discourse and victim discourse ridden document. The decision to implement Bill C-36 
served as a strategy to control discourses of exploitation and victimization, which became 
conflated with sex work and sex worker. The ability to further conflate sex trafficking 
discourse with sex work discourse was due to the susceptibility of the latter to 
moralization, and pre-existent barriers to recognize the activity as viable labour. The 
shifts brought through the implementation of Bill C-36 further regulate sex work 
discourse. 
Comprehending Discursive Changes Through Governmentality and Anti-Carceral 
Feminism  
As established earlier, there have been changes in prostitution discourse in 
Canadian common law from 2010 to 2018. The changes in discourses reflect the 
introduction of discourses with similar conceptualizations to previous discourses, 
conflation of conceptually diverse terms, and resistance to discourses that connote 
consensual practices or labour. The theory of anti-carceral feminism in this paper uses the 
Foucauldian concept of governmentality, thus, the discursive constructions and practices 
within it to comprehend the power of legislation and systems of the criminal justice 
system to discipline, and govern the population (Taylor, 2018a). Therefore, legislation 
and institutions of the criminal justice systems do not benefit the sex worker; this is due 
to the construction of such institutions from a hetero-patriarchal perspective (Huxley, 
2002; Taylor, 2018a; Whalley & Hackett, 2017). Morality discourses, which deem sex 
work as an inappropriate activity, carry connotations of paternalism; this disciplines, and 
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thus regulates, the subject from engaging in ‘inappropriate’ activities. Other discourses, 
such as exploitation and coercion, also undergo similar subjectification into disciplining 
the public. Furthermore, the exploitation discourse is used in conjunction to the victim 
discourse; the discursive practices that identifies victims is a legislative tool, which is 
perpetuated by Bill C-36. Yet, the paternalistic undertones of discursive constructions 
and practices have existed before the implementation of Bill C-36.  
The report from the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws foresaw potential issues 
with the Nordic model. The political parties who were against the implementation of the 
Nordic model reasoned it to be paternalistic (House of Commons, 2006). The model 
dismissed the voices of sex workers who exchanged sexual services consensually and 
voluntarily (House of Commons, 2006). Furthermore, the political parties argued that the 
discursive practice of victim on sex workers took away the agency of sex workers, and all 
was an attempt at redirecting the issue of the safety of sex workers towards the 
abolishment of prostitution (House of Commons, 2006). The Nordic model became a tool 
of the penal system in 2014; subsequently, the literature argued for the negative effect of 
the neo-abolitionist approach on sex workers (Benoit et al., 2015; Benoit et al., 2016; 
Benoit et al., 2017; Campbell, 2015; Krüsi et al., 2014). The failure of legislation 
demonstrates the legislative power that ineffectively and negatively affect the individual 
it ‘seeks’ to protect (Michalsen & Williams, 2019).  
The Canadian penal system underwent a major discursive change after the report 
from the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws. In the SSL report, the Conservative 
government proposed to criminalize clients and pimps, and provided exit plans for sex 
workers. The Conservative government used the law to eradicate sex work, because they 
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perceived sex work as a form of violence, not as a source of employment (Marques, 
2006). Furthermore, this caused over-policing in areas of high concentration of sex 
workers; unfortunately, over-policing negatively affected sex workers by displacing them 
towards isolated and unfamiliar locations (Campbell, 2015; Krüsi et al., 2014). This 
example not only serves to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the patriarchal criminal 
justice system, it also demonstrates a shift in victimhood discourse. As previously 
mentioned in the current chapter, the discursive use of victims is closely intertwined to 
institutions of power (Gordon, 2018). The early 1900s Canadian legislative discourse of a 
prostitute constructed their sexuality as deviant, “promiscuous and unmanageable” 
(Marques, 2010, p. 323). Discourses of promiscuous and unmanageable sexuality were 
forced to co-exist with discourses of victim, abused, coerced, and exploited, which were 
brought forward by legislative proposal of the Conservative party (House of Commons, 
2006). The findings of the current research have a vast number of examples of the latter 
discourses.  
There was an overrepresentation of discourse of morality, exploitation, victim and 
sex trafficking in the findings. The shifts were at times almost imperceptible if the 
meaning of the new language used was not taken into consideration. Discourses of 
agency, financial independence, business and labour were present, yet resisted through 
discourses of victim-blaming, expectation of exploitation and incredibility. The 
overrepresentation and resistance occurred due to (a) the Canadian penal system being 
established upon heteropatriarchal white ideologies, (b) sex work legislative reform 
throughout history perpetuating conservative, thus paternalistic, ideologies, and (c) 
previous and current discourses in the criminal justice system that perpetuate the 
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ideologies mentioned earlier. Clearly, conservative, heteropatriarchal, sex trafficking 
ideologies do not align nor represent discourses of agency, empowerment, voluntary and 
consensual engagement, labour nor entrepreneurship. This recycle process of ideologies 
within the Canadian criminal justice system serve as barriers for pro-prostitution sex 
work advocates that seek decriminalization.  
 Anti-carceral feminists recommend mindfulness surrounding legislative reform 
(Whalley & Hackett, 2017); this is due to punitive systems’control over freedom 
(Whalley & Hackett, 2017). As established earlier, legislative reform that uses 
exploitation discourse, and focuses on criminalizing third parties has negative outcomes 
for sex workers (Canadian Alliance for Sex Work Law Reform, 2017); paternalistic 
legislative reform make sex workers vulnerable, and prevents them from reporting any 
abuse or assault in their jobs (Albright & D'Adamo, 2017). Furthermore, sex work 
discourses in legislation represent sex workers through victim discourse, and associate 
the activity of sex work with exploitation and coercive discourses. Excluding the removal 
of s. 210 from the Canadian Criminal Code, prostitution reforms in Canada have only 
served to further discriminate and stigmatize sex workers. Decriminalization of sex work 
proposes a beneficial legal reform for sex workers.  
Decriminalization of sex work, steps away from the repressive and punitive 
legislation to control sex work. Legalizing sex work will ensure safer working conditions 
for sex workers, destigmatization, and overall marginalization of sex workers (Albright & 
D'Adamo, 2017). At the level of discourse, decriminalization opposes the discursive 
assimilation of sex work to sex trafficking (Vanwesenbeeck, 2017). Decriminalization 
shifts the focus to structural issues sex workers undergo, rather than preoccupying itself 
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with the regulation of sexuality (Vanwesenbeeck, 2017). A pro-prostitution legislative 
reform hinges on decriminalization of sex work, and implementing strategies that are 
based on recommendations from sex work advocates and organizations that seek the 
well-being of sex workers (Whalley & Hackett, 2017). Decriminalization fits in the 
framework of anti-carceral feminism given the overlap of the perception of the criminal 
justice system as an inappropriate instrument to tackle the structural issues sex workers 
face (Vanwesenbeeck, 2017). Anti-carceral feminist theory in conjunction with 
governmentality establishes the power of prostitution discourse in Canadian common 
law, prostitution discursive practices as regulatory discourses, and the inefficiency of the 
criminal justice system as a tool to regulate sex work.  
The theory of governmentality complements anti-carceral feminist theory by 
explaining how sex work is regulated. The findings revealed the existence of exploitation, 
prudence and morality discourses. Such discourses are produced by judges and law 
enforcement, thus individuals who hold a position of power. The caselaw uncovers that 
judges were self-disciplined through the normative ideologies derived from legislation. 
Judges also disciplined sex industry stakeholders through the reproduction of stated 
discourse. Law enforcers were disciplined to comply and enforce with existent legislation 
and also subjectified sex workers. This illustrates the processes through which sex 
trafficking language, thus its ideology permeates from legislation to Canadian common 
law. Similarly, previous studies on governmentality of institutions exposed that 
individuals were subjected to responsibilization as a means to establish discipline 
(Siltaoja, Malin, & Pyykkönen, 2015). Moreover, the permanence of exploitation, 
prudence and morality discourses and victim blaming principles throughout time indicate 
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the ingrained regulations of sex work on the Canadian subject. The disciplining through 
sex work discourse is such, that after 150 years since the creation of the Canadian 
criminal justice system there are still discourses that view the commodification of sex as 
deviant, inappropriate, exploitative. 
Progress Through Awareness  
A striking finding was a judge’s awareness of the actual purpose of Bill C-36. 
Judge Bale stated that the purpose of Bill C-36 was to “reduce the demand for 
prostitution with a view to discouraging entry into it, deterring participation in it, and 
ultimately abolishing it to the greatest extent possible” (R. v. Boodhoo, [2018] O.J. No. 
6413 at para.23). The statement of Judge Bale was a reminder to a sex worker in the court 
that the Bill did not aim to protect sex workers’ safety. The necessity of Judge Bale to 
separate safety or protection discourses from discourses established by Bill C-36 brings 
awareness of the issues with the legislative reforms. The contribution of Judge Bale 
serves to establish discursive practices that problematized Bill C-36 in common law. This 
highlights the issues previously discussed regarding paternalistic penal systems. The 
finding of the use of labour discourse was also considered progressive. 
The use of labour and business discourse in common law was not an unexpected 
finding. That is, when considering the presence of pro-prostitution discourses in the 
Bedford decision, which provided a vast collection of scholarship framed from a pro-
prostitution stance. Furthermore, other circumstances that has exposed the criminal 
justice system to pro-prostitution discourses include committees that have analyzed sex 
work legislation from multiple angles; this includes the Fraser committee, the Badgley 
Committee and the Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws. The presence of discourses of 
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sex work, sex worker, and business language emphasized the influence of pro-
prostitution discourses and labour discourses in Canadian common law. The resistance of 
judges to such discourses through victim-blaming, expected exploitation and incredibility 
demonstrates the work ahead for pro-sex work advocates towards complete acceptance.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
While this study uncovered discursive constructions and practices in Canadian 
common law, the caselaw was from Ontario. Future studies could expand on the findings 
by including caselaw from other provinces. This could allow for a provincial comparison 
of discourses prior and after the implementation of Bill C-36. Furthermore, the inclusion 
of British Columbia caselaw could be particularly insightful, given that prior to the 
Bedford decision, there were tensions in between law enforcement and sex workers. The 
area of the Vancouver downtown eastside was an overpoliced location after the arrest of 
Robert Pickton, which directly impacted sex workers in the area (Campbell, 2015; Krüsi 
et al., 2014; Pablo, 2008). Future studies could also expand the time range of the pre and 
post-Bill C-36 time-frame.  
Adjusting the range of the pre and post datasets to have them include more years 
would create more data. The change in data can bring others discourses or emphasize the 
existence of discourses already found. This study allowed for a four-year window for 
each pre and post-Bill C-36 dataset. The range of each dataset was adjusted to be equal to 
provide natural changes occurring from 2010 to 2018. Furthermore, the removal of s. 210 
from the Canadian Criminal Code in the summer of 2019 could uncover the effect of the 
decriminalization of keeping a bawdy house on sex work discourses in Canadian 
common law.  
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Contribution to Scholarship  
This study contributes to the Canadian literature on the intersection of sex work 
discourse, and the criminal justice system. The study provides the socio-political setting 
prior to the implementation of Bill C-36, which included a summary of events that 
catapulted the application and appeal of the Bedford decision, the legislative history of 
provisions s. 210, s. 212(1)(j) and s. 213, and the aftermath of Bill C-36. The data of the 
study provides an insight on the discursive constructions of prostitution discourses, as 
well as discursive practices of judges in Canadian common law. The study also uncovers 
the major changes of sex work discourse hinged on the exploitation discourse brought by 
Bill C-36. More specifically, it uncovers changes on prostitution discourse in Canadian 
common law from a pro-sex work and anti-carceral feminist perspective. This advances 
the knowledge on tools the paternalistic punitive system ineffectively implements. Such 
tools are detrimental to sex workers and sex work discourse, not only in Canadian 
common law, but the Canadian criminal justice system. Furthermore, the study 
emphasizes the permanence of discourses rooted in sex trafficking ideology in the 
criminal justice system.  
Even though there are studies that address the intersectionality between anti-
carceral feminism and sex work (Musto, 2019; Taylor, 2018a; Taylor, 2018b), at times it 
is conveyed that an unstable economy, thus lack of alternate jobs are causes for 
individuals to engage in sex work (Taylor, 2018a). Such discourse compromises the 
meaning of voluntary engagement in the sex industry, since it implies that the individual 
is coerced by the economic system. The current study approaches the engagement in the 
sex industry as voluntary, and not coercive. The study uses both governmentality as well 
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as anti-carceral feminism to comprehend the sex work discourses in Canadian common 
law. The study aims to contribute to the pro-sex work literature with the hopes of 
uncovering changes in prostitution discourse in Canadian common law from 2010 to 




This study sought to uncover the manner in which prostitution discourse changed 
in Canadian common law from 2010 to 2018. Researching changes in prostitution 
discourse in common law provides an insight to the effect of Bill C-36 on prostitution 
discourse. Furthermore, the research uncovers the positionality of stakeholders in 
common law on the topic of sexuality. After the implementation of Bill C-36 the 
prostitution discourse consisted of discourses of exploitation, victimization, victim-
blaming, expected exploitation, amongst the most common findings. Regardless, 
discourses of inappropriateness and exploitation to regard prostitution were present prior 
to the implementation of the Bill C-36; yet, exploitation and victimization discourses 
were more prominent in the post-Bill C-36 data. Governmentality explains that such 
discourses are disciplining tools, laden with power, which enable the criminal justice 
system to govern individuals. Anti-carceral feminist theory uncovers that institutions of 
the criminal justice system do not advocate for sex workers. The institutions serve as 
tools of power that are constructed from hetero-patriarchal white ideology, thus, sex 
workers’ work environments become further compromised when the punitive system 
implements a restrictive legislative reform, surveillance or over policing. As indicated 
earlier in the current chapter, there were some findings that indicated the existence of 
voluntary engagement, labour and business discourse in common law, even though such 
discourses were resisted by judges. This finding demonstrates the progress towards 
detangling the erroneous conflation of sex work to sex trafficking ideology. A legislation 
reform can also bring about discursive change in common law.  
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The results of the current research provide an insight for policy makers of the 
predominant discourses in common law prior and after the implementation of Bill C-36. 
Östergren (2017) created a policy classification system that categorizes sex work policies 
as either repressive, restrictive and integrative. Repressive policies represent 
prohibitionist legal approaches (Östergren, 2017). Restrictive policies use neo-abolitionist 
legal models and integrative policies use a combination of social restructuring, 
legalization and decriminalization (Östergren, 2017). In Canada, as well as other 
countries policy makers have opted for the use of restrictive policies; this fuels the 
conflation of sex work to sex trafficking through moral panic and reinforcement imagery 
of hopeless victims (Abel, 2019).  
Benoit et al.’ (2019) study argues that integrative approaches to sex work policy 
has the strongest empirical evidence to reduce intersecting social inequalities for sex 
workers. Therefore, Canadian policy makers can consider integrative policies as well as 
influence of dominant discourses. Abel (2019) reported the difficulty of policy makers to 
“separate values from evidence” (p. 1926) since their “response is much less likely to be 
evidence-based when an issue is publicly sensitive and highly charged” (p.1926).  
Adopting an integrative policy can include the labour rights the Bedford applicants 
demanded for sex workers and correct the negative effects of neo-abolitionist legislation 
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Statistics of Court Decisions 
 
 Number of Cases  
Pre-Bill C-36 dataset 13 
Post-Bill C-36 dataset 45 
Total  58 
 
 Number of Cases 
 
Pre-Bill C-36 cases involving underage 
sex workers 
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Code Book and Definitions of Codes 
Sex worker: person engaging in the exchange of sexual acts for profit 
● Age:  
➢ Minor: person under the age of 18 years  
➢ Adult: person of and above the age of 18 years  
● Charges: charges of which the sex worker was charged in the trial.  
● Breach of rights: instances where rights of the sex worker has been violated, not 
limited to instances where the sex worker views/feels their Charter of rights and 
freedoms are not being exercised completely. 
● Lack of information: instances where the sex worker was not aware or had 
knowledge regarding the premises of the work they were/will be involved in. This 
code also applies to lack of knowledge regarding the legitimacy of sex worker’s 
employment or knowledge about the criminal justice system. 
●  Use of protection: instances where sex worker had or lacked protection. Certain 
data covers best practices to ensure the protection of the sex worker. 
➢  Lack of Protection: instances where sex worker did not have or was not 
provided protection, whether it was for their health (condoms/ STD 
checks) or physical to prevent violence and abuse. This label also covers 
practices that are detrimental to the sex worker’s well-being, meaning 
“worst practices” 
➢  Health: sex worker informs about the protection of their health via the use 
of condoms, STD checks, assessment of client’s health and hygiene, etc. It 
also covers steps to best practices to ensure health protection of the sex 
worker 
➢  Physical: instances where sex worker was provided protection of their 
body to prevent violence and abuse towards them. This would mean use of 
the buddy system, bodyguards, etc. This label also includes best practices 
or any protective strategies that promote the overall protection of the sex 
worker.  
● Practice: pertaining to the act of exchanging sexual services for profit, the code 
also refers to individuals who dance and strip for money.  
➢  Willing: the sex worker voluntarily engaged in the practice of exchanging 
sexual services, dancing and/or stripping for a financial gain. It also 
includes instances where the individual expressed interest in participating 
in such activities  
➢ Unwilling: the individual is pressured or forced by another individual to 
engage in the practice of exchanging sexual services, dancing and/or 
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stripping for a financial gain. It also includes instances where the 
individual expressed thoughts of not wanting to continue to participate in 
such activities 
➢ Thoughts/ Feelings: the sex worker expresses their thoughts and/or 
feelings on the participation of the sex industry. This includes moments 
where the sex worker also expresses thoughts/ feelings of the people 
involved in the sex industry about their surroundings. It also includes 
comments on the overall experience of the individual/sex worker 
● Relationship with pimp: referring to the relationship between the sex 
worker/individual with the pimp prior and during the practice of the sex worker’s 
exchange of sexual services, dancing and/or stripping for a financial gain. 
➢ Negative: interactions between the pimp and sex worker where the pimp 
attempts or carries out acts that were physically, emotionally or mentally 
violent towards the sex worker. For example, shoving, pushing, hitting, 
yelling, verbal threats, use of weapons/ objects to perform assaults, sexual 
assault, rape. This also entails the pimp destroying or throwing objects of 
the sex worker. 
➢ Positive: interactions between the pimp and the sex worker where the 
pimp provided for the sex worker. In this case to “provide” entails 
providing financially, emotionally, provision of shelter, food, material 
goods. It also includes moments where the sex worker perceives the pimp 
as a caring person, views that their relationship has a romantic component, 
that makes them feel reassured and cared for.  
➢ Power dynamic: interactions between the pimp and sex worker where the 
pimp holds a certain level of control, power and direction over the sex 
worker’s body and the sex worker’s work. This includes moments where 
the pimp expresses their expectations of the sex worker, gives sex worker 
instructions or withholds financial gains. The code tries to define instances 
where the dynamic between the sex- worker and pimp is not in 
equilibrium due to authority the pimp has over the sex worker. 
● Relationship with client  
➢ Positive: interactions with clients who respect the sex worker, meaning, 
complying with the rules the sex worker sets in terms condom use and 
hygiene and services to be provided. In cases where the individual 
performing the sexual acts was coerced into such activities, the codes 
serves to identify clients who protect the coerced individual by “covering” 
for them or providing resources to escape the coercion.  
➢ Negative: interactions with clients who do not respect the sex worker, 
meaning, they do not comply with the rules the sex worker sets in terms 
condom use and hygiene and services to be provided and use violence 
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against the sex worker. Violence represents: verbal, physical or 
emotional/mental, sexual violence against the sex worker.  
● Case: brief summary of what led to the charges of the trial. It includes important 
details about the trial  
● Labour: moments where the language used (use of language regarding sex work 
as as business)  
Client: buyer of sexual services 
●  Charges  
Pimp: third parties  
● Charges 
Judge: trial judge or sentencing judge  
●  Performance: allows to take a look into the process of analysis for trials in terms 
of credibility and reliability of evidence for the defendant and complainant  
➢  Lack of thoroughness: dismissing further analysis of evidence  
● Perception of sex worker: comments from the Judge obtained from the analysis 
section, where he/she explores the evidence and legal framework to come to a 
verdict 
➢ Threat: perception of the sex worker as an individual who 
engages in risky behavior. Risky entails unacceptable 
behavior deemed by the Judge’s perception of society 
normalcy  
➢ Person at risk: comments on the sex worker that depicts 
them as a victim of the ordeal. It can entail blatantly stating 
“ the victim” 
➢ Court behavior: comments on the demeanor and/ or 
behavior of the sex worker. Usually pertains to statements 
about their reactions, mannerisms, attitudes when giving 
testimonies and when being cross-examined. At times 
interpretations of the sex worker’s emotions/feelings  
➢ Labor: comments on transaction of sexual services for 
money view as a line of work. Thus, referring to it as a 
business transaction.  
➢ Exercising free will: comments on the ability of the sex 
worker to make their own decisions, their level of 
independency. At times this entails recognizing the sex 
worker was in the sex industry due to their own volition. 
● Perception of Crown: comments on the performance of the crown to prove 
through evidence the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt  
➢ Lack of thoroughness: inability of the crown to prove charges against 
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt  
231 
 
● Perception of detectives/ officers: comments on the performance and 
involvement of the detectives/ officers during the process of the charges being 
laid, comments on their trial testimonies.  
➢ Lack of thoroughness: comments that negatively depict the ability to carry 
out the job of the detective/ police officer. This also includes comments on 
their in-court testimonies  
● Perception of pimp: comments on the charges, court behavior and overall 
demeanor while in court of the pimp. 
➢  Negative: comments that imply an exploitative and coercive demeanor 
towards sex worker. At times personal opinions of the “disgust” of the 
charges and their involvement in such acts are stated.  
● Verdict: aftermath of the trial or sentence  
Transaction: transactions of sexual services or ability to work for non-financial benefits, 
including shelter, food, transportation, groceries.  
● Money for Sexual services: comments of the sex worker or characters involved 
in the transaction of sexual services for money on such act. Sometimes it includes 
the types of services provided by the sex worker, sometimes rates are included.  
● Non-specified transaction: transactions that do not explicitly state the exchange 
of money for sexual services. For example, the comment may include the 
existence of the sexual service, without expressing receiving money.  
 Attorney/Crown 
● Perception of sex worker- pimp relationship: comments on the relationship 
between the sex worker and the pimp. At times it entails descriptions of the 
Attorney/Crown on the role of the sex worker in the dynamic of the pimp- sex 
worker.  
➢ Coercive: comments on the coercion the pimp exerted unto the sex 
worker.  
● Perception of sex worker- client relationship: comments on the relationship 
between the sex worker and the pimp. At times it entails descriptions of the 
Attorney/Crown on the demeanor and role of the sex worker or the client. 
➢ Coercive: comments on the coercion the client exerted unto the sex 
worker. 
Language  
● Labor: comments where the transaction of sexual services for money is referred 
to as a business or described as work. To a certain extent is the commodification 
of sexual services.  
● Definitions: comments that address definitions from the trials and sentences. 
Definitions of prostitution, services, etc. Under this category are also coded the 
many labels of “sex work/ sex worker”. Realities from the realm of the sex 
industry are also coded (issues in legislation) 
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➢ Construction of characters subtle comments that shape (or construct) the 
many characters involved in the transaction of sexual services for financial 
gain, this includes: workers, consumers, etc. This category establishes how 
members of common law refer to people involved of the sex industry  
● Interchangeability: comments from trials where the language of human 
trafficking and prostitution are either used interchangeably and also exemplifying 
how through this specific process Judges recycle the ideas and maintain certain 
notions in use.  
● Consent: comments from trials addressing the notion of consent within the 
practice of the transactional relationship of sexual services for financial gain  
● Negative: comments that depict the context from which the terminology of the 
sex industry is spoken in. In this instance terminology refers to the many labels 
used in trials, which are “prostitute, prostitution, sex trade, sex trade worker”.  
➢ Coercive: comments from trials that refer to the act of the exchange of 
sexual services for money as exploitative and coercive  
➢ Threat to society comments from trials that refer to the act of the exchange 
of sexual services for money as a threat to society. This also includes 
instances where characters in the trial refer to society and the effect of the 
topic at hand on it 
➢ Responsibilizing sex worker: comments made on behalf of court characters 
that emphasize that the sex worker that imply they could have done 
something to avoid the predicament of the matter 
References to Bedford: instances where the Bedford decision or the issue addressed by 
the trial of Bedford is mentioned or discussed 
Policy: comments on legislation 
● Failure: comments made on the legislation that has failed to achieve its purpose  
In court  
● Testimonies  
➢ Detectives: testimonies of detectives and or police officers regarding their 
involvement in the case of the defendant and complainant. Testimonies are 
used primarily as evidence 
➔ Changing: instances where the original testimonies changes, 
mostly after undergoing cross examination  
➢  Sex worker: testimonies of sex workers, consisting primarily of evidence.  
➔ Changing: instances where the original testimonies change, mostly 
after undergoing cross examination. Usually Judges make 
comments on the reliability and credibility of the sex worker due to 
their “inconsistent” nature.  
 
